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SUMMARY 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the implications of different government financial 
policies on the real sector of the economy. For this purpose we develop two overlapping- 
generations models. The first one allows us to evaluate the performance of the economy 
when debt is managed with different types of financial assets. A general result of the analysis 
is shown to be that an increase in the burden of debt leads to crowding out of the capital 
stock. A criterion for deriving endogenously the maximum sustainable level of debt within 
the model is also identified. The model turns out to be useful to provide an explanation of the 
poverty trap which is a very common phenomenon in some developing countries. 
The second model is developed to discuss the effects on the real economic variables of two 
different government deficit financing policies. The framework is an overlapping-generations 
monetary economy with population growth. Firstly, we analyse the effects of public deficit 
financing policy by injection of money into the economy at an exogenous constant rate and 
we emphasise the Mundell-Tobin effect (or non-superneutrality of money). Secondly, we 
extend the previous financing policy to include an endogenised money growth rate and we 
succeed in providing a powerful framework to explain the conditions under which dynamics 
of hyperinflation may arise. The novelty and importance of the findings are highlighted 
throughout the thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, government debt and its effects have received much attention from 
economists for several reasons. First of all, in many industrial countries there is an increasing 
concern about the possible unfavourable effects of a persistent large debt on the level of the 
capital stock. Secondly, the general increase in the real interest rates, due to the expansionist 
fiscal policy adopted in several countries, and the resulting increase in the burden of debt 
servicing may require a contractionary fiscal policy in the future in order to prevent debt 
from becoming excessively large relative to other macroeconomic variables. The aim of the 
present thesis is to investigate the effects of some government policies which can be used to 
finance both a certain level of debt, by using taxation, and a certain amount of public deficit 
(under the form of subsidies) by money printing. The study is carried out by using two 
overlapping-generations (OLG hereafter) models with perfect foresight, a framework 
conceived in the seminal articles of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). The two models 
we will develop differ both in some characteristics of the economy under investigation and in 
the kind of financial policy rule pursued by the government and are an extension of two 
models presented for the first time by Diamond (1965) and Stein (1971). The results which 
are highlighted in the thesis stand out as a proof of the potential of such a framework for 
analysing macroeconomic issues and for providing more relevant answers to questions which 
have already been dealt with in the literature adopting IS-LM models'. 
The first government policy discussed in the thesis is concerned with debt management 
under the form of different (non-money) financial assets issued by the government. Although 
there is no government spending inside the model, nevertheless we assume that the 
government has inherited a certain level of debt which is being financed by using taxation. 
Each type of asset implicitly generates a different government budget constraint. The 
I For example, see Blinder and Solow (1973), Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Currie and Gazioglou (1983). A 
complete survey of this literature is contained in Currie (1978). 
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viability of each policy depends on whether it is sustainable and we derive the criterion for 
the maximum sustainable level of debt the government can issue. 
The investigation of the second government deficit financing policy, through issue of 
money, is initially related to the issue of money non-superneutrality, i. e. to the effects of a 
change in the exogenous rate of money growth upon capital intensity. Subsequently, we 
endogenise the money growth rate by fixing the real government deficit exogenously. This 
allows us to generate hyperinflation dynamics in a context of endogenous real interest rates. 
The models we will develop are similar in so far as they are both production OLG 
economies where individuals live for two periods. A government exists which is pursuing a 
programme of debt management or deficit financing. However, the related issues and the 
results obtained are different and, therefore, a separate analysis is required. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 contains a brief overview of the literature 
on the issue of debt sustainability which has been developed over the years, and a discussion 
of the implications of unsustainable fiscal policies for the real economy. Our attention will be 
focused on some key papers which tackle in different ways the issue of debt sustainability; 
this will enable us to provide a general overview of the different approaches applied to 
investigate and to shed light on this topic. We also summarise the conclusions of some 
empirical studies which have been carried out for individual countries (especially Italy). The 
survey ends with a brief discussion about the Maastricht Treaty and the restrictions implicitly 
set on debt management policies for the European Community (EC) countries. 
In chapter 2 we present the general model of debt management policy. The originality of 
this model consists in considering the existence of three types of bonds which are at disposal 
of a government and the different dynamic behaviour which is related to the instrument the 
government relies on. The main aim is to provide a criterion, which will be also tested by 
using real data, to determine whether a government debt management policy can be defined 
as sustainable. The model assumes an intertemporal optimising framework in which the 
capital stock is driven by utility and profit-maximising behaviour of private agents and a tax 
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policy of the government. The presence of debt also provides an explanation why a poverty 
trap, which has been a topic of interest in the recent endogenous growth theory, may occur. 
Chapter 3 illustrates further applications of the criterion of the maximum sustainable level 
of debt to other frameworks, to show under what conditions that criterion is applicable. 
These alternative frameworks are represented by a social security model with a pay-as-you-go 
system where contributions can be well compared to interest payments on debt and by a 
continuous time model with lifetime uncertainty as proposed by Blanchard (1984)-(1985). 
Some interesting findings related to a simple pure-exchange OLG economy are also put 
forward. 
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with a re-formulation of Stein's (1971) model of a monetary OLG 
economy with government deficit financed through money printing. More precisely, in 
chapter 4 we illustrate the Mundell-Tobin effect of money non-superneutrality and consider 
the evolution of the system following an exogenous change in the rate of monetary growth. 
The recent incompletely successful efforts by economists to model hyperinflation in a perfect 
foresight context with certainty make more striking the results we obtain with our model in 
chapter 5 where money growth rate is made endogenous. In fact, in our new framework we 
find that there are some conditions which guarantee that hyperinflation may arise. The 
relaxation of some restrictive assumptions applied in the standard analysis is crucial for 
having an ever-increasing inflation rate rather than an ever-decreasing one, as more 
commonly found. 
Appendices to chapters 2,4 and 5 contain details on some theoretical specifications, 
mathematical analyses, studies of dynamics and simulations of the models. 
A summary of the main findings is provided in the final conclusions, where we also 
highlight their contribution in explaining the real economic world. 
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Table 1.1 
Year Canada France Italy United Kingdom 
b b 
k 
b b 
k 
b b 
k 
b b 
k 
1986 348101 0.4685 1220.82 0.1894 736025.78 0.3680 249617.81 0.2887 
1987 366577.84 0.4695 1292.58 0.1958 796624.67 0.3890 248750.62 0.2817 
1988 382785.94 0.4630 1347.87 0.1987 849722.72 0.4037 226541.19 0.2497 
1989 395177.37 0.4514 1405.56 0.2010 902557.74 0.4168 201292.95 0.2156 
1990 410268.49 0.4462 1425.02 0.1973 946152.08 0.4247 187864.88 0.1967 
1991 444635 0.4629 1473.69 0.1982 992811.23 0.4343 187813.20 0.1941 
1992 490256.20 0.4934 1647.76 0.2162 1069268.23 0.4574 213891.72 0.2189 
1993 529507.36 0.5170 1868.42 0.2410 1148238.75 0.4851 248016.72 0.2510 
1994 573383.85 0.5400 2044.11 0.2585 1211114.17 0.5058 272164.60 0.2718 
b= gross (including interest payments) debt-to-index price ratio of each country. 
k= indexed debt-to-capital stock ratio. 
As it is clear from table 1.1, there has been a steady increase in debt in all the countries 
considered while some of them, like Canada and Italy, display also a high debt-to-capital 
stock ratio. An immediate question is whether there is an upper limit to the level of debt 
beyond which an economy would collapse. In our thesis we, then, try to derive a working tool 
by which it is possible to define whether a debt-to capital stock ratio is too high and, 
therefore, unsustainable for the economy under consideration. 
This chapter briefly introduces the main theoretical and empirical findings of the literature 
which concern debt management policies whereas a further overview of the literature of 
money financing policies is presented at the beginning of chapter 5 where we focus on 
seigniorage policy rules. 
More specifically, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first one illustrates the 
concept of debt sustainability, gives a brief outlook on some models and their results and 
tries to underline the shortcomings of these studies. The second section deals with the 
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empirical evidence about debt behaviour whereas the third one underlines the importance of 
the constraints of a maximum sustainable level of debt in the light of the Maastricht Treaty 
requirements. 
1.2 The Concept of Debt Sustainability and 
Some Theoretical Explanations 
In order to develop the debt sustainability issue, we start by resorting to, the seminal model 
of debt management policy in an OLG economy proposed by Diamond (1965). In an 
economy with two production factors, capital and labour, the government is running a deficit 
and, in order to finance it, issues debt and levies lump sum taxes on the young generation. In 
a competitive solution the saving function is determined as a residual from the utility 
maximisation process and is a function of the rate of interest which, in equilibrium, is equal 
to the marginal product of capital. Population is assumed to grow at a constant exogenous 
rate n. The government issues a constant amount of one-period maturity debt; which can be 
held either domestically or externally and affects the consumer's income because it represents 
an asset to be held in the portfolio of the investors. The conclusions are different depending 
on the type of debt considered. If debt is held domestically, individuals' savings can be 
diversified between accumulating capital and purchase of debt4. A rise in taxes and 
investment in bonds affects negatively output, whereas the equilibrium rate of interest rises. 
Debt can reduce over-accumulation of capital and increases the steady state utility whenever 
the economy is dynamically inefficient. 
Conversely, when debt is held externally, the interest payments on government debt would 
flow abroad. Increased taxes would alter the equilibrium on the capital market and factor 
prices, thus affecting directly utility. Increases in the stock of the per capita public debt 
become a burden, reducing both aggregate consumption and the supply of capital. 
3 In this thesis we intend to consider only the issue of a constant amount of domestic debt because, as far as we 
know, it is the case less studied in the literature. 
4 This is what Diamond calls the government's entering on the demand side of the capital market. 
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Diamond's analysis is concerned only with the comparative statics of the steady states of 
the model and with a welfare analysis of the effects on the individual consumer's utility 
following an exogenous increase in debt. However, it is intuitive that debt cannot reach a too 
high level because, if this happened, the burden of taxes would have to increase 
disproportionally in order to offset the widening of interest payments. This highlights the 
importance of analysing the issue of debt sustainability and of deriving a criterion to 
determine whether a certain level of debt is sustainable. 
The term "unsustainability of a fiscal policy" has been frequently used in the literature and 
in recent multilateral political discussions with different connotations and in different 
circumstances. Generally speaking, it can be defined as a situation where a government is 
heading towards excessive accumulation of debt by following a particular fiscal policy, 
which must be reversed before the economy collapses. The term can refer equivalently to the 
level of debt, of public spending or to the tax rate. Other definitions have been suggested 
which can be summarised as follows. 
1) Assuming that the intertemporal budget constraint for the public sector (see in the 
following pages for an accurate and mathematical description of this concept) must be 
satisfied, a fiscal policy is said to be sustainable when it is expected to generate sufficient net 
revenues in the future to finance the accumulated debt and interest payments (see over 
eq. (1.3)); conversely, it is unsustainable when the government pursues a policy of financing 
interest payments by issuing further debt and is unable to offset them by curbing other outlays 
or by raising other revenues (including seigniorage). 
This assessment involves a projection of future taxes and spending and a forecast of some 
economic variables, such as the rate of growth of potential output and the interest rates. 
Moreover, it is related to the issue of solvency of government which can, ex post, be satisfied 
through either debt repudiation or monetization or revision of tax rates and spending plans5. 
2) Public debt sustainability implies that debt-to-GNP ratio does not exceed an upper limit 
beyond which the system would end onto an explosive path. This definition may pose some 
3 Obviously, fiscal sustainability does not necessarily implies optimality of public debt. 
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problems for an empirical evaluation, especially if this limit is to be set exogenously. In this 
respect, our attempt is to find a limit which can be derived endogenously within the model. 
3) Sometimes debt sustainability is a synonymous for debt stability. A level of debt is 
sustainable if in the absence of unanticipated exogenous shocks the system converges to a 
stable steady state. 
A simple but very enlightening theoretical work dealing with the analysis of the upper limit 
of debt sustainability (point 1) is by Blanchard et al. (1990), in which the authors define some 
indicators for an overall assessment of debt sustainability6. The model assumes that the 
primary deficit7, transfers and interest payments are financed with the issue of new debt 
which is time-varying. The ratio debt-to-GNP, b, at time n is equal to its initial value at time 
t=0, bo, accumulated at a rate equal to the difference between the interest rate and the growth 
rate, plus the accumulated value, at the same rate, of the primary deficit from time 0 to time 
n: 
H 
(1.1) b= boe("- 5" +jd e('-O'("-)ds ns 
0 
where 0 represents the real rate of growth of GNP, d the primary deficit-to-GNP ratio and r 
the real interest rate. It is usually assumed that the no-Ponzi-game condition holds, i. e.: 
(1.2) limb"eß'-6" = 0. 
This condition, which will be referred to throughout this thesis, says that the discounted value 
of debt goes to zero and it will hold either if the ratio of debt-to-GNP, b, converges to zero 
or to a positive constant value (let us also, say, back to b0) as n tends to infinity or if public 
debt grows but asymptotically at a rate smaller than the "growth-adjusted" interest rate. 
Therefore, the level of debt in the far future does not matter in the present time so long as it 
does not grow at a rate more than (r - 6). If condition (1.2) holds, eq. (1.1) can be 
transformed into the following: 
6 We choose to start off by illustrating Blanchard's paper disregarding the chronological order because it includes 
an important and complete analysis of the first interpretation of the term "debt sustainability". 
7 Deficits equal government spending net of tax and seigniorage revenues. 
S 
00 
(1.3) -bo =fd., e-c. -O)sds, 
0 
which implies that the existing debt must be financed in the future by either increased 
taxation or money printing in excess of public spending net of interest payments if debt is not 
to grow uncontrolled. A budget policy is sustainable if the present discounted value of the 
ratio of primary deficits-to-GNP is perfectly offset by a negative debt-to-GNP ratio. 
Therefore, two scenarios are possible: if the real rate of interest is above the real growth 
rate of the economy (r > 0), then an expansionary policy at present must imply a 
contractionary one in the future or the use of money creation for the fiscal policy to be 
sustainable. In the opposite case, when (r < 0)8, the government can continue to run 
indefinitely a constant primary deficit and service its debt by further borrowing9. 
The authors construct a generic indicator of sustainability which makes use of the 
"sustainable" tax rate defined as the tax rate which guarantees that eq. (1.3) is satisfied. The 
indicator is computed by subtracting from the sustainable rate, t*, the current one, and is 
indicated as (t*-t). When the indicator (t*-t) is positive, taxes will have eventually to be 
increased'0 or spending (transfers) decreased by the size represented by the indicator itself. In 
other words, it is called for a fiscal retrenchment or a rise in the tax ratio to meet solvency. 
The indicator (t *-t) represents how much current policy should change if it is to become 
immediately sustainable' 1. 
8 This corresponds to the case of a dynamically inefficient economy, where the issue of debt can correct the initial 
inefficiency represented by over-accumulation of capital: crowding out of private capital is a Pareto improvement 
and allows the present and future generations to increase their lifetime consumption. 
9 Home (1991) states that the condition of the sign of (r - imposes weak restrictions on fiscal policies for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, if output growth exceeds the real interest rate, no constraint needs to be imposed on 
government borrowing and on the ultimate size of debt because the debt ratio would ultimately reach a steady 
state level. Secondly, it does not take into account the possibility of shocks to the demand for bonds and, 
therefore, to the interest rates which could make an initially sustainable fiscal policy to become unsustainable. If 
interdependencies between interest rates, economic growth, public debt and risk premia are ignored, the solvency 
constraint fails in providing a warning signal about the size of debt. Finally, it does not include private sector's 
perception of government's commitment to meet the constraint and the lack of credibility following a 
postponement in the action of increasing the primary surplus to satisfy the budget constraint as time goes by. 
10 Of course, the possibility of increasing the tax rate is constrained by the rate already existing in the country. 
II Namely, it measures the size of the necessary transfer of resources that would be needed to ensure that a given 
public sector expenditure meets the solvency constraint at the point in time when it is measured. 
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In case of delay in pursuing a tight policy, the size of t* to be imposed would be influenced 
as well. The sustainable tax rate postponed to the far future, say period n, t;,, should be 
sufficient to offset the amount needed to keep the ratio of debt-to-GNP constant given a 
certain level of primary deficit and discounted value of spending and transfers between time 
0 and n. 
The shortcomings of this approach arise when we have to calculate the indicators (t;, - t) 
for the medium and long run because it is necessary to use forecasts of the main economic 
variables on which the indicators depend. A lot of difficulties may arise: for instance, often 
those forecasts are hardly available12 and there is a problem of how to estimate the net real 
interest rate for the medium and long term. However, there are also advantages connected to 
the long-run indicator, like the fact that it takes into account the ageing of the population, 
which influences government spending through public pensions and health expenditure 
programmes. Using the forecasts of non-interest spending, population growth rate, pension 
spending and public health care spending, a long-run analysis suggests that the gap (r - 6) 
has two contrasting implications for the sustainability of the policy itself. The first effect is 
that the higher (r - 9), the more likely the policy to be unsustainable because a primary 
surplus to be run, in order to keep the debt-to-GNP constant, should increase. The second 
effect is that it reduces the weights given to public spending in the distant future, so that the 
problem of ageing becomes less important. The higher the discount rate, the less valuable the 
present government spending. 
Most of the simulations carried out by the authors with data referring to some OECD 
countries rely on projections of future spending and on the assumption that the real interest 
rate exceeds permanently the rate of economic growth. Generally speaking, evidence from 
the early 1990s suggests that the interest rates exceed the economy's growth rate, thus 
justifying the choice of dynamic efficiency within the model simulations. 
12 However, also the one-period indicator presents some drawbacks. Firstly, it assumes that present fiscal policy 
will remain unchanged in the future. Secondly, by ignoring budgetary projections and future government plans, it 
may give misleading signals about the underlining fiscal situation. Nevertheless, it requires minimal information, 
i. e. only about the present primary balance, the base year public debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio 
and the trends for the real interest rates and output growth. 
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It is worth noting that, given the relationship between the variables within the government 
budget constraint, an indicator of sustainability of government spending or transfers could be 
derived, without altering the general interpretation of the concept and its implications. 
Some criticisms of these indicators, which are used to judge solvency and sustainability of 
government debt, can be put forward: for instance, they seem to lack the properties of 
behavioural content, normative criteria and global perspective. Firstly, they do not take into 
account the possibility that some variables, like the real interest rates, may be affected by 
other factors within the economy and that any "adjustment policy" undertaken to achieve a 
partial sustainability may increase the gap in future periods. Secondly, it must be 
remembered that the target value of sustainable debt set by the government could 
significantly affect the speed and nature of the process to achieve debt stabilisation. Thirdly, 
they lack economic perspective since they do not take into consideration a shared macro 
policy adjustment arising from political interdependence. It is also important to note that, 
while public debt-to-GNP ratio is an ex post measure, indicators of sustainability are an ex 
ante measure of the magnitude of the necessary stabilisation to be carried out. 
The paper just illustrated is an example of the stream of literature which deals with the 
issue of debt sustainability and focuses on a framework where debt is growing over time but 
interest rates remain constant. In contrast, Diamond's analysis considered a constant level of 
debt and endogenous interest rates, which is a framework not so frequently used to study the 
influence of debt on the economy, but which turns out to be interesting to detect dynamics of 
interest payments. However, the conclusions of both papers could be easily criticised on the 
basis that the first one does not take into account that the real interest rate cannot be 
considered constant over a period of time whereas the second one assumes a government 
policy which is sometimes hard to sustain. 
On the other side, Masson (1985) developed an OLG model based on a time-varying 
interest rate and implying uncertainty about the sustainability of the fiscal policy in the 
future. The objective of his analysis is to study how this kind of uncertainty can affect the 
behaviour of the private sector. People assign probabilities to different government actions 
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which are determined by the amount of government debt at any point in time (and, of course, 
by the size of current and prospective fiscal deficits) and the sustainability of government 
financing policy depends on the expectations of money holdings which are reduced if high 
rates of inflation are forecast. The government is allowed to "default" on the real value of its 
debt through monetization; however, uncertainty arises about whether the government will 
choose, as a financing policy, a money supply or a tax increase. The increasing risk of 
monetization and the possibility that consumption may be lower in the second period as a 
result of higher taxes shifts individuals' preference from the first to the second period 
consumption which favours "precautionary saving"13, and, consequently, capital 
accumulation. However, if continued bond finance is used, the real return on bonds must be 
higher than the return on capital because bondholders must be compensated for the possible 
loss of value of their holdings which are fixed in nominal terms14. But the increase in interest 
rates aggravates the problem of debt management, making a slightly unsustainable financing 
policy more unsustainable. A wedge is driven between the return on capital and yields on 
bonds and this has some implications on savings and risk premia. 
Generally speaking, the inflation tax can be an easier option if the government has to face 
an increasing debt. However, if people anticipate the possibility of future monetization, 
interest rates would rise and endanger debt stabilisation. On the other hand, the uncertainty 
characterising the economy allows for unexpected inflation which reduces the real cost of 
servicing debt so that the government can surprise investorsts. 
Uncertainty is crucial in determining agents' demand for government bonds with respect to 
productive capital. The longer the deficit persists, the higher the level of government debt, 
the higher the bond interest rates and the higher the probability of fiscal stabilisation or 
monetization. This clearly affects agents' beliefs who expect a future monetization which 
13 This happens in the hypothesis that both first and second period consumption are normal goods and taking into 
account that both monetization and tax increases have a negative income effect. 
14 This implies that demand for bonds is subject to the inflation risk. 
15 Since it is likely that an upper limit on the tax rate exists, a policy of monetization seems the most likely. 
Subjective probabilities are influenced by the course of fiscal policy, but monetization would have some effects 
only if the increase in inflation was partly unexpected, namely if people would attribute a probability of less than 
one to the inflation tax when the government has decided to adopt that policy. 
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tends to increase interest rates. The author underlines that "The uncertainty associated with a 
loss in the real value of bonds would be a net cost to the society and could be reflected in 
higher real interest rate. For the government, a consequence of a loss in credibility is that it 
may face higher financing costs [ .. 
]"16. The important result of the model as pointed out by 
Masson is that a real interest rate (r) below the economy's growth rate (n) is not sufficient to 
ensure that a constant ratio of primary deficit to output is sustainable. This is also true for the 
case of perfect certainty. This result is justified as follows. Even though an interest rate 
below the real growth rate should hypothetically permit to finance a primary deficit 
indefinitely, however continuous shocks to government deficit would lead to endogenous 
changes in the bond stock. An increase in the supply of bonds for financing the additional 
deficit would require a higher interest rates to divert investors from their first period 
consumption towards saving. But higher interest rates are consistent with low levels of 
capital stock, which implies a low level of income available to be saved. If the latter effect 
dominates (which happens when the real interest rate becomes bigger than the population 
growth rate), bonds and interest rates would explode as the interest rates increase so much 
that the desired holdings of the capital stock fall to zero. A cumulative increase in debt and 
interest rates would lead the economy towards the collapse. 
The conclusion that dynamic inefficiency (i. e. r <n) is not sufficient to guarantee a 
sustainable deficit in an economy, is in contrast with most studies which were trying to show 
that only under dynamic efficiency is there potential instability. Anyway, also the assumption 
of a time-varying debt, as assumed by most economists, is not a necessary condition for 
having an unsustainable fiscal policy. We will show that instability of the system may occur 
also in a constant government debt policy framework with endogenous interest rates. 
As we anticipated in the introduction, one of our aims will be to derive a method for 
calculating the maximum sustainable level of debt which guarantees that interest rates are 
economically meaningful. A similar approach is followed by Soren Bo Nielsen (1992) who 
also investigates the sustainability of primary deficit financing policies in a non-monetary 
16 Masson (1985), p. 591. 
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economy with capital accumulation, endogenous interest rate and no bequests motives. 
Population grows at a constant rate a: individuals have infinite lifetimes and new generations 
appear at a birth rate of, " 17. Each agent owns financial wealth, a(t), consisting in ownership 
of capital stock per capita, k(t), and public debt d(t) (perfect substitutes in the investors' 
portfolio), on which he earns a positive return. Taxes (with the tax rate equal to z, ) are levied 
proportionally on labour income and are used to partly finance the fraction of production the 
public sector consumes. Each individual maximises his lifetime utility (assumed logarithmic 
for simplicity) and consumption turns out to be a fraction of his total wealth. The economy's 
productive sector operates competitively, the production function is of Cobb-Douglas form 
and in per capita terms equal to y(t) = k(t)a. 
The model consists of three non-linear equations in the endogenous variables consumption, 
capital stock and debt: the stock of capital and public debt are interpreted as predetermined 
variables whereas consumption per capita is free to jump in response to an unanticipated 
shock. 
By assuming that the public sector is in debt (i. e. d(t) > 0) and has a primary budget 
deficit, there exists a level beyond which primary deficits are no longer sustainable. This 
result is derived by calculating the steady state solutions for the real interest rate. In order to 
have economically meaningful values for the steady states (namely an acceptable solution for 
the equilibrium interest rate), it is necessary to set an upper limit to the primary budget deficit 
if public debt is positive18. 
Sustainability depends on the parameters in the economy, namely the population growth 
rate, the pure rate of time preference, the share of capital in production and the size of public 
sector. The conditions for sustainability are the following: the pure rate of time preference 
must be small relative to the rate of population growth (which implies that people must be 
"patient" and willing to save at a high rate) and the public sector must be not too large so that 
17 The framework is taken by Weil's (1987) paper, where the author considers a model of overlapping infinitely 
lived families model where Ricardian Equivalence does not hold. 
18 The condition for having an economically meaningful steady state represents a constraint on some economic 
variables and will be applied in this thesis to derive the maximum sustainable level of debt, although in our 
specific case we set public spending equal to zero. 
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not too many resources are diverted away from the production activity. If these conditions are 
satisfied, then two steady states exist. In the presence of a primary budget deficit and public 
debt, both steady states turn out to be dynamically inefficient; the fact that both steady states 
will be dynamically inefficient represents an innovation with respect to most of the models 
developed in the literature. In any case, the condition of dynamic inefficiency does not 
guarantee that the system, following an increase in the primary deficit, continues to display 
stable dynamics. 
Generally speaking, an established method, which can be used to judge the sustainability of 
debt, has not been developed yet. Home (1991) stresses the difficulty of capturing the 
essence of unsustainability only by looking at simple measures of solvency, where debt 
sustainability is identified with a stable long-run equilibrium path of the economy. The 
reasons put forward are "... the weak restrictions imposed on the behaviour of the fiscal 
authorities [and] the assumed independence of real interest rates, economic growth and 
fiscal balances"19. The author claims that policy makers may be worried about debt-to-GNP 
ratio because a rising stock of public debt is usually associated with a rising real interest rate 
through the portfolio effect or the risk premium arising from imperfect asset substitutability, 
and this might call for immediate intervention notwithstanding the sustainability20 of the 
policy itself. 
The sustainability analysis could be extended by including the policy choice between 
borrowing and repaying the debt through a future fiscal retrenchment, and resorting to the 
inflation tax. Sargent and Wallace (1981) have argued that debt management based on an 
initial stabilisation policy of disinflation and budget deficit financing through increased 
borrowing can be more inflationary than the alternative approach of financing through money 
printing. As a matter of fact, by following the first strategy the government loses a channel of 
revenues represented by the inflation tax and would roll over the amount of total debt which, 
19 Horne (1991), p. iii. 
20 The standard analysis of sustainability deals with the case of domestically financed deficits; but if the country 
issued external debt, then the condition of sustainability would be that the present value of trade surpluses must 
equal the stock of outstanding net external debt, all expressed as ratios of GDP. 
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at the end, must be repaid. If the interest rate is greater than the rate of growth of the 
economy, debt inclusive of interest payments would increase. Should the public at a certain 
date be no longer willing to buy the additional stock of bonds issued, then the government 
would have to switch to money financing, and here comes out the paradox that "Although 
fighting current inflation with tight monetary policy works temporarily, it eventually leads to 
higher inflation"21. As the stock of debt gets larger, higher revenues from seigniorage and a 
higher future inflation are required in order to hold constant future fiscal deficits. 
In the next section we focus on the empirical studies which have approached the issue of 
government solvency and the problems which must still be solved to build up powerful and 
robust tests for debt sustainability. 
1.3 Some Empirical Results about Debt Sustainability 
As far as the empirical analysis is concerned, many studies have focused on the evidence of 
the conditions of sustainability as stated in eq. (1.3) and on the empirical testing of the 
satisfaction of the intertemporal government budget constraint which has recently acquired 
great importance for evaluating fiscal regimes and government financing policies in most 
countries. Among the most common tests, there is the cointegration analysis of the stock of 
public debt and deficit net of interest payments and the investigation of the intertemporal 
budget constraint satisfaction when the deficit is not generated by a stationary first-difference 
stochastic process or when the real interest rate cannot be assumed constant. This last 
approach coincides with studying whether the deficit gross of interest payments is stationary. 
One of the most influential works on this topic is Hamilton and Flavin's (1986) paper22. The 
authors test the satisfaction of the budget constraint assuming particular stochastic 
21 Sargent and Wallace (1981), p. 2. 
22 They compare the case of an ever-accumulating debt through perpetual deficit financing to the case of a 
continuous rise in prices in a self-fulfilling speculative bubble, so that their test resembles the one carried out to 
disentangle the presence of a bubble in the economy. "We show that the proposition that the government can 
accumulate ever-growing debt through perpetual deficit financing has a mathematical parallel in the 
proposition that prices can rise continually in a self-fulfrlling speculative bubble" (Hamilton and Flavin, p. 809). 
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characteristics of the processes which generate the variables considered. The test consists in 
estimating whether the deviation of debt from the sum of future surpluses is growing at a 
constant interest rate: 
(1.4) b, =ao(1+r)`+ZE, (1+r)-Js, +. f=i 
where s stands for public surplus, s=T -G (T being the amount of revenues and G the real 
government expenditure exclusive of debt interest payments23). The borrowing constraint 
holds if ao = 0, which implies that the sum of all current and expected future non-interest 
outlays in present value must not exceed the sum of all discounted revenues, including 
seigniorage24. The authors carry out three checks by using a data series for the US which 
spanned from 1960 to 1984 with different available information sets, i. e. current and lagged 
values of the surplus and lagged values of debt or expectations where surpluses are formed 
only on lagged values. In all cases, they find that ao is not significantly different from zero so 
that the conclusion is the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of the public 
debt series and deficit net of interests. Therefore, they conclude that, in that period, the fiscal 
policy in US has been consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint. However, their 
analysis has some drawbacks in so far as violations of the budget constraint are considered 
non-stochastic, which is equivalent to saying that the discounted debt series is stationary. 
Since their findings are not as expected, the authors consider it necessary to suggest an 
alternative measure of the government deficit which takes into account revenues from 
monetization and capital gains from gold. Using the new measure for deficit, they can 
conclude that "... then the prevailing sentiment in Washington that current deficits can 
continue for ever is wrong; the adjusted deficit series must soon turn to surplus"25. Their 
analysis is, naturally, limited by the assumption of a non stochastic real interest rate26. 
23 This test is based on the hypothesis that the interest rate is constant, namely that given the information set at 
the beginning of period t, S), _l, 
the real interest rate is such that E(r,,, 
Ic2, 
_1) =r. 
24 This remarks what already expressed with egs. (1.2)-(1.3). 
25 Hamilton and Flavin (1986), p. 818. 
26 The authors take the average ex post real rate over the period 1960-1984. 
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In this respect, Wilcox (1989) argues that the conclusions of the tests by the previous 
authors are sensitive to the specification degree of the model adopted, especially to the 
number of lagged variables on the right-hand-side (RHS) of the equation for the Dickey- 
Fuller test used to check the stationarity of the process. Therefore, it is possible that ao does 
not converge to zero but it is equal to a positive constant, which implies that a part of fiscal 
spending is not financed by an increase in taxes27. Wilcox's tests differ from Hamilton and 
Flavin's in so far as: "First, /he] allows for stochastic real interest rate, whereas Hamilton 
and Flavin assumed a fixed real interest rate. Second, [he] allows for non-stationarity in the 
non-interest surplus, whereas Hamilton and Flavin require the surplus to be stationary28. 
Third, [his tests have] power against stochastic violations of the borrowing constraint, [since 
the discounted debt is likely to be non-stationary]"29. The working tool is the following: 
eq. (1.4) can be rewritten in terms of discounted variables as: 
N 
(1.5) B, = B, +N + Si+J, J=1 
where BB is the discounted value of the debt and S, is the discounted value of the surplus. 
According to Hamilton and Flavin's concept of sustainability, the expected value of the first 
term on the RHS approaches zero as N tends to infinity, so that the current value of the debt 
equals the sum of expected future non interest surpluses: 
GO 
(1.6) B, =ZE, S1+J. 
J=1 
Wilcox argues that one has to test for the violations of the borrowing constraint as being 
either constant or stochastic30. To carry out his tests, the author applies the same data31 series 
27 Generally speaking, as pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, a sustainable fiscal policy may be defined as 
a policy which is expected to generate a sequence of debt and deficits such that the present-value borrowing 
constraint holds, i. e. permanent non interest deficits are ruled out, and transitory deficits have to be offset in later 
periods. 
28 Debt stationarity implies that, according to the last two economists, a,, =0. 
29 Wilcox (1989), p. 292. 
30 These violations At = tim E, Bt+N $0 would be stochastic if B1 is nonstationary. 
31 More precisely, the sequence of discount factors is derived from the real interest rates whose variation is 
attributed both to fluctuations in the real return on gold and to the shifts in the yield curve. 
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used by Hamilton and Flavin. The analysis shows that the hypothesis of a zero unconditional 
mean must be rejected32 so that doubt about the sustainability of fiscal policy arises. 
However, there are still some problems in the tests for the detection of parameters instability 
which may be explained by the non inclusion of some variables affecting future values of 
debt. 
Trehan and Walsh (1991) argue that, if the real interest rate is kept constant, the test 
applied by Wilcox based on the cointegration between B and S and the test based on the 
stationarity of budget deficit gross of interest payments should lead to the same result 
because, otherwise, either the hypothesis of constant interest rate would not be plausible or a 
structural break has occurred in the same period. Therefore, a sufficient condition for the 
sustainability of public debt is the stationarity of the gross interest payments deficit provided 
that the expected real interest rate can be assumed to be positive and independent of the 
stochastic characterisation of the process governing public debt stock and primary deficit. 
Because of the problems to measure the real interest rate to discount the series of debt, the 
estimation of the stationarity of gross interest payments deficit when the interest rate is not 
constant is a good alternative. 
Some other empirical studies focus on debt management in some specific countries. An 
example is Baglioni and Cherubini's paper (1993) which deals with the sustainability of the 
Italian debt. The financial relaxation of the Italian public sector has recently been a source of 
concern with regard to its economic conditions: this is quite understandable if we consider 
that the proportion of the stock of debt-to-GNP is higher than 100% while the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) process entails much lower bounds on the public sector debt and 
deficit. The current Italian fiscal policy is judged unsustainable on the grounds that the 
intertemporal budget constraint for the public sector is violated, i. e. the present value of the 
sum of all current and expected future non-interest outlays exceeds the present value of all 
discounted revenues33. 
32 Moreover, ao in eq. (1.4) results to be significantly different from zero. 
33 Corsetti (1990) also concludes in favour of the insolvency for the Italian public sector. However, the 
economist is aware of the limitations of those tests in so far as they are conditional on the absence of major 
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In fact, evidence shows that debt non-stationarity started from 1983, when changes in 
monetary policy towards a more rigid discipline obliged the governmental authorities to rely 
more upon funds (public debt) rather than inflation tax revenues34. This change in monetary 
policy which gave back autonomy to the Bank of Italy did not only imply the possibility of 
having a separate policy programme for each institution, but it also allowed the Bank itself to 
get separated from the political power more concentrated on sterile debates. The switch of 
the Italian monetary policy has been mainly dictated by the attempt to re-equilibrate the 
structure of the economy in order to adhere more strictly to the commitments of the European 
Monetary System (EMS). 
On the other side, some economists have argued that the required satisfaction of the 
intertemporal budget constraint is not always sufficient for judging the sustainability of the 
debt level. Although a converging limit is set, it might have the result that the fiscal pressure 
turns out to be politically unfeasible and socially unacceptable due to the radical impact on 
income and wealth distribution. 
In conclusion, if interest rates are kept constant and deficit gross of interest payments is 
stationary, then public debt and deficit net of interest rates should be cointegrated and fiscal 
policy would be sustainable. It is a fact that the robustness of the empirical testing procedure 
requires estimating for potential structural breaks in subperiods, big and infrequent shocks or 
for the non-constancy of the rate of interest. 
In the next section we focus on some interesting studies which have been carried out to 
illustrate the economic and fiscal situation in some European countries which can help us to 
understand why the conditions in the Maastricht Treaty can be interpreted as measures of 
virtue and rescue for some countries. 
changes in the relevant macroeconomic variables, like growth, interest rates and inflation which may actually 
prevent the intertemporal government budget constraint from being satisfied. 
34 Following the reasoning by Sargent and Wallace (1981), this change in policy is responsible of the high 
accumulation of a larger stock of public debt and, therefore, a more demanding policy of stabilisation. 
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1.4 Further Remarks about the Current European Economic Situation 
and the Maastricht Treaty Requirements 
Italy, as most European and OECD countries, has faced a huge increase in debt, especially 
in the last few years as it was clear from the figures presented in table 1.1 at the beginning of 
this chapter. For the Italian case this situation is determined, as emphasised by Alesina-De 
Broeck-Prati-Tabellini (1992), by the high real interest rates currently paid on the Italian 
long-term debt which might represent a premium against a general risk of a financial crisis 
expected on the basis that in few years' time the government could be called on to roll over a 
large fraction of its outstanding debt. In theory, the government could be forced to repudiate 
its debt if investors refused to buy any public debt in the future. 
The requirements of the Maastricht Treaty should prevent the EC countries (or at least the 
countries whose currency is still in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)) from running 
independent inflationary policies, so that inflating away debt is impossible. The only way of 
repudiating debt would be to cancel government debt obligations by law, which should raise 
the risk premium35 since investors would require a higher compensation for the repudiation 
risk. A reason which is usually put forward to justify debt default is that it represents a non- 
distortionary lump sum tax which substitutes the distortionary taxes which could be levied to 
service the debt. 
On the other hand, the policy of debt default involves some costs, like the loss in 
reputation, the difficulty of borrowing in the next period, income redistribution and the risk 
of bankruptcy in the financial sector. Especially for the OECD countries, the costs seem to 
outweigh the benefits so that repudiation is a very unlikely possibility. 
To show how the risk premium on debt can affect the economic situation, Alesina-De 
Broeck-Prati-Tabellini (1992) analysed the default risk by comparing the returns from 
holding government debt with the returns from holding safe private debt of corresponding 
35 The presence of a risk premium is triggered by high levels of debt which make confidence crises more likely, 
but its size decreases in debt average maturity. 
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maturity in some OECD countries. A clear relationship between the risk premium and the 
level of government debt receives an empirical support only for Denmark, Italy and the 
Netherlands. It is possible that different institutional rules may affect this relation in the other 
countries. Moreover, for all the countries with a very high level of debt, the hypothesis of 
instability (unit root) of debt-to-GDP ratio cannot be rejected. 
Generally speaking, data on the public debt in different countries have been used not only 
to estimate the solvency of the public sector, but also to carry out a comparison between the 
economic policy programmes in different countries and a general evaluation of their policies. 
The general conclusion from the analysis of the data referred to some of the OECD 
countries for the period 1971-1989 is that the present path of fiscal policy is unsustainable in 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands on the basis of a too high level of debt- 
to-GDP ratios, from which it follows that a serious fiscal retrenchment is required. In 
particular, Greece and Italy must carry out primary fiscal corrections to avoid complete 
insolvency, whereas Belgium and Ireland have to continue their policies of huge fiscal 
primary surpluses to embark on a path of decreasing debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Before concluding our overview of the issue of debt sustainability, we would like to focus 
on illustrating the implications of the constraints set in the Maastricht Treaty, which can help 
us to visualise better the importance of the limits which must be set on some economic 
variables and which will be discussed more deeply throughout the presentation of our two 
main models. In fact, we will underline the importance of setting a maximum level of debt- 
to-capital stock ratio and of seigniorage in order for the economy to be well-behaved, an 
issue which is believed to be crucial for the monetary union. 
A way of judging the sustainability of the current fiscal policy in the EC Member States 
(which is a necessary condition to allow a country to join the single currency) is measuring 
the size of the adjustment effort which is required to satisfy the fiscal convergence criteria by 
the deadline for the monetary union. 
The concept of debt sustainability has been, therefore, invoked in relation to the 
convergence criteria as a conditio sine qua non for joining the monetary union as indicated in 
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the Maastricht Treaty. These criteria require, among other things, that the government budget 
deficit is not higher than 3% of its GDP and its debt-to-GDP ratio moves significantly 
towards the target of 60%. The fiscal adjustment is very urgent for some countries like Italy 
as the future involvement in the process of European Monetary Integration prohibits 
monetization as a source of financing. 
Since the fiscal constraints for joining the EMU are linked to the convergence criteria for 
inflation, interest rates and exchange rates, Buiter-Corsetti-Roubini (1993) point out that the 
convergence criterion on inflation36 together with the limitation of the power of the central 
bank to finance national budget deficits created by the national governments, implies the 
impossibility of using a nationally differentiated strategy of debt management through 
seigniorage policies in order to reduce debt ratios. Therefore, there would exist a maximum 
level of seigniorage which could be run by each country individually once they have entered 
the EMU37. This can be interpreted as a sort of monetary counterpart of the maximum 
sustainable level of debt-to-GDP ratio38. In fact, this criterion of maximum deficit and debt- 
to-GDP ratio implicitly includes a limit on the size of the monetary base in a country as 
stated in the following sentence: "Maastricht penalises countries that, for whatever reason, 
have a big monetary base"39. This situation would penalise some countries like Italy whose 
most important instrument used over the years to repay its debt has been the inflation tax. In 
fact, "... since the beginning of this century the Italian state has always repaid its debt either 
by resorting to new debt issues or to the printing press. When the outstanding stock had 
grown to an intolerable level so that a reduction was considered necessary, the state has 
never enacted the required transfer of real resources. It opted instead for implicit 
repudiation by curtailing the purchasing power of the Lira "40. 
36 This criterion states that a country's inflation rate is not more than 1.5% higher than the average of the three 
lowest inflation rates in the EMS. 
37 Namely, this condition deprives a country of an important source of financing. 
38 Both levels of maximum sustainable seigniorage and debt will be the main topics of our thesis. 
39 Buiter-Corsetti-Roubini (1993), p. 72. 
40 Canziani-Giavazzi-Manasse-Tabellini (1993), p. 3. In their paper, the authors set up a model based on the 
experience of the French fund after the First World War. They wanted to show how the informational asymmetry 
about the strength of the government commitment to fight the debt and different structure of debt could influence 
the fiscal adjustment and help to build a strategy to redeem existing debt at lower costs. 
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The authors also suggest that an excessive size of government debt may be dangerous in so 
far as it creates a negative externality which may spread a financial crisis any time the market 
realises that a country's public debt is unsustainable while the other countries might be forced 
into a fiscal bail out of the insolvent government. If the Central Bank decided to partially 
finance such a deficit, then the EMU area would suffer a high inflation rate. 
However, it must be noted that the fiscal criterion does not take into account the possibility 
that a government may own public enterprises whose value actually affects the total net value 
of the public sector liabilities. The process of privatisation could in fact provide enough re- 
ceipts to be used for financing government spending and reducing government debt, although 
this does not mean that the fiscal retrenchment must be postponed. Moreover, it is also 
necessary, as underlined by Blanchard et al. (1990), to consider that the long-run fiscal 
position of a country is affected by its social security scheme and its policy of pensions 
financing. A natural process of homogenisation would be necessary to avoid big 
discrepancies in the tax and funding practice system. 
The general feeling one can get from the codification of the Maastricht fiscal requirements 
is that if some retrenchments were inevitable, Maastricht has the power to tighten them, 
although it is not the only way by which fiscal discipline may be enforced. An example is 
represented by a situation where a government is facing a solvency crisis. The Treaty states 
that there should not be any bail-out by its Member States and the government should be the 
only responsible for its own debt. The general fear is that financial panic may spread around 
the EMU and lead to a general liquidity crisis41. This kind of macroeconomic spillovers must 
be taken into consideration in so far as they can affect the economic policy of the other 
countries. In the extreme case, the Central Bank should behave as a lender of last resort in 
order to safeguard the payment system. If only the fear that a crisis could occur were 
effective, then the European Central Bank (ECB) might be forced to monetise the budget 
deficits of some countries without discipline. But as one of the primary goals of this bank is 
41 It could also be argued that if the commitment was not credible, then on the point of an economic collapse 
other governments would intervene to avoid a complete financial disaster. 
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to maintain price stability, the independence of the ECB would help to safeguard it from 
outside intrusions in its own plans. 
The social and political debates that have accompanied the agreement process to the Treaty 
itself help to understand how important Maastricht's fiscal constraints are and why in some 
countries, such as Italy and Greece, fiscal austerity is required 42. 
The political aspect, i. e. the political instability and polarisation, has become also an 
important issue in studying debt growth. For political instability it is meant the probability 
that a government loses its power and for polarisation the degree of disagreement between 
alternating policy makers43. The intuitive result is that the more unstable and polarised the 
political systems, the more likely that they behave myopically and, therefore, public debt 
becomes larger. A support to this hypothesis is that the political instability and government 
weakness that prevail in Italy may be considered important factors for explaining the fiscal 
stalemate and inability to curtail fiscal deficits. On the other hand, an explanation of why 
similar countries experience different debt policies could be the differences in the degree of 
polarisation, political stability and flexibility in government decisions about public 
consumption. 
The measures which can be taken as proxies for evaluating political instability are the rate 
of fractionisation between the parties in the Parliament whereas a measure of polarisation can 
be the inequality rate of personal income distribution represented by the Gini coefficient or 
the quantity of irregular government transfers. Evidence shows that the more unstable the 
government, the more likely that the same fiscal policy is unsustainable. 
After having illustrated the main approaches in the literature to the issue of debt 
sustainability, in the next chapter we introduce our OLG model a-la-Diamond which is used 
42 However, the question is still open on whether the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht Treaty should be considered 
as an expression of virtue. Frankel, in commenting on the paper of Buiter-Corsetti-Roubini (1993), suggests that 
the Treaty could be considered as a desirable goal to reach because of the difficulty of the task itself and it could 
represent a way of gaining reputation especially for those countries which are less virtuous. It could also be 
interpreted as a test of will in so far as it would test how far governments are disposed to go to support the 
agreement any time a shock occurs and jeopardises the process of unification. A sufficiently large shock would 
disrupt the currency union if the individual nationalities were not so serious in committing themselves to sustain 
the Treaty. 
43 Alesina and Tabellini (1990) focused and modelled this aspect. 
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to discuss a criterion of debt sustainability, endogenously derived within the model itself. The 
analysis of the maximum inflation tax which can be raised in a country and its implications 
for the economy is instead the topic of discussion in chapters 4 and 5. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A MODEL OF DEBT MANAGEMENT POLICY RULES 
2.1 Introduction 
A key question which has been dealt with in the literature is whether issuing extra debt to 
finance a tax cut or an increase in government spending has any effect on the real economy. 
There are different approaches to investigate this subject. The first approach focuses on OLG 
models with flexible prices and instantaneously-clearing markets where, if Ricardian 
Equivalence fails because generations are not altruistically linked to future generations, 
crowding out of the capital stock takes place in the long run as a consequence of an increase 
in government debt. As shown by Diamond (1965), whenever the economy is dynamically 
inefficient (i. e. when the interest rate is lower than the population growth rate), this 
displacement of capital increases stationary utility. The second approach is headed by Blinder 
and Solow's paper (1973) where the two authors show that, in a dynamic IS-LM model with 
fixed prices and income-linked tax revenues rising faster than the additional burden of 
interest payments, bond financing of fiscal deficits is more expansionary in the long run than 
money financing. 
In this chapter we focus on an OLG framework with debt and we show that the size of the 
crowding out of the long-run capital stock depends on the type of debt management rule 
followed by the government. In particular, our analysis will be concerned with three different 
kinds of financial instruments, each of which is associated with a particular budget constraint 
which has different implications for the repayment tasks to be faced by the government. 
The basic framework of the model, presented in section 1, consists of two-period lived 
consumers and a production sector in which firms operate. We focus on the dynamics of 
capital in an economy where the government is absent. In section 2 we introduce a 
government which is running debt and we analyse three different debt management policies 
R7 
at its disposal'. We therefore use the same framework to study the impact of the issue of 
government bonds on the real side of the economy and the question of debt sustainability. 
Section 3 deals with a particular case of the general model by using Cobb-Douglas utility and 
production functions and highlights the properties of the steady states and the specific 
dynamics of the system. 
Our study is well justified by the renewed interest in the analysis of the effects of debt on 
capital accumulation and welfare following the rapid growth of public indebtedness recently 
experienced by many industrialised countries. However, as we anticipated in the previous 
chapter, economic instability is not necessarily associated with an explosive path of debt: in 
fact, in this chapter we show that, in a context of endogenous interest rates and constant debt 
a-la-Diamond, the economy can still collapse. 
Another interesting issue is also tackled by our analysis. As a consequence of the model, 
adopted to study debt policies, being characterised by multiple equilibria, we will show that 
the poverty trap situations could arise, provided that some particular conditions are satisfied. 
This issue had been overlooked by Diamond, since he assumed that a unique steady state 
existed2. We will show that in our OLG models the existence of a poverty trap is associated 
with the existence of debt or government deficit: the threshold level of the initial capital 
stock below which this phenomenon occurs turns out to be the amount of capital stock of the 
unstable equilibrium. If the initial capital stock is lower than that level, then the system 
would diverge from the equilibrium onto an unstable path characterised by decumulating 
capital stock. 
In the following section we present the basic OLG model which will be extended in 
sections 2 and 3 to include government sector and debt management policies. Section 4 
I It is worth remembering that permanent government deficits and debt can be visualised in economies in which 
the government is infinitely lived but households are not since constitutions and social agreements provide 
continuity for the government. 
2 Diamond (1965) admits that he is interested in comparing alternative Golden Age Paths to which the economy 
converges with different quantities of outstanding government debt. Therefore, he only examines the long-run 
implications of the issue of national debt. 
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instead contains a simulation exercise of the model which highlights the potential of this 
framework in evaluating the sustainability of fiscal policies in the G-7 countries. 
SECTION 1. 
A SIMPLE PRODUCTION ECONOMY WITH NO GOVERNMENT 
2.1.1 Consumer's Behaviour and the Production Sector 
Our basic OLG model resembles Diamond's (1965) model, with the simplification that we 
assume no population growth. In our economy L identical individuals are bom in every 
period, namely the population growth rate is set equal to zero. Individuals live for two 
periods and they are identical within as well as across time. As far the consumers' behaviour 
is concerned, in the first period of their life they supply their unit-endowment of labour 
inelastically and earn the competitive wage rate w,. They allocate their income from labour 
between the first period consumption, Cr and savings, ss such that the first period budget 
constraint is: 
(2.1) w1 = cr' + s1. 
Individuals' consumption in the first period must be weakly less than the wage they receive 
from old entrepreneurs. In the second period they retire and their consumption (CO,, ) is 
guaranteed by the returns earned on their first period saving3 (in fact, we assume that 
consumers start life with no assets), which, in the absence of debt, has been entirely invested 
in the capital stock (the only asset available in the economy): 
(2.2) Cr+1 = (I+r, 1)s . 
r, +, 
is the rationally anticipated net return on next period's capital. We assume that agents 
can predict perfectly the future path of the economy and they use these predictions to form 
3 The rate of interest earned on the amount saved is net of the rate of depreciation of capital, set equal to zero for 
simplicity, whose source is saving itself. 
29 
their expectations about the future rate of return on their investment. Such "perfect foresight" 
expectations are independent of past observations and are self-fulfilling. However, it is not 
necessarily true that there exists a unique self-fulfilling expectations equilibrium. 
The consumer's intertemporal allocation problem consists of maximising his intertemporal 
utility function whose arguments are the consumption in the two periods of life of a single, 
non storable physical commodity4: 
(2.3) u(cr, c° 1) 
where u. R+ -+ R is a well-behaved real-valued utility function, twice continuously 
differentiable, monotonically increasing, strictly quasi-concave and which does not change 
from one generation to the next5. From the maximisation process6 we derive the following 
saving function: 
(2.4) st=s(wr, r, 1)=argmax u[w, -s,, (1+r, +i)s, ]. 
Savings earn the return r,,., in the following period, and enable the cohort to consume 
during retirement. Given (ww, r,,, ), from the postulated properties of the utility function and 
under the perfect foresight assumption, an optimal level of savings exists and is uniquely 
determined. In addition, the saving function depends on each of its arguments in the 
following way: 
(2.5) s _ýE (0,1), i. e. the marginal propensity to save with respect to net income is 
w, 
positive but less than 1. 
4 We assume no labour-leisure choice. 
5 Future consumption is assumed to be a normal good and starvation is avoided in both periods, namely 
lim uy(c;, cr , )=°o, slim 
uo(c,, cam I)=°o" 
6 The lifetime intertemporal budget constraint which states that the present discounted value of lifetime 
consumption cannot exceed that of labour income is given by: 
CO 
Cy +I+<W ir 1+r, +1 
and assuming an interior solution, eq. (2.4) follows. 
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(2.6) S, has instead an ambiguous sign. An increase in the interest rate in the 
following period decreases the relative price of second period consumption. Therefore, the 
individuals would tend to shift consumption from the first to the second period (the 
substitution effect). However, an increase in the interest rate also makes available a larger 
feasible consumption set so that consumption would tend to increase in both periods (the 
income effect). The result depends on which of the two effects dominates. If the substitution 
effect dominates, the relationship between s, and r, +l 
is positive, and conversely it is negative 
if the income effect dominates. 
As far as the production sector is concerned, we assume that at any period the composite 
good consumed in the economy is produced through a production process whose structural 
components are capital and labour. We assume that the individuals work when they are 
young and retire when old and leave no bequests. The old, who serve as entrepreneurs in their 
retirement year, hire the young up to the point where profits are maximised given the existing 
capital stock. The supply of labour at any period of time is inelastic and equal to the number 
of young at that date (=L). The endowment of capital at time t, Kr, is the amount of resources 
which were not consumed in the period before. Thus, the expression for the change in capital 
is: 
(2.7) 
The left-hand-side (LHS) is net investment and is represented by a change in the capital stock 
between period t and t+1. The RHS represents net saving which consists of saving of the 
young, s("), net of dissaving of the old. 
The technology employed in the production process is assumed to satisfy a constant returns 
to scale production function which is constant over time and is neoclassical in its 
specification: 
(2.8) Y= F(K,, Lr)= L1f(k, ) 
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where k, = K, / L, is the capital-labour ratio. We assume that the production function 
f: R+ -> R. is twice continuously differentiable, positive, strictly concave7. 
As we assume perfect competition in both capital and labour market, each factor is paid its 
marginal product. This yields the usual marginal conditions for factor rewards: 
(2.9) r, =f'(k, ) 
(2.10) w, =f(k, )-krf'(kr)- 
From the properties of the production function it is immediate to see that real interest rates 
must be positive. As the growth rate of the population is assumed to be zero, this implies that 
the economy must be dynamically efficient. This is quite a realistic assumption especially for 
developed countries and has been tested empirically in studies on capital accumulation and 
economic growth8. 
2.1.2 Dynamic Equilibrium 
Assuming that the only source of capital accumulation is savings, the system is 
characterised by the following relation: 
(2.11) k,.,, =s(w,, r, 1) 
or, in a more detailed specification: 
(2.12a) k, 1=s[. f(k, )-krf'(k, ), f'(k, 1)]=6(k, ) 
where only the young have an incentive to hold assets. Eq. (2.12a) represents a relationship 
between kf+, and k1 which is called the asset market equilibrium locus9. This locus identifies 
equivalently a relationship between r, +i and w, as 
is clear from the following: 
7 Strict concavity implies the following sign of the derivatives in the Hessian matrix: 
F,, <O, F <O, FlF -(Fk)2 > 0. 
8 Dynamic efficiency (i. e. rj > n) is quite a well-established result, although there are still some unresolved 
problems for its estimation. The empirical measures which have been usually adopted are both the marginal 
product of capital from observed accounting profit rates and the safe real interest rate, such as the return on 
treasury bills. Abel et al. (1989) provide empirical evidence for dynamic efficiency for the US whereas Corsetti's 
(1990) analysis presents the same conclusions for Italy. 
9 Blanchard and Fisher (1989), p. 95, call the relationship in eq. (2.12a) the saving locus. 
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(2.12b) = s(w, r, +, 
)- 
The equilibrium of the system is defined as follows: 
Definition 2.1. A dynamic equilibrium is defined as a sequence (k, ) _o under which 
k, 
+1= s[f 
(k, )- f'(k, )kk, +, 
] and ko is the exogenous initial condition10. 
Galor and Ryder (1989) have proved this statement under the hypothesis that, if 
6: R. -* R+ is a single valued function and exhibits certain properties", a dynamic 
equilibrium exists and is uniquely determined. A steady state equilibrium is defined as a 
stationary capital-labour ratio, T, under which k= 6(k-). The stability condition of the steady 
state consists in the following constraint on the first derivative: 
(2.13) 
dk, 
+, -) < 
dk, 1-sf(k) 
If inequality (2.13) holds and the derivative is positive (negative), the endogenous 'variable 
will display a monotonic (oscillatory) convergence towards the steady state. The sign of the 
derivative in (2.13) is, however, ambiguous. Whilst the numerator is positive (as an increase 
in the capital stock in period t increases the wage and, therefore, savings), the sign of the 
denominator depends on the effect of the interest rate on saving itself. If s, is positive the 
denominator is positive whereas if it is negative the sign of the denominator has an 
ambiguous sign. The 45 degree line in a (kk, +, 
) space represents the locus of all steady 
states. 
10 The analysis of the dynamics of the system by using a (k, , 
k, 
1) diagram is quite popular (see Azariadis 
(1993) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989)) although for a welfare analysis it is more convenient to use the (r, w) 
diagram a-la-Diamond. The study of the effect of a change in debt on the interest rate which is presented in the 
next section does not include the analysis of the efficiency of the steady state; consequently, we use eq. (2.12a). 
II The conditions for the existence, uniqueness and stability of a non-trivial steady state equilibrium in an OLG 
model in which individuals live for two periods and a single good is produced using capital and labour are also 
listed and proved in Galor and Ryder (1989), p. 372, proposition 5, where the production function is assumed to 
satisfy the Inada conditions: lim f (k) = 0, lim f(k) = oo, lim f' (k) = 0. k-+O k-, O k-ºao 
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Moreover, in a specific interval of values more than one steady-state may exist so that the 
system may be characterised by a multiplicity of steady state equilibria, among which T= 0 
is to be included12. Two possible asset market equilibrium loci (phaselines OS and OS') and 
the steady states (points 0 and E) are pictured in fig. 2.1 below. 
k, + 
k 
k2 k k1 
figure 2.1 
So 
5 
k, 
Point 0 (E) is unstable (stable) because the slope of the phaseline is higher (lower) than 1, 
namely the phaseline intersects the 45 degree line from below (above). The dynamics of the 
figure above are the following. Starting from an arbitrary point in the neighbourhood of the 
steady state, say at k2, we find the corresponding value of k,,., on the phaseline. Then, we 
reflect that value on the 45 degree line and we find the corresponding value of k,,. 2 and so on. 
The dynamics will converge towards the steady state k, which is stable. Moreover, among 
the multiple equilibria the Golden Rule level of capital-labour ratio, k *, which is 
independent on the allocation of consumption between young and old, would be another 
equilibrium. As we underlined at the beginning, the equilibrium in our model will always be 
dynamically efficient since the population growth rate is zero. 
We now focus on the dynamics of this economy when the government sector is introduced 
and its debt can be financed through different kinds of financial instruments. 
12 See Galor and Ryder (1991), p. 387 for a study of the efficiency of the equilibria. 
34 
SECTION 2. 
INTRODUCING A GOVERNMENT 
2.2.1 Introduction 
We consider a decentralised economy in which the government has no direct control over 
the economy's resources and has inherited a certain level of debt. There are many reasons 
why this situation may arise. The government could, for instance, finance some windfall 
payments, such as veterans' bonuses, war debts or other kinds of debt which are not exactly a 
counterpart of an ongoing fiscal spending policy, through debt. We, therefore, investigate the 
dynamics of the change in capital stock when the government can manage debt by a variety 
of different financial instruments13. 
We assume that this governmental institution levies lump sum taxes on the young and it 
may trade in long-term assets as it is infinitely lived. Each of these assets is associated with a 
particular government budget constraint which defines different repayment tasks to be faced 
by the government and we address the question of what financing policy is more convenient 
for the government. 
This section includes the description of each asset and the study of the effect of a change in 
debt on the steady state capital-labour ratio. In all cases debt per capita is held constant and 
the measure of the quantity of debt outstanding in any period is defined at the beginning of 
the period. The main conclusion is that, regardless of which kind of "policy rule" the 
government chooses to follow to manage its debt, the system always displays multiple 
equilibria. In the following Proposition 2.1 we state a quite well-known result which is 
represented by the negative relationship between capital intensity and national debt at the 
stable steady state and which has been already shown by Diamond for a specific policy. 
13 Government policies may affect the old and the young differently and, in particular, government bonds are a 
way of transferring wealth between the generations as the possibility of gifts and bequests is not considered here. 
In fact, as money does not exist, the only way of shifting purchasing power into the future is represented by those 
financial activities. 
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Proposition 2.1. In an economy where government purchases are zero and a constant 
stock of per capita public debt is serviced by taxes on young individuals, an increase in the 
level of debt will exert a positive effect on the steady state interest rate. This will result in 
crowding out of the capital stock in the economy, independently of what kind of bonds the 
government is issuing. In fact, at the asymptotically stable stationary equilibrium, capital 
intensity is a decreasing function of per capita national debt. 
As a matter of fact, the originality of our analysis will be to investigate the validity of this 
proposition in the context of the other debt management policies which differ from the one 
considered by Diamond. The proof is carried out separately for each debt management policy 
(savings deposits, treasury bills and perpetuity bonds) and is discussed in the remaining part 
of this section. 
2.2.2 10 Case: Savings Deposits 
A "savings deposit" can be thought of as a loan of one unit of the good by the household in 
period t which will yield (l+r, +, 
) in the next period. As a matter of fact, this kind of asset 
corresponds to a non-marketable form of government debt, such as National Savings 
accounts which are administered through the Post Office. 
At time t the number of existing savings deposits which are made available from the 
households to the government are sf. We assume that, in order to pay back the loans, the 
government raises lump sum taxes r on the young and issues new bonds in the following 
period. The government budget constraint implies that the amount of taxes levied on the 
young and of the newly issued bonds are equal to the total payments on the bonds issued in 
the previous period: 
(2.14) . z, +br+I =b, 
[l+r, ]. 
Past interest rates are important because the amount of saving that occurred in the previous 
period affects productivity, and hence the level of income available for saving today. 
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If the stock of existing bonds at the beginning of each period is constant, i. e. b, +, = 
b, = F, 
taxes are endogenously determined in each period by r, = rb and employed to finance 
interest costs. 
This policy rule intuitively implies that the government is holding constant only the 
principal whereas the interest payments on the stock of debt itself can change; consequently, 
in order for the government budget to be balanced, in each period taxes must perfectly offset 
the interest payments which depend on the interest rate of that period14. 
The equilibrium on the capital market requires that the supply of capital by the households, 
s must be sufficient to face the demand by the government to finance the fixed stock of 
bonds issued in each period, F. As individuals can hold in their portfolio both debt 
(institutional asset) and physical capital, the intertemporal equilibrium for the entire economy 
is established when the asset market is cleared in every period: 
(2.15) s, =k, +, +b. 
Bonds and capital are assumed to be perfect substitutes and hence they have an identical rate 
of return, r. From eq. (2.15) it immediately follows that debt absorbs part of the households' 
wealth, thus reducing investment and output as less resources are invested into capital. The 
government can only affect the economy's capital intensity through the market mechanism by 
varying the amount of its outstanding debt. 
The proof of what we claimed in Proposition 2.1 is the following. The asset market 
equilibrium in eq. (2.15) can be re-expressed as: 
(2.16) k, +1=s[. 
f(k, )-k, f'(k, )-f'(k, )b, f'(k, , )]-b 
where we have substituted the expressions for the wage rate from eq. (2.10) and for the lump 
sum tax. The properties of the asset market locus depend on the following derivative: 
(2.17) 
dk, +, _ -sf'(k 
+b ) 
dk, 1-s, f"(k) 
which must be less than one in absolute value for the stability condition to hold. The 
numerator is positive whereas the sign of the denominator depends on the effects of an 
14 This case strictly resembles Diamond's analysis of "internal" debt. 
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increase in the interest rate on saving. For the stability condition to hold, the effect of an 
increase in the interest rate on saving must be positive or, at least, not too negative. If this is 
satisfied, the dynamics imply a monotonic (oscillatory) convergence to the steady state 
depending on the positive (negative) sign of the denominator and, therefore, on the slope of 
the function at the steady state. 
The representation of the phaselines in the diagram below (figure 2.2) assumes that the 
derivative in (2.17) is positive. The phaseline OD represents the asset market equilibrium 
locus in the simple case of F= 0 where only one non-trivial steady state exists (point E). The 
phaseline D'D' instead has been drawn for a positive amount of debt in the economy: it is 
lower and flatter than OD because debt both drives part of the savings away from the capital 
sector (represented by a downward shift of the phaseline) and increases the level of taxation 
and lowers disposable income (i. e. flattening of the curve). Due to the presence of debt, there 
are two steady states, E' and F, the smaller of which is the unstable one since the phaseline 
intersects the 45 degree line from below. 
k, + 
k 
ký 
figure 2.2 
The effect of an increase in debt on the capital stock is measured by the multiplier: 
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(2.18) 
dk 
- 
-[sf'(k)+1] 
db l+f'(k)[sw(k+b)-s, ]' 
which is negative if the stability condition holds15. An increase in debt would, therefore, 
affect positively the rate of interest and negatively the stable steady state capital stock16, so 
that crowding out of capital stock occurs'7. Additional interesting aspects of this model and 
associated results will be illustrated in the next section where we consider the specific case of 
Cobb-Douglas production and utility functions. 
2.2.3 2° Case: Treasury Bills 
A "treasury bill" is a one-period bond which yields a safe claim of one unit of the good in 
the next period. If the market price of such a bond in period t-1 is q1-,, then its rate of return 
in the next period will be r. = [(1- q, _, 
)/q, 
_, 
]. The government budget constraint requires 
that the payments at time t on the bonds issued at time t-1, b, are financed with the taxes 
levied on the young and with the present value of the revenues received from selling the 
bonds which will expire at time t+1. Algebraically, this relation is expressed by: 
(2.19) b$ = r, +[1+ rr+i ]-1 br+, = Ti + q$br+i 
When the stock of treasury bills issued is constant, the amount of taxes raised in each period 
is equal to z, = r, +, 
[1 + r, +, 
]-lb F. In this case, by keeping constant the amount of total payments 
15 This comes directly from the application of the Correspondence Principle which is commonly used in studying 
the comparative statics. The sign of the multiplier can be derived using the information provided by the stability 
condition 
I'ul 
< 1. In particular, the latter is satisfied if 
(1- sr f ") > -s, ,f" 
(k + T'), from which it 
follows that the denominator in eq. (2.18) is positive. 
16 It is interesting to note that the case of a steady decrease in the capital stock is associated with a too high 
initial level of the interest rate which reduces investments and crowds out the accumulation of capital. 
17 It is worth noting that the analysis we present here is robust to the choice of a lump sum or income tax 
structure. The explanation is quite simple and 
is derived by examining the labour market structure. Since we 
assumed that prices and wages are perfectly 
flexible and the supply of labour is equal to the fixed total amount of 
the population (i. e. it is inelastic to the wage rate), the equilibrium on the market is not affected by an income tax. 
The wage earned by the workers decreases by the amount of the income tax; from the standard microeconomic 
theory, when the supply is inelastic to the price, the tax is fully passed onto the workers and the equilibrium levels 
of output and nominal wages do not change. 
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in each period, the government is implicitly holding constant the stock of debt inclusive of 
the interest payments and is paying them back by issuing new bonds and using tax revenues. 
From the capital market equilibrium condition we derive the equation of motion of the 
system: 
(2.20) s, = k, +1 +4, 
b, 
+, = 
k, 
+, 
We can calculate the effect of an increase in debt on capital stock per capita by starting 
from the following relationship: 
(2.21) k, 1=slý(k, )-krfý(k, )- fý(kr+t )(l+fý(kr+t))-'b'fý(k, 1)]-[1+fý(k, 1)ý-'b 
which is a dynamic equation in the capital-labour ratio. The stability condition of the system 
which must be satisfied is: 
dk, +, - -f"(k)ks (2.22) dk, 1+bf'(k)(s-1)[1+f'(k)]-2-sf'(k) 
<1. 
The effect on the steady state level is given by the following multiplier: 
A 
(2.23) _ 
-[1+f'(k)]"'[sf'(k)+1] 
----- db l+f'(k)b(s-1)[1+ f'(k)]-2-sf'(k)+kf'(k)s 
The numerator is negative whereas the denominator is positive by direct application of the 
Correspondence Principle from (2.22). 
In conclusion, also in the case of debt management through treasury bills, an increase in 
government debt would partially crowd out the capital stock in the economy. However, a 
direct comparison with eq. (2.18) is not immediate as it is necessary to specify functional 
forms both for the underlying utility and production functions'g. 
2.2.4 30 Case: Perpetuity Bonds 
This kind of bond entitles its buyer to receive one unit of the good in every period in 
perpetuity. If the market price of this bond in period t-1 is qr-,, then the rate of return will be 
r'r = [1 +q, - qr-t ]/q, -1. 
We assume that at time t the number of outstanding perpetuity bonds 
18 This exercise will be the topic of next section. 
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is b,. The fact that these bonds are never repaid is analytically convenient although some 
complications, which were not present in the previous bonds examined, now arise. The 
government budget constraint is expressed as: 
(2.24) b1 = zr +g1[br+1-be]. 
The government interest payments at time t are financed both by levying taxes on the young 
and by the revenue from selling more bonds between t and t+1. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to derive an expression of q, in terms of the interest rate only. However, a relation 
between q, and rr can be found by rewriting the expression for the bond price as follows: 
(2.25) q1-1 =1 -F 
q, 
0+0 0+0 
By substituting the same expression for q, into eq. (2.25) we find the following: 
1 
,+1+ 
qr+, 
(2.26) Rr-i = 0+0 (I+r, )(l+r, +l) 
(I+r, )(I+r, +, ) 
We can proceed in this way up to infinity and the equation which defines the relationship 
between the bond price and the rate of interest is: 
1 
(2.27) qr-1 =++... + + 
qr+, 
0+r, )(1+r, )(1+r, +l)(1+r, 
)(t+r,,, )... (1+r, 
+, 
)(1+, )... (1+r, 
+, 
) 
Eq. (2.27) clearly indicates that the bond price in every period is the unit coupon discounted 
by a factor which depends on all the interest rates from the period when the bond was issued 
up to the time when the coupon is paid off. Therefore, the bond price can be interpreted as a 
forward-looking variable. 
If the stock of perpetuity bonds issued is constant, from eq. (2.24) the amount of taxes 
raised on the young is equal to z, = 
F. Intuitively, as the government is holding constant the 
amount of interest payments, the amount of taxes to be raised does not change over time. 
The capital market equilibrium requires that the amount of households' savings just equals 
the revenues the government obtains from selling bonds in each period. By substituting the 
expression for r, the asset market equilibrium condition can be written as: 
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(2.28) +q,,, -q, -. f'{sL. f(kr)-kr. f'(k, )-bý1+qr+, -qrý-q, b 
qr q, 
This is a first-order difference equation in q; however, as the capital stock is an endogenous 
variable, we must find another equation to close the model. As we already know, the asset 
market equilibrium also implies that: 
(2.29) kr+j =3'Cf(kr)-krýý(k, )-b'fý(kr+ý)ý-qrb. 
Equations (2.28)-(2.29) form a two first-order difference equation system which can be 
solved to find the steady state solutions. To evaluate the effect of an exogenous change in 
debt on the steady states, we substitute eq. (2.28): 
(2.30) 1/q =r = f'(k) 
into eq. (2.29), both evaluated at the steady state, to get: 
(2.31) k =sL. f(k)-kf'(k)-b,. 1'(k))-b. f(k) 
The effect of a change in debt on the long-run level of capital stock is measured by the 
following multiplier: 
dk s+1/ ft (2.32) db -1- f'(sk -s, )+bf"! f'Z 
Although the numerator is unambiguously positive, the sign of the denominator is 
ambiguous. An analysis of the comparative statics of the system is presented in appendix 1; a 
change in the level of debt turns out to decrease the saddle point steady state level of capital 
stock by direct application of the Correspondence Principle. The crowding out effect is, 
therefore, at work also' when the government issues perpetuity bonds. In the same appendix 
we derive the overall effect on the steady state value of q, which is equal to: 
d f" 2(S,. +9) 
(2.33) 
db -1- f'(spk -s, )+bf"l f i2 
By the Correspondence Principle, this multiplier is negative at the saddle point equilibrium. 
This is a quite intuitive result since the relation between the perpetuity bonds price and the 
long-run interest rates is negative. In conclusion, an increase in debt has a crowding out 
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effect on the steady state levels of capital and bond price. Proposition 2.1 is proved to hold 
also for this specific financing policy. 
In the next section we study the dynamics of our model by specifying a particular form for 
the utility and production functions, which allows us to carry out interesting comparisons 
between the dynamics of the system in the presence of the different types of assets and to 
define a method to calculate the maximum sustainable debt level. 
SECTION 3. 
THE CASE OF COBB-DOUGLAS UTILITY AND PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In this section we develop our model by appealing to Cobb-Douglas utility and production 
functions in order to evaluate the effects of a change in debt on the steady state capital stock 
and attain some definite results about the maximum sustainable level of debt-to-capital stock 
ratio. Each of the three financial assets analysed in the previous section are considered 
separately as a single specific case of our analysis. 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function so that the consumer's intertemporal allocation 
problem can be written as follows: 
(2.34) maximise Blncr +(1-ß)lnc, *+, 
subject to ww - z, = cý'+s, 
0 
ýr+ý _ (1+r, 1 sr" 
Using the Lagrangean method, we find the saving function relevant to our model: 
(2.35) S, = (1-Q)(w1- Ti)- 
At the same time we assume that the production function has the following Cobb-Douglas 
form in terms of per-capita variables: 
(2.36) y, =ki 0<a<1 
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so that we get the following expression for the wage: 
(2.37) w, =(I - a)ka. 
We now focus on the main results we obtained from our analysis which are summarised in 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.2. In our model a maximum sustainable level of debt exists. The latter is 
defined as the maximum level of debt which the economy can bear, consistently with a steady 
state existing19. 
The concept expressed in Proposition 2.2 is strictly related, in our model, to the scenario 
that, if debt exceeds this maximum sustainable level, a steady state ceases to exist and the 
economy ends up on an unstable path. We will show that this proposition holds for all debt 
management policies, although dynamics differ in each particular case. 
2.3.2 Savings Deposits 
The asset-market locus (eq. (2.16)) is equal to: 
(2.38) k, 1= (1-ß[(1-a)k, 
`-abk, ' ]-b. 
The function is unambiguously concave whereas the number of steady states depends on the 
amount of debt. When debt is not too large, two steady states exist, and at the stable point the 
following condition holds: 
(2.39) 
±+<1. 
d 
The higher T, the more likely that the steady state is stable. Therefore, we can assert that 
the smaller of the two steady states is the unstable one, where the phaseline (DD) intersects 
the 45 degree line from below (see fig. 2.3). 
19 The issue of debt sustainability is also discussed in subsection 2.3.5. 
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A change in the level of debt affects capital stock by an amount represented by the 
following multiplier: 
(2.40) 
dk 
_- 
(1-ß)aka-'+1 
db 1-(1-X3)(1-a)aký-' I+k 
If the steady state is stable (point A), it is clear that an increase in debt would decrease the 
steady state level of capital stock (point A) by application of the Correspondence Principle20, 
provided that the increase in debt is not too high. Conversely, if it starts off with a level of 
capital stock lower than the level corresponding to the unstable equilibrium (i. e. if the 
interest rate is too high or, namely, k, < TB), the system would experience a steady decrease 
in capital stock until the latter becomes negative. 
It is interesting to note that the instability is not associated with an explosive rise in the 
stock of debt - unlike in the most familiar scenario of an unstable fiscal policy - because, by 
assumption, the stock of debt is being held constant. Rather, the instability is a phenomenon 
which is based on an inherent possibility of instability in the private sector of the economy. In 
the model without government, we noticed that the origin is already an unstable steady state. 
20 In fig. 2.3 the phaseline DD shifts to D'D' following an increase in debt. 
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It is just because a negative stock of capital is ruled out that we cannot observe paths below 
this steady state where capital would follow an unstable path. When the government is 
introduced, debt just shifts the unstable steady state into the interior of the (kk,,, ) space, so 
that paths below it become feasible. 
The role of debt is, however, more important and subtle than it would seem. The simple 
dynamics of the model are quite intuitive. A fall in the current capital stock leads to a fall in 
the current wage, since less capital means lower demand for labour. A fall in the current 
wage leads to a fall in saving, and thereby to a fall in the future capital stock. The process 
then repeats itself. The instability must arise because a fall in current capital has a very large 
negative impact on current savings and thus on future capital (i. e. dkr+, / dk, >1 at point B). 
With Cobb-Douglas preferences, savings are just a constant fraction, less than one, of the 
wage. This implies that the source of a strong negative impact of a fall in current capital on 
savings must lie in a large negative impact of a fall in capital on the wage. With Cobb- 
Douglas technology, the wage is just a constant fraction of per-capita output. A fall in capital 
has a negative impact on output. When capital is already close to zero, the impact of a fall in 
capital on the wage will be powerfully negative, and sufficient to make future capital fall 
more than one-for-one with current capital. Hence the source of the instability is the high 
marginal product of capital around the unstable steady state which occurs at low levels of 
initial capital and consequently a shrinkage of the current wage. 
Debt risks exacerbating these unstable dynamics because it affects disposable income 
(which is already negatively affected by the reduction of capital) through the taxes. The latter 
are equal to rib , and, remembering that the 
interest rate payable on debt tends to increase as 
current capital falls, the taxes which the government must levy are raised. So positive debt 
increases the likelihood of instability in the economy by worsening the negative effect which 
a fall in current capital has on the young's disposable income, and thereby on their savings. 
In conclusion, instability may arise as a consequence of a too low initial level of capital 
stock irrespective of the size of debt (provided that it is non-zero). This result can be 
interpreted as an example of the poverty trap phenomenon which has been discovered to 
46 
affect many poor countries. If a country cannot rely on external sources to increase its level 
of capital stock, then it would have to rely completely on its population's savings. However, if 
the country is temporarily at the unstable equilibrium with the lower level of capital stock, 
then any small shocks could endanger its future productive capacity. It is also interesting to 
note that the higher the level of debt, the larger the poverty trap. This conclusion can justify 
the fact that a high debt level is often interpreted as a signal of financial instability of an 
economy and it would discourage investments in that country. Savers would learn from 
experience and new bonds could be placed only at much higher real interest rates. Without 
additional financial resources, capital stock could not grow but, on the contrary, it would 
decrease as a higher number of investors would shift towards other investment opportunities 
elsewhere. 
The analysis just presented is based on the assumption that debt does not exceed a certain 
level, as stated in Proposition 2.2. In fact, as debt rises, the two steady states get closer until 
for a certain level of b no steady state exists (i. e. beyond point C in fig. 2.3). If the 
government decides to increase debt beyond the level for which the two steady states 
coincide, the system would head towards a collapse with decumulation of capital stock. The 
disappearance of the steady states is known as a catastrophe, and it is connected to debt 
being pushed slightly beyond the maximum sustainable level for which a steady state still 
exists. When this destructive phenomenon occurs, the economy leads towards a collapse. 
This maximum level of debt which the economy can bear without ending on an unstable 
path is also called the maximum sustainable level of debt. At that level, the total amount of 
savings in the economy would be still sufficient to cover the new issue of debt and the 
requirements for new capital stock. 
In this model the concepts of sustainability and stability are clearly distinct. While 
sustainability refers to an acceptable size of debt which can be an offsetting investment to 
productive capital, the intuition behind the stability property relates to the behaviour of the 
system when a temporary shock in the amount of debt run occurs. When the government 
issues additional bonds, individuals, by acquiring these bonds, would consider themselves 
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wealthier (because bonds raise their lifetime income) and consume more, thus reducing their 
savings. Lower savings mean lower demand for bonds and, ceteris paribus, interest rates have 
to rise to balance the bonds market. As higher real interest rates are consistent with a lower 
level of capital stock, there would be lower income available to be devoted to savings in 
subsequent periods. However, if the effect of the interest rate on savings is not too strongly 
negative, the system would end up at the new lower steady state level of capital. The two 
concepts of sustainability and stability are interrelated since continuous positive shocks in 
debt may cause an initially sustainable policy to become unsustainable and bring about 
unstable dynamics21. 
2.3.3 Treasury Bills 
The asset market equilibrium in this case is equal to: 
(2.41) kr 1 a)k; + 
aýk''1 
-b 1+ak; +; 
` 
where rt+l has been replaced by 4' '. The stability condition22 is the following: 
(2.42) _ 
a( 1-a)(1-A3jka-1 (1+aka-1 ) 
l+a2ka-'+a(1-a)2(1-ß)kPa-2-ab(1-a)(1-ß)E' 2 
ý1. 
The shape of the function resembles the phaseline for the savings deposits, so that there 
exists a maximum sustainable level of debt beyond which the system heads towards the 
collapse (Proposition 2.2). The debt multiplier is equal to: 
(2.43) 
dk 
db 1+a2 -a(1-a)(1-/3)k"'` -a(1-a)(1-ß(2a-1)k2a_2 -ab(1-a)(1- 
1+a(1- 
21 At the end of this chapter, we will point out that, in our model, the concept of maximum sustainable level of 
debt is associated with the occurrence of a catastrophe in the economy. 
22 In order to calculate the derivatives, the asset market equilibrium has been rewritten as: 
k, +, +ak;, =(1-a)(1-fl)k°+a(1-a)(1-f3)k°k; +, +aßbk; 
; '-b -abk;; ' 
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Again, by applying the Correspondence Principle, it follows that the effect of an increase in 
debt on the capital stock is negative, as previously analysed in Proposition 2.1. 
2.3.4 Perpetuity Bonds 
The existence of multiple equilibria can be demonstrated by solving the system made up by 
eqs. (2.28)-(2.29), evaluated at the steady state: 
(2.44) 
1= 
a[(1-a)(1-ijk"-(1-ß)b 
q 
(2.45) T= (1-/3)[(1-a)ký-b]-qb 
By combining these last two equations, we obtain an equation either in k: 
(2.46a) b (1-ßa= a(1- a)(1-ý13)k°` - ak -bk'-a 
or, equivalently, in q: 
(2.46b) 
(aq)''a+b(1-ß)+bq 
-(a4)l 
1a 
=0. (1-a)(1-ý 
The system has two solutions. This result seems to be robust to any values of the 
parameters (a, ß), provided that the level of debt does not exceed a critical level beyond 
which no steady state exists. 
The effect of a debt increase on the steady state level of capital stock is measured by the 
following multiplier: 
(2.47) 
dk 
_- 
TI'a+a(1-ý 
db b(1-a)k''+a-a(1-a)(1 
The existence of multiple equilibria comes out clearly also from the analysis of the 
dynamic properties of the system. 
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Let us start from the first equation for the asset market stationary locus (eq. (2.28)23), where 
eq, = 0: 
(2.48) +(1-ß)b +q, 
b 1I 
la 
_l 
! 
'/(t-a) 
1 k' 
(1- a)(1-ß) I 
The phaseline QQ is illustrated in fig. 2.4 where the intersection point with the abscissa axis 
is 
1 
balla 
> 0. As debt rises, the stationary locus shifts down and outwards. 
- 
q1 
00 
0 
figure 2.4 
The first derivative of the function is equal to: 
(2.49) 
dqý 
= 
a(1-a)(1-ß)ka-I 
dk, aýa +b 
1-aýý 
23 The asset market difference equation, using the specific Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, is: 
1+q, __ 
a{(1-a)(1-) k; -(1-ý3jb -q, bJa-1 
q, 
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Given that the acceptable values for the two endogenous variables must lie in the positive 
quadrant, the phaseline is upward sloping. For all the points above the phaseline the price of 
the bonds, q,, increases and conversely for all the points below. 
The second equation, which represents the capital stock stationary locus (eq. (2.29)24), 
Ak, = 0, is: 
k (1-a)(1-ß)k, ß 
(2.50) q, _-b`+ -0-A. 
The sign of the first derivative: 
(2.51) 
dß' 
._1 +a(1-a)(1-, 
B)k'-' 
dk, b 
depends on the size of the capital stock. The smaller is the capital stock, the more likely that 
the slope is positive. The function is concave as suggested by the second derivative: 
d29, 
___ 
a(1-a)2(1_ß)k"-2 <o. (2.52) 
dk, 2 b 
The phaseline, KK, in fig. 2.5, has the shape of a parabola with the downward concavity. The 
capital stock increases below the function and decreases above it. As debt rises, the stationary 
locus shifts down at each level of k,. 
24 The capital stock difference equation using the specific Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions 
becomes: 
kr+1 =(1-a)(1-aka-qýb-(1-fib. 
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figure 2.5 
The overall system and its dynamics are represented in fig. 2.6. 
4r 
0 
figure 2.6 
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1 
The graph analysis suggests that point A is a source whereas point B is a saddle. The line SS 
represents the saddle path which is the unique locus of points which converges to the 
equilibrium in the neighbourhood of the saddle point steady state, B. It must be noted that the 
existence of the two steady states is conditional on the assumption that debt does not exceed 
a level, beyond which dynamics of capital stock decumulation would arise (Proposition 2.2). 
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Now the analysis proceeds with the investigation of the stability properties of the two 
steady states given some sets of parameter values and with the study of the effects of an 
increase in the size of debt on the steady state values of the capital stock and the bond price. 
The procedure followed is divided into three steps. Firstly, we find the Jacobian matrix of the 
system and we linearise the system around the steady state. Secondly, we provide the 
conditions which must be satisfied for the system to be a saddle and a source, respectively25, 
and we apply the Correspondence Principle to determine the sign of the long-run debt 
multipliers. A brief description of the Correspondence Principle and its applications to a 
discrete time models is found in appendix 1 at the end of this chapter. Finally, we check that 
the eigenvalues of the system are consistent with the characterisation of the two stationary 
points as described before. 
The local stability properties of the system are studied by using two particular solutions to 
the system found for some sets of parameters. These solutions are found by using 
"Mathematica" which has turned out to be very helpful in solving non-linear equations and 
depicting some of the functions analysed in this thesis. For instance, for the set of parameter 
values (a = 0.5,, ß= 0.3, b = 0.01) we found the following solutions: 
1k, = 0.000519173 _ 
k2 =0.0943808 
(2.53) A=B0.614429 ' qt = 0.0455707 q2 = 
whereas for (a= 0.5,, 6=0.7, 
F=0.0l) we found: 
k, = 0.0009 _ 
k2 = 0.01 A 
q, = 0.06 
B 
q2 = 0.2 
These solutions will be useful to support our intuitions about the properties of the two 
steady states. 
25 See Azariadis (1993), pp. 63-67. 
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STEP 1 
The system can be rewritten in a matrix form as follows: 
(2.54) 
a (1-a)b 2(1 2 1-a dq+, ]=[, + , k, _« 
+(I- k -a(1-a)-ý3)k -dgl +k 
1-ýß+ 
a 
JIdb 
dk1+1 
-b a(1-a)(1-ß k7 
1] 
a_, dk, -(1-ý-q 
where the Jacobian matrix is equal to: 
2.55) J(q, k)= 
l+kaa+(1 k 
a)b 
-a(1-a)2(1-ýk"-i 
with 
a (1-a)b T=1+k, 
_"+ k 
+a(1-a)(1-/k"-ý>0 (7-Trace) 
D= a(1- a)(1 _ p)k a''r1+. % 
a 
I_a >0 
(D=Determinant). 
If we denominate each term of the matrix above by a,,, where i, j=1,2 indicate the number 
of the rows and the columns respectively, and we subtract dq, (dk, ) from the first (second) 
row, the system can be rewritten as: 
(2.56) 
A ql+l 
= lau -1 a12 dq, ]+[ b' db. skr+l a21 a, -1 dk, b2 
On the two stationary loci Oq, +, = 
4+1= 0, so that the system can be transformed as: 
(2.57) 
all -1 a12 d4' _ 
[-b 
l 
]dF. 
a2, a22 -1 dk, -b2 
where the matrix on the LHS is hereafter called coefficient matrix C. 
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STEP 2 
i) If point B is a saddle, this implies that the eigenvalues are real and the dominant one is 
outside the unit circle while the other is inside. In a deterministic system, this is equivalent to 
saying that the system converges to the steady state with a positive debt only for an initial 
value of q0, given some arbitrary k0. This shows that, although the level of debt is kept 
constant, financial instability may, nevertheless, take place. 
Considering the Jacobian matrix in (2.55), since T> 0, the condition which must be 
satisfied to be a saddle is: -(T+ 1) <D< (T- 1). By substituting the co-ordinates of point B 
for both sets of parameter values in (2.53), we find that these inequalities are satisfied. 
ii) If point A is a source, this implies that both eigenvalues are real and outside the unit 
circle. The stationary state is an unstable node. Out of the three different sets of conditions 
for which, if satisfied, the system can be a source, the only set which applies with T> 0 is the 
following: D> T- I, D > -(T+ 1), D > 1, T> 2. Substituting the values of the co-ordinates of 
point A in (2.53) we find that all the inequalities are satisfied. 
In order to determine the sign of the long-run debt multipliers, we apply the 
Correspondence Principle. As we explain in appendix 1 to this chapter, the sign of the 
determinant of the matrix on the LHS of (2.57) is related to the stability properties of the 
steady state. If the steady state is saddle point stable, the sign of the determinant is negative 
and conversely if it is unstable. The long-run multipliers are calculated from (2.57): 
dk 
__ 
(a -1)(-b2)+bia2, dq _ -b, 
(a22-1)+b2a, 2 (2.58) 
db det C db det C 
By substituting each term of the matrix and carrying out the calculations, we get: 
Fa 
1-ýß+ 
a 
(kI 
it 
(2.59) 
dk 
_ db det C 
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The numerator of the multiplier is positive whereas the sign of the denominator depends on 
the steady state at which det C is evaluated. The determinant of the coefficient matrix C is 
equal to: - 
(2.60) detC= 
(k, 
la)2 
"[a2(1-a)(1-, 6) -kt-a-(1-a)bk1-2a]. 
The higher the steady state level of the capital stock, the more likely the determinant to, be 
negative. As a matter of fact, when evaluated at the steady state B (in (2.53)), det C turns out 
to be negative whereas for the source A it is positive. By direct application of the 
Correspondence Principle26, it follows that, as a consequence of a debt increase, there is 
crowding out of capital stock if the steady state is saddle point stable. Conversely for the 
unstable steady state. 
The same reasoning can be applied to find the long-run debt multiplier of the bond price. 
The latter is equal to: 
1 -fl+ 
T" ). I-a 
(2.61) q= 
db det C 
The numerator is positive, so that an increase in debt decreases the stable equilibrium value 
of the perpetuity bond, QED. 
STEP 3 
The eigenvalues, found by using "Mathematica" and substituting the steady state values of 
T, satisfy the properties anticipated for each steady state27. In conclusion, there is a unique 
path which converges to the stationary equilibrium B. Therefore, if initially the system is off 
this path, i. e. there is a wrong combination of capital stock and bond price, it will never 
converge to a stationary point because dynamics would drive it away from the equilibrium. 
What distinguishes this analysis from that the two previous cases of financial assets is that a 
26 For a more complete explanation of the Correspondence Principle, see appendix 1. 
27 We omit to report the solutions for the eigenvalues for matter of simplicity. 
56 
completely stable (sink) equilibrium does not exist, so that the initial conditions are more 
stringent for the system to finally converge to an equilibrium: in fact, even if ko > kA, we still 
have to assume away "bubble paths" to approach point B. On the other hand, if the initial 
condition for k implies that ko < k,,, then the poverty trap is still a possibility with this kind of 
financial instrument. 
A final comment can be drawn from comparing the multipliers given in egs. (2.40)-(2.43) 
I 
and (2.47). After some calculations we can state that for 
T> [a(1- a)(1 -/3)]'-a (and setting 
b=0 for simplicity) the multiplier is bigger in the case of perpetuity bonds than in the other 
two cases, thus indicating a larger crowding out effect. This is a relevant result which has 
been derived by considering an initial framework which does not involve the presence of debt 
a government has suddenly to finance. Therefore, it implies that the financial instrument the 
government chooses to use can be relevant to the process of economic growth of a country28. 
2.3.5 The Issue of Debt Sustainability 
The main findings of the model we have presented are twofold. The first one is that there is 
a positive likelihood that a system facing a positive amount of debt is unstable and the 
consequent collapse of the economy occurs if the latter exceeds a critical level29. This 
is a 
very important and interesting finding which denotes 
how "... deficits may be simply 
unsustainable, a possibility never considered 
by the traditional view"30. High levels of 
public-sector debt may simply push up interest rates, 
displacing private investment and 
creating the so called debt trap. Beyond a certain level, 
indebtedness can cause a vicious 
circle: rising debt boosts interest payments which 
in turns leads to extra borrowing. In 
addition, our model has shown that if a too high constant debt is accumulated, 
unsustainabilitY can still arise. Only if the government runs a surplus on its primary 
budget it 
28 In appendix 2 we show that, conditional on debt equal to zero, the size of the multiplier for the treasury bills is 
the smallest one independently of the production function used. 
29 The concept of debt repudiation has been a major topic of discussion in these last few months given the 
possible debt default by the Mexican government. 
30 Blanchard (1984), p. 7. 
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can lighten the burden on tomorrow's taxpayers. Looking at the real world, this issue is 
strictly related to the debate of whether debt may help the recovery of a country by increasing 
aggregate demand or, if instead, it will increase the long-run interest rates thus offsetting the 
expansionary effect. 
The second finding is that it can explain the existence of the poverty trap if the capital 
stock is extremely low when the government increases the issue of debt. This tends to 
underline how a policy of debt management through the issue of bonds is sustainable only if 
the capital stock in the economy is high enough to be maintained in the long run31. 
However, the most probably distinctive feature of our model is that a maximum 
sustainable level of debt exists, which is crucial for determining the future path of the 
economy. When debt is pushed very slightly beyond this point, a catastrophe occurs in the 
economy. This catastrophe takes the form of a steady state with a strictly positive capital 
stock suddenly ceasing to exist, so that the economy is thrown into an abyss of uncontrolled 
capital decumulation, leading to complete annihilation. This catastrophic scenario can label a 
fiscal policy as destructive if a small shock makes debt bigger than the maximum sustainable 
level, which would provoke a massive collapse. This phenomenon will be underlined further 
on in this thesis and it turns out to be associated with the existence of two non-trivial steady 
states, a policy of increasing debt beyond the level for which no equilibrium exists. 
Finally, we confirm the standard result that debt plays an important role in affecting the 
long-run level of the capital stock and, consequently, of aggregate demand and output. 
Before considering a simulation exercise of our model, we briefly compare the results we 
have derived in this section with those reported in section 3 of Blanchard's (1984) paper, 
which focuses on the same issue of debt sustainability formalised in a standard 
macroeconomic continuous time but not microfounded set-up. Both the assumptions made 
31 Blanchard (1984) claims that the sustainable levels of debt are very large at the historical level of real rates of 
1-2% but much smaller at the current 3-6%. His analysis is quite similar to ours in so far as his computations do 
not take into account GNP growth 
(which would increase the sustainable ratio of debt-to-GNP) and do not allow 
for monetization and the use of the inflation tax. 
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and the results achieved by Blanchard differ from ours, and his most interesting conclusions 
are here summarised. 
First of all, he defines the maximum level of debt as a function of the difference between 
the maximum amount of taxes which can be collected by the government and the minimum 
socially acceptable amount of government outlays, and these measures are, noticeably, quite 
ad hoc. On the other side, the rule of deficit adjustment is criticizable. In fact, the budget 
surplus X (or deficit) is assumed to converge slowly to its maximum level until the gap 
between the current and the maximum level is eliminated. Debt D instead increases in order 
to repay the interest payments and net public spending. Only if D and X at time t=0 are such 
that the system is on the saddle path or above it on a trajectory which intersects the function 
b=0, would the dynamics eventually lead to the equilibrium. Any time the starting point is 
off and below the saddle path, deficit is not sustainable: although it is reduced as fast as 
feasible, the maximum level of debt would be reached before deficits are totally eliminated. 
However, difficulties arise because the maximum socially acceptable net deficit is difficult to 
define empirically. With a different approach we derived the maximum level of debt 
endogenously in the mode132. 
Secondly, in our model the interest rate paid on debt is no longer constant, and this permits 
to evaluate the effects of the fiscal policy on the real economy. 
The concept of debt sustainability as introduced in our model seems to be very important in 
relation to the convergence criteria as the necessary condition for joining the monetary union 
according to the Maastricht Treaty. As underlined in the previous chapter, the fiscal 
adjustment is very urgent for some countries since the future involvement in the process of 
the European Monetary Integration prohibits monetization as a source of revenue. The 
transition to the final stage of the monetary union depends on the capability of a country to 
meet these requirements. The most likely forecast is that, in the future, countries will have to 
run high primary budget surpluses to prevent an explosive growth of debt. 
32 However, in Blanchard's analysis the requirement that the initial values of debt and deficit are on or above the 
saddle path may be broadly interpreted as the conditions for sustainability. 
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We continue our analysis of the sustainability of debt management policies by investigating 
whether our model fits in the reality and how reliable it can be as an instrument for 
evaluating current fiscal policies in the G-7 countries. 
SECTION 4. 
SOME CALIBRATION EXERCISES AND 
A REAL WORLD FISCAL POLICY EVALUATION 
2.4.1 Introduction 
From the model we have set up in this chapter, the issue of maximum sustainable debt-to- 
capital stock ratio has turned out to be very important for evaluating the fiscal policy and the 
future of a country. Now the purpose of our exercise is to highlight some of the aspects of 
fiscal policy sustainability. In the first subsection, we simulate our model to find the 
maximum sustainable level of debt for the three types of financing policies (for particular 
parameter values) and we compare one each other in order to determine under what policy 
the maximum sustainable debt-to-capital stock ratio is the biggest. 
In the second subsection, the ratios found by the model simulations are compared with the 
debt-to-capital stock ratios which are calculated for some developed countries using the 
NIGEM33 (National Global Econometric Model) data referring to the G-7 countries. A 
general evaluation of the sustainability of the policies pursued in those countries is then 
provided by taking the simulated maximum sustainable ratios as benchmarks (i. e. the 
maximum levels beyond which a debt management policy should be regarded as 
unsustainable according to our model). 
33 The data of this model were made available by the ESRC Macroeconomic Modelling Bureau at the University 
of Warwick. 
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This exercise aims at studying whether a very simple model like ours, when parameterised 
with plausible parameter values, provides values for the "maximum sustainable level of debt" 
which can be compared with the actual values. As a consequence, this is not intended as a 
precise "calibration exercise", but just a simple and rough attempt to see whether the model 
generates numbers which are reasonably consistent with the real-world numbers. 
Before proceeding with our analysis, it is obvious to point out that this exercise presents 
some drawbacks due to the simplified structure of our model, which partially affect the final 
results. In the next pages we first illustrate the results of the simulations, and then we deal 
with their interpretation. 
2.4.2 A Calibration Exercise 
In this subsection we simulate our model with the aim of determining the maximum 
sustainable level of debt under the three different financing policies presented in this 
chapter. The simulations are carried out for different parameter values of the utility function, 
but in all of them the value of the share of the capital stock in the Cobb-Douglas production 
function (a) has been kept fixed at one-third as suggested by the empirical estimations in the 
literature. 
The sets of parameters considered are {a = 0.3, ß= 0.3}, (a = 0.3, ß= 0.5), (a = 0.3,3= 0.7) 
where 83 represents the pure time preference rate in the Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
In the following table we report the values of the simulations for each financing policy 
marked with a subscript. The equations considered are (2.38)-(2.41)-{(2.48)-(2.50)) for 
savings deposits, treasury bills and perpetuity bonds, respectively. 
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Table 2.1 
Param. Savings Deposits Treasury Bills Perpet. Bonds 
values 
a=0.3 
R; D 
= . Rsn = R re = RPa = Rra ' Rsn = Rpa = 
b 
Rý (1 + rsD) R' " SD . R " b r 
. R 
R TB . b sD 
k* 
re 
l+rra ' 
'B 
k* 
_ 
l+rre ' 
Pa 
r- 
" 
1 
=RPB' "-' 
rPe 
Pe _ - k* 
"(I+rPB) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(6) 
7 (8) (9) 
ß= 0.3 1.6113 4.5745 2.9632 1.0072 3.1727 2.1655 1.4823 7.6598 6.1754 
, ß= 0.5 0.5625 1.5689 0.9895 1.1469 5.2482 4.1014 1.2744 10.2845 8.7941 
ß= 0.7 0.275 0.7584 0.0387 1.2228 9.3333 8.1105 1.4746 15.6531 14.1785 
Table 2.1 reports the values of the maximum sustainable debt-to-capital stock ratios, 
where i= SD, TB, PB. Some interesting observations can be put forward. First of 
all, it seems to be a quite general result that the maximum sustainable debt-to-capital stock 
ratio is different according to the policy the government chooses to manage its debt. 
Secondly, the comparison between the three different government financing policies 
depends on the value of the parameter ß, so that the individual's pure time preference can 
influence the fiscal policy sustainability and the amount of debt which can be raised 
relatively to the capital stock within the economy. A careful investigation of the figures in 
table 2.1 suggests the following comments: 
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a) as far as Rso is concerned, the comparison carried out between the figures in columns (1)- 
(4)-(7) allows to define the policy consistent with the highest sustainable debt-to-capital 
stock ratio: 
- for ß= 0.3, Rs-Dis the greatest under the savings deposits policy; 
- for ß= 0.5 and ß= 0.7, this ratio is the greatest under the perpetuity bonds policy. 
b) As far as R; and R; 8 are concerned, the comparisons are carried out between figures in 
columns (2)-(5)-(8) for TB and in columns (3)-(6)-(9) for PB: both ratios are the greatest in 
the perpetuity bonds case independently of the value of ß. 
An explanation why the financing policy through perpetuity bonds yields the higher ratios 
for both the treasury bills and perpetuity bonds is that the interest payments which are 
included in the simulated amount of debt are very high since the interest rates are measured 
over a forty-year period (these values are here omitted for convenience). Of course, savings 
deposits are not affected by this problem since they are defined as net of interests. 
Consequently, when we compare real data (in which interest rates data are annual) with the 
present model simulations, it will be more appropriate to compare the ratios referring to the 
savings deposits case only, taking column (1) as the benchmark. 
Before turning our attention to the real world, it is worth remembering that another 
measure usually adopted to evaluate the sustainability of a fiscal policy is the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. However, this measure within our model is meaningless. The reason is that the 
simulated values of the GDP (which is a flow variable) in our model would be measured over 
a period of 40 years; a big problem would then arise if we tried to divide a stock (debt) with a 
flow variable (although measured on the same period) and if the latter referred to a period of 
more than one year. Instead this problem does not arise if we divide two stocks (like debt and 
capital stock), no matter if measured over forty years like in our model, provided they are 
measured over the same time span. 
In the next subsection we compare our model simulations with some actual figures for the 
ratios (RSD, RrB, RPB) in some 
developed countries. These values will be important for 
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evaluating government debt management policies and the trends of debt-to-capital stock ratio 
which reflect approximately the economic fiscal situation in each country. 
2.4.3 An Evaluation of the Current Fiscal Policy 
in the G7 Countries 
As already explained, our main purpose is to resort to some data referring to the G-7 
countries debt and capital stock in order to compare the debt-to-capital stock ratios so 
calculated with the simulated maximum sustainable ratios of our model and to give a general 
evaluation of the performance of the model itself in explaining the reality. For this purpose, 
we resort to the NIGEM data. Complete and detailed tables of the main economic variables 
data of our interest referring to the G-7 countries are contained in appendix 3, tables (C. I- 
C. 7), where we also summarise briefly the fiscal situation in each individual country. 
By comparing the actual ratios, RSD, with the simulated ones, Rso, we can notice that, 
generally, in some countries the former are just slightly higher than the latter and they have 
been increasing over the last decade: this is the reason why the fiscal policies in these 
countries, where the economic situation may jeopardise their future growth, should be 
reversed. Conversely, for those countries where the simulated ratios are higher than the actual 
ones, the fiscal policies are sustainable. Anyway, the consistency in size between the two 
ratios for all countries is quite reassuring in terms of the potentiality of our model as a tool 
for evaluating the sustainability of government fiscal policies. 
As a consequence of the fact that some countries are running an unsustainable level of debt, 
it is important to underline that our model forecasts could be a bit pessimistic because it 
assumes that the government budget always balances and revenues from monetization are 
excluded, whereas in reality debt is also financed by seigniorage and inflation tax. 
A further remark concerns a direct comparison between our RR (R; B) and the actual ratios 
b"I (LE-2), which must be carried out with a critical attitude, since simulated interest 
k kPa 
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payments would tend to be overvalued. In fact, each generation is assumed to live for two 
periods of approximately forty years each, so that the simulated maximum ratios are 
calculated over this time span, whereas the actual ratios are yearly. As we mentioned in 
subsection 2.4.2, our simulations assume that the interests to be paid on debt are calculated 
over a forty-year period (which is half a lifetime, i. e. a high degree of temporal aggregation), 
whereas the empirical data on gross debt only include interests for one-year period. 
On the base of the results achieved, by comparing the actual ratios RSD with the simulated 
ones, RRD, we can conclude that the fiscal policy in some countries, like Canada, Italy, Japan 
and the United States, should be soon reversed before debt starts rolling over on an unstable 
path which has already been reached. 
Therefore, it follows that, notwithstanding the somehow simplistic structure of our model, 
nevertheless its simulations provide interesting results which can help to understand and 
investigate more deeply the reality. 
We now continue our analysis of the sustainability of debt management policies in the next 
chapter where we apply the methodology developed in this chapter to other frameworks and 
we study the implications for other main real economic variables. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The comparative statics analysis of the system composed by egs. (2.28)-(2.29) can be carried 
out by linearising it about the steady state (k, q ), which allows us to rewrite: 
(A. 1) 
[dki+i] 
_[(kq)]dkh 
-(sM+q)/(1-srf") 
d41+l 
Jý 
dqi + -f"gisw+4)/(1-sf") 
db, 
where the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives is equal to: 
-kswf"1(1-s, f") -b l(1-s, f") (A. 2) J(kýq)= 
-f tt2sp%CQ/(1-s, f") {1/Cj+l-f"ýSr(1/q+l)+bq]}/(1-S, f") 
By subtracting dk, and dqr from the first and second row respectively and setting 
Odk1+1 = Odq, +, = 
0, we get: 
f Wb - f.. - 1-s 
, 
f'1-sr 
1 __ý 1 
dk 
_ 
ýs,. +R)ß(1-s f") db. (A 3) 
9%2q q 
+l+f.. -bq-s, q +1 äq 
[f"qs 
+q)I(1-sf") 
,, 
f 
_ -1 " i-s, f i-sf 
The long-run debt multiplier of the capital stock is determined by applying Cramer's rule: 
(A. 4) 
dk 
db 
s+q b 
1-s, f' 
+ "(-5v-s, 
(I+l 
+sf f 
4fýý(S. +R') 
1-S, f'' 1-S, f'' 
det C 
where det C stands for the determinant of the coefficients matrix on the LHS in (A. 3). After 
some calculations we obtain the following expression: 
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(s,. +4) 
1 
(1-sf") 
9 
dk (1-S, f")2 
(A. 5) 
db (-ksWf'-1+Srftt+fu q2)(1-s f1)q 
0 -Srf ")2 
f' (k) and carrying out 
the necessary simplifications, turns out which, after substituting q=1I=1 
to be equal to the multiplier in eq. (2.32). 
The application of the Correspondence Principle enables us to determine unambiguously the 
sign of the multiplier. This method will be used throughout the thesis in order to determine the 
sign of the expression measuring the effect of an exogenous shock in debt on the endogenous 
variable in the model (a rigorous analysis of the Correspondence Principle for a difference 
equations system was carried out by Rankin (1985a)). The system consists of two endogenous 
variables of which only one (the bond price) is a jump or forward-looking variable. Therefore, 
for the saddle point stability property to be satisfied, it is required that only one eigenvalue of 
the Jacobian matrix lies outside the unit circle, whereas the other must lie inside. An equivalent 
condition is that, assuming that the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix in (A. 3) are real, one 
should lie inside and the other outside the interval (-2; 0). This means that their product could be 
positive or negative. Since we tend to exclude extravagant behaviour, i. e. oscillatory paths 
which are attributed to a negative sign of an eigenvalue', stability of this sort imposes that the 
determinant of the coefficient matrix is negative. In conclusion, the determinant for a saddle 
point stable steady state is negative whereas it is positive for an unstable steady state. On the 
other hand, since the condition (1- s, f") >0 is sufficient for the numerator to be positive, it 
I For a study on the application of the Correspondence Principle to discrete time models, see Rankin (1985a). The 
author also underlines that a "perverse" case may occur when an odd number of unstable real eigenvalues 
lying below 
(-2) exists in a perfect foresight model with more than one state variable. However, 
in the author's words, "Such 
eigenvalues give rise to "oscillations" along 
divergent paths, and since the latter do form part of the complete 
perfect foresight trajectory in cases in which, 
for example, there is a pre-announced policy change, [... ], this case 
might conceivably be dismissed as involving too 
bizarre a form of behaviour to be of economic interest" (Rankin, 
p. 7). In conclusion, it is possible to exclude such perverse 
behaviour by the condition that all eigenvalues must be 
"non-oscillatory". 
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follows that there is a crowding out effect on the saddle point steady state level of capital stock, 
which is what we found for the other two cases of debt management policies. 
The same reasoning can be applied to evaluate the overall effect on the steady state bond price 
following the same policy of an increase in government debt. The denominator is the same as in 
eq. (A. 5) so that the Correspondence Principle still applies. After some calculations we find the 
following multiplier: 
-4b(s,. +9)(1-sf") 
(A. 6) 
d (1-sf ")z 
db_ (-ks, 
ýf"+srfit+ 
f"zbq1) 
4 
(1-s, f'1)2 
which is negative for the saddle point steady state provided that (1- s, f") > 0, that is a 
condition usually assumed to hold and considered at the beginning of chapter 2. This is quite 
intuitive since there is an inverse relationship between the perpetuity bond price and the long- 
run interest rate (and, therefore, a positive relationship between q and 
T). 
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APPENDIX 2 
The purpose of this appendix is twofold. In the first part we rank by size the debt multipliers 
associated with the three financial assets which were presented in chapter 2. In the second part 
we further investigate the model by proving that the results obtained from our model simulations 
are not dependent on the "technology efficiency" parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Moreover, we derive the equations which define the debt-to-capital stock ratios. 
First of all, due to the fact that, following our analysis in chapter 2, b, $ , 
b,, and b, B are not 
equivalent, since the first is inclusive of interest payments which are not included in the second, 
whereas the third consists only of interest payments, we have to find out the debt expression 
which holds for the three financing policies under investigation. After doing so, we can 
compare rigorously the size of the multipliers 
Idb 
r, 
where i=SD, TB, PB. 
From the definitions given above, at the steady state the following relations hold: 
(B. 1) bSD (1+r)=bTB 
(B. 2) bsD = 
bF 
Equating (B. 1) and (B. 2), we derive the relationship between these different types of debt: 
(B. 3) 
bTB 
=bPB. 1+r r 
When we calculate the multipliers, the following equalities hold: 
dk dk r2 
(B. 4) 
AT 
_ A 
7e 
db dr PB. r+rZ -bPB. dbI pB 
2 In all the three cases we assumed that the government budget constraint is balanced by endogenous taxes. 
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(B. 5) 
dk 
_ 
dk 1 
db 
TB 
db 
so dF 1+r+bSD - db so 
dk dk r2 (B. 6) -_, dbSD db - PB 
(F- 
b , 
dr 
PB 
db PB 
from which it is clear that, by setting b, = 0, the multiplier of the treasury bills is smaller than 
the multipliers of the savings deposits and the perpetuity bonds, whereas 
db 
is bigger than 
JP 
dk ifr<1. 
db 
sD 
We now briefly show that the ratios of debt-to-capital stock do not depend on the parameter of 
technological progress represented by the term A3 of the Cobb-Douglas production function 
y, = Akt , and that a neat equation 
for calculating of these ratios can be found. 
1) Savings Deposits. 
The asset market equilibrium for which the simulations have been carried out is the following: 
(B. 7) k, +, = 
(1-A[(1-a)ka-abk"-l]-b. 
To show that the maximum ratio RsD = --- (being b* the maximum sustainable level of debt k sn 
and k the steady state level of the capital stock) is independent on the parameter A, we first 
consider the tangency point condition which says that, at the maximum sustainable level of debt, 
the slope of the phaseline line must be equal to the slope of the 45 degree line, i. e.: 
(B. 8) 1= A(1-/3)[a(1-a)ka-ab*ka-']-b*. 
3 This intuition is supported also by the results of the simulations which have been carried out for different values of 
A. 
70 
Taking into account that RRD-I =* the previous relation can be rewritten after few 
SD 
rearrangements, as: 
(B. 9) 1= a(1-a)(1-ý(Ab *a-')(Rsv' +R; D2 
a). 
The other condition which must be satisfied for a unique steady state to exist is that the steady 
state itself must lie on the 45 degree line. This implies that, from eq. (B. 7), the following 
equation must be satisfied: 
(B. 10) k= A(1-A)[(1-a)k"-ab*k"'']-b*. 
Dividing it through b* and doing the necessary rearrangements, we find: 
(B. 11) Rs-D-' = (1-f(Ab *"-1)[(1-a)R;, 
"-aR; 
D`-" 
Substituting the expression for (Ab derived from eq. (B. 11), into eq. (B. 9), we find an 
equation where the only unknown is the ratio Rte, whose value is clearly independent of the 
parameter A and the variable b*, QED, and which allows us to calculate the capital stock-to- 
debt ratio given the parameter values. 
2) Treasury Bills. 
The asset market equilibrium is equal to: 
afiFkaýI a 
(B. 12) k, +; 
(1-a)(1-, 3) 
In order to show that the value of the ratio 
4 is independent of A we follow the same 
reasoning as in point 1 above. One of the two conditions for having a unique steady state is that 
the steady state itself must belong to the phaseline and the tangency condition must hold. 
Carrying out all the calculations, we obtain the final equation: 
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(B. 13) 
1 
i 
a(1- a)(Ab *a-l)a(1-fl) 
I-a 
. -ý a(Ab *t)ßRral-a R ;a__ 'ý [1+a(Ab *a-')R; I a]z 
1+ a(1-a)ß(Ab 
*°-')R sa 
(1-a)(1-ß) [1+a(Ab *a-I)Rý1-« 2 
Substituting into eq. (B. 13) the positive root of (Ab *'-') which is derived from the steady state 
condition applied to eq. (B. 12), we obtain an equation in the only unknown 4, from which it 
follows that the ratio debt-to-capital stock does not depend on the value of A and b *. 
3) Perpetui Bonds. 
The system consists of two equations in k and q: 
(B. 14) kr = 
(aq)1 a +(1- fib +qb 
(1- a)(1-ß) 
k (1-a)(1-ß)ka 
(B. 15) q, =-b +b -(1-A, 
whose intersections give us the steady state values. Substituting eq. (B. 14) into eq. (B. 15) we get: 
ta 
(aq)i-11 +(1-+qb 
(aq) 
(B. 16) 
'-° 
- =O. b. b 
The maximum level of debt corresponds to that value where there are two coincident solutions 
for q to eq. (B. 16). We can prove that also in this case the ratio of debt-to-capital stock is 
independent on the parameter A. The procedure followed is the same as in the two previous 
cases. One condition is represented by eq. (B. 16) evaluated at the steady state, and the other by 
the tangency of the two phaselines: 
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(B. 17) 
d 
da q 
d k (B. 13) (8.14) 
The final equation in RPB and (Ab *'-l) is the following: 
(B. 18) a(1-a)(1-fl)(Ab *a-1)RPB1-a =[a(1-a)(1- fj(Ab *a'I)RpB'-«-1]" 
-L a 
[1+a(Ab 
* "IIla(-RPB-t-(1- +(1-a)(1-ý(Ab *a-t)RPB-")i 
Substituting into the positive root of (Ab *"-`) found from eq. (B. 16) evaluated at the steady 
state, we derive an equation in the only unknown RPB, which again suggests that the value of A 
does not affect the maximum sustainable ratio 
b*, 
QED. 
k Pa 
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APPENDIX 3 
In this appendix we report some data concerning the G-7 countries which are used for the 
exercise contained in chapter 2, section 4, and we briefly dwell upon the actual fiscal situation 
in each of them. The exact source of these real data is reported in the captions for each country 
separately. The series of the data available for the capital stock variable has been elaborated by 
the NIGEM from the following expression: 
KBV = (1- 0.0125) " KBV (-1) + 1B, where IB stands for fixed capital business investment, 
which depends on IB(-1) and on the ratios 
1B(-1)' LR(-1), IB(-I), where LR is the long-run Y(-1) IB(-2) 
interest rate and Y is the GNP. 
Government debt under the form of treasury bills, B, $, is in nominal terms. When it is deflated 
by the GDP deflator, real debt is marked by b.. The other two kinds of debt, namely bsDand 
bpB, are calculated with the formulas bsD = bTB - (1 +r ) 
and b, 8 = rp8 "bsD, respectively. 
The nominal interest rates (i) have been transformed in real terms (r) by taking into account 
the annual inflation rate. The year base is different for each country. In the following tables we 
report the actual situation elaborated for the G-7 countries. The underlined results and the 
related comments separately for each country are given at the end of the presentation of the 
tables. 
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CANADA 
Table C. 1 
Year B 1, bre k r, $ r_e RsD R, $ Rß 
1984 264466 277800.42 678037.4 8.7984 11.5784 0.3766 0.4097 0.0436 
1985 310374 317843.32 709957.9 6.1891 8.6191 0.4216 0.4477 0.0363 
1986 348101 348101 743019.5 4.9774 6.4074 0.4463 0.4685 0.0286 
1987 383807 366577.84 780524.7 4.3825 6.2525 0.4499 0.4695 0.0281 
1988 419342 382785.94 826668.0 5.9131 6.4131 0.4372 0.4630 0.0280 
1989 453960 395177.37 875368.1 8.7782 6.5182 0.4150 0.4514 0.0271 
1990 486681 410268.49 919455.3 10.3635 8.5535 0.4043 0.4462 0.0346 
1991 540565 444635 960782.1 8.035 9.255 0.4284 0.4629 0.0396 
1992 602770 490256.20 993656.3 5.4279 7.7229 0.4680 0.4934 0.0361 
1993 656192 529507.36 1024211 4.0122 7.0872 0.4965 0.5170 0.0352 
1994 712975.3 573383.85 1061884 4.6972 7.6572 0.5157 0.5400 0.0395 
Caption of table C. 1: source of data. 
- B. is the stock of government 
debt, expressed in million domestic currency, from the OECD 
Economic Outlook. 
-k is the capital stock, 
1986 prices, million domestic currency, from the OECD Business Sector 
database, and where unavailable, interpolate annual data from OECD Economic Outlook, gross 
real stock of business fixed capital. ib is business investment, 1986 domestic prices, million 
domestic currency. 
- r7z, is the real 3-month 
interest rates, where i. is taken from MEI (OECD Main Economic 
Indicators), Canada Tables, National Accounts Section, 90 day deposit receipts. 
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- rPB is the real long-term interest rates on government bonds, where ipB is taken from the Bank 
of Canada. 
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FRANCE 
Table C. 2 
Year BTB bra k rra rPB Rsn Rra Rre 
1984 1618.7 1103.22 6173.597 7.6638 9.3938 0.1660 0.1787 0.0156 
1985 1813.3 1168.55 6302.983 5.3935 7.3685 0.1759 0.1937 0.0130 
1986 1993.3 1220.82 6444.847 5.5215 6.9165 0.1795 0.1894 0.0124 
1987 2172.5 1292.58 6600.310 6.0351 8.1351, 0.1847 0.1958 0.0150 
1988 2329.8 1347.87 6784.242 5.6566 6.8366 0.1880 0.1987 0.0129 
1989 2503.3 1405.56 6996.640 6.499 6.379 0.1886 0.2010 0.0120 
1990 2614.2 1425.02 7222.365 8.1113 8.2713 0.1825 0.1973 0.0151 
1991 2783.8 1473.69 7437.219 7.6363 7.4563 0.1841 0.1982 0.0137 
1992 3184.3 1647.76 7623.175 9.0429 7.6229 0.1982 0.2162 0.0151 
1993 3701.3 1868.42 7767.236 7.16 5.35 0.2245 0.2410 0.0120 
1994 
T 
4109.9 2044.11 7908.218 4.4833 6.4733 0.2474 0.2585 0.0160 
Caption of table C. 2: source of data. 
- B. is the stock of government debt, in billion domestic currency, from the OECD Economic 
Outlook. 
-k is the capital stock, 1980 prices, in billion domestic currency, from the OECD Business 
Sector database. ib is taken from OECD Quarterly National Accounts, France section, table 5B, 
gross fixed capital formation, billion domestic currency. 
- r, B is the real short 
interest rates, where i. is taken from the International Monetary Fund 
(IlVIF), International Financial Statistics, French country page, interbank deposit rate, 60BS. 
-rß is the real long term 
interest rates on government bonds, where ipB is taken from the 
Banque de France, yield on government bonds on secondary market (over 7 years). 
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GERMANY 
Table C. 3 
Year BTB bra k rre rPa Rsn Rra RPB 
1984 734.6 878.38 4480.750 4.5885 6.4535 0.1874 0.1960 0.0121 
1985 778.8 912.55 4582.380 3.272 4.807 0.1928 0.1991 0.0093 
1986 824.2 935.90 4692.120 3.6251 5.1751 0.1925 0.1995 0.0100 
1987 882.2 983.25 4810.230 3.2753 5.5703 0.1979 0.2044 0.0110 
1988 938.1 1029.91 4933.610 2.7764 4.9414 0.2031 0.2088 0.0100 
1989 975 1045.18 5068.300 5.1734 5.2134 0.1961 0.2062 0.0102 
1990 1053.5 1094.86 5217.260 6.7716 7.2916 0.1965 0.2099 0.0143 
1991 1173.9 1173.85 5393.300 5.7263 4.9713 0.2059 0.2176 0.0102 
1992 1345.2 1288.27 5590.820 6.5987 4.9887 0.2162 0.2304 0.0108 
1993 1509.2 1399.50 5778.110 5.1601 4.2801 0.2303 0.2422 0.0099 
1994 1618.9 1463.02 5914.795 3.4862 5.3162 0.2390 0.2473 0.0127 
Caption of table C. 3: source of data. 
- B, $ is the stock of government 
debt, billion domestic currency, from Monatsberichte der 
Deutschen Bundesbank, section VIII, public finance, table 7, col. 1, verschuldung der 
offentlichen haushalte, total indebtedness of the public sector, millions domestic currency. 
-k is the capital stock, 
1991 prices, OECD Business Sector. ib is 1991 prices, billion domestic 
currency, is from Deutche Bundesbank Saisonbereinigte Wirtschaftszahlen, Statistisches Beiheft 
Zum Monatsbericht, table 111-2, Ausrustungsinrvest plus bauinvest, taken away the proportion of 
total investment accounted for by housing investment over the last year, and government 
investment. 
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- r., is the real short-term interest rates, where irB is taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics, German country page, 60BS, interbank deposit rate. 
- rPB is the real long-term interest rate on government bonds, where ipB is taken from MEI, 
summary table on long-term interest rates. 
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ITALY 
Table C. 4 
Year B, $ bre k rre rpe Rso Rra RPB 
1984 561489 611144.49 1923411 7.5955 8.9355 0.2953 0.3177 0.0264 
1985 683044 683214.80 1959973 7.7719 8.7819 0.3234 0.3486 0.0284 
1986 793583 736025.78 2000171 5.6682 6.2082 0.3482 0.3680 0.0216 
1987 910542 796624.67 2048004 4.2442 5.3442 0.3731 0.3890 0.0199 
1988 1035812 849722.72 2104600 3.7242 5.1842 0.3892 0.4037 0.0202 
1989 1168361 902557.74 2165417 5.4367 6.7167 0.3953 0.4168 0.0266 
1990 1318936 946152.08 2227822 3.9882 6.1652 0.4084 0.4247 0.0252 
1991 1485742 992811.23 2285747 6.4257 6.6557 0.4081 0.4343 0.0272 
1992 1675276 1069268.23 2337911 10.3097 9.4497 0.4146 0.4574 0.0392 
1993 1862937 1148238.75 2367129 6.2317 6.6917 0.4566 0.4851 0.0310 
1994 2023796 1211114.17 2394682 4.6642 6.5542 0.4832 0.5058 0.0317 
Caption of table C. 4: source of data. 
- B. is the stock of gross government debt, billion domestic currency, from OECD Economic 
Outlook. 
-k is the capital stock, from OECD Business Sector, 1985 prices and where unavailable, 
interpolate annual data from OECD Economic Outlook. fb is the total investment, 1985 prices, 
billion domestic currency, ISTAT gross fixed capital formation, seasonally adjusted. 
- rr is the real short-term interest rates, where i. is taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics, Italian country page, money market rate, 60B. 
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- rPB is the real long-term interest rates on government bonds, where iP& is taken from MEI, 
summary table on long-term interest rates. 
81 
JAPAN 
Table C. 5 
Year B, $ bre k rre r_a Rsn Rre Rpa 
1984 204005.7 207237.57 545367.4 5.2675 5.9485 0.3610 0.3800 0.0215 
1985 220176.7 220157.77 574096.8 5.4752 5.1142 0.3636 0.3835 0.0186 
1986 241976.9 237783.12 606381.6 4.6057 4.5457 0.3749 0.3921 0.0170 
1987 260814.9 256236.47 638685.2 4.1264 4.8004 0.3853 0.4012 0.0185 
1988 270578.1 264883.80 671093.5 4.0713 4.6533 0.3793 0.3947 0.0176 
1989 279729.9 268877.73 710823.2 2.8617 2.8017 0.3677 0.3783 0.0103 
1990 296156.8 278612.04 757924.0 5.9223 5.2673 0.3470 0.3676 0.0183 
1991 305456.2 281730.54 811589.1 5.9505 4.7985 0.3276 0.3471 0.0157 
1992 329757.9 299237.47 865883.5 3.1886 3.8286 0.3349 0.3456 0.0128 
1993 345466.9 310451.96 914576.9 2.2044 3.2184 0.3321 0.3394 0.0110 
1994 374623.5 336985.59 952740.1 2.2659 4.3489 0.3459 0.3537 0.0150 
Caption of table C. 5: source of data. 
- B78 is the stock of gross government 
debt, OECD Economic Outlook, billion domestic 
currency. 
-k is the capital stock, 
1985 prices, billion domestic currency, from OECD Business Sector. ib 
is at 1985 prices, from the Economic Planning Agency, annual report on National Accounts, 
National Accounts section, machinery, equipment, etc. 
- r, B is the real short-term 
interest rates, where i7 is taken from MEI, Japan section, certificates 
of deposit, % per annum. 
- rrß is the real long-term 
interest rates on government bonds, where i, 8 is taken from MEI 
summary table on long-term interest rates. 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
Table C. 6 
Year Bra bra k r7 r_ RsD Rra RPB 
1984 177132.2 245240.45 830080.0 5.6045 6.3495 0.2798 0.2954 0.0178 
1985 188167 246550.21 848480.0 7.7047 6.0697 0.2698 0.2906 0.0164 
1986 196787 249617.81 864770.0 9.5153 8.4453 0.2636 0.2887 0.0223 
1987 205804 248750.62 883030.0 5.9599 5.7299 0.2659 0.2817 0.0152 
1988 198749.5 226541.19 907312.1 4.1321 3.1771 0.2398 0.2497 0.0076 
1989 189406.5 201292.95 933650.1 8.4073 4.1023 0.1989 0.2156 0.0082 
1990 190830.7 187864.88 954967.0 8.6307 4.9507 0.1811 0.1967 0.0090 
1991 202808.2 187813.20 967858.9 7.8806 6.2756 0.1799 0.1941 0.0113 
1992 240836.3 213891.72 977296.5 7.2821 6.7821 0.2040 0.2189 0.0138 
1993 288581.1 248016.72 988296.5 2.906 4.831 0.2439 0.2510 0.0118 
1994 326705.3 272164.60 1001312 3.4779 5.9979 0.2627 0.2718 0.0158 
Caption of table C. 6: source of data. 
B. is the stock of gross government debt, million domestic currency, OECD Economic 
Outlook. 
-k is the capital stock, 
1990 prices, from OECD Business Sector. ib is at 1990 prices, from CSO 
Economic Trends, Quarterly article on national income, table A. 17, private sector less private 
investment in dwellings. 
- rý is the short-term 
interest rates, where im is taken from the Financial Statistic, table 13.15,3 
month inter-bank rate, CSO. 
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- rpB is the long-term interest rates on government 
bonds, where iPB is taken from the Financial 
Statistic, table 13.5, col. 3, interest rate on 20 year UK government securities (average of 
monthly figures). 
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UNITED STATES 
Table C. 7 
Year BrB bre k rre rPB Rsn RM Rpß 
1984 1695.6 1862.47 6890 7.4848 9.1048 0.2515 0.2703 0.0229 
1985 1941.2 2057.24 7130 5.6599 8.3699 0.2731 0.2885 0.0229 
1986 2178.4 2247.79 7390 4.5026 6.1276 0.2911 0.3042 0.0178 
1987 2362.9 2363.3 7620 4.4295 6.2045 0.2970 0.3101 0.0184 
1988 2583.7 2488.15 7830 4.3342 5.5892 0.3046 0.3178 0.0170 
9 198 2794.4 2574.84 8050 6.123 5.633 0.3014 0.3199 0.0170 
1990 3070.2 2710.95 8270 5.0001 5.5851 0.3122 0.3279 0.0174 
1991 3368.5 2861.48 8490 3.6587 5.9887 0.3251 0.3370 0.0195 
1992 3743.6 3091.46 8660 1.8719 5.1709 0.3504 0.3570 0.0200 
1993 4075.6 3282.20 8810 1.8795 5.1595 0.3657 0.3726 0.0189 
1994 4342.2 3406.72 9020 1.7593 4.5393 0.3712 0.3777 0.0168 
Caption of table C. 7: source of data. 
- B. is the stock of gross government 
debt, billions domestic currency, OECD Economic 
Outlook. 
-k is the capital stock, 
1987 prices, from OECD Business Sector. ib is at 1987 prices, billion 
domestic currency, from Survey of Current Business (USA), nipa table 1.1, line 18, government 
purchases billions of dollars. 
_ rm is the real short-term 
interest rates, where fTB is taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics, United States tables, certificate of deposit rate, series 60LC. 
r, ß is the real 
US long-term corporate bond rates (10-year Moody AAA), where 'PB is taken 
from MEI long-term interest rates, % per annum. 
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A brief comment of the situation in each country is reported here below. 
Canada 
The level of debt and of the debt-to-capital stock ratios have been increasing in the last decade 
and the latter turn out to be the highest among those of the G-7 countries. From a comparison 
with the simulated values, a reversed fiscal policy seems necessary to allow the country to head 
on a sustainable debt policy path. 
France 
France seems to be quite a virtuous country since all the ratios turn out to be among the 
lowest, although the interest rates have been quite high almost all over the time period 
considered. The trend for the ratios RSD and RO has been increasing and only R3 exhibits some 
constancy due to the fact that, in recent years, the long-run interest rates have been quite 
constant. 
German 
The same reasoning done for France applies to Germany, whose debt-to-capital stock ratios 
were between the French and the Canadian ones until 1993. The increase in the ratios during the 
1990s is probably a result of the German unification and of the big increase in the interest rates 
determined by the need of the huge investments in the country. 
Italy 
The situation in this country is similar to Canada's since the debt-to-capital stock ratios are 
quite high. The first striking aspect to note is that the interest rate payments have been very huge 
during all the time span under investigation, and they have worsened the already precarious 
Situation. The Italian debt management policy requires a urgent reversal since the ratios are on 
an increasing path and have already approached the maximum sustainable levels. 
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Japan 
Notwithstanding the low values of the interest rates, it is interesting to note that the debt-to- 
capital stock ratios are just below those of Italy and Canada. However, the Japanese ratios seem 
to have reversed from the beginning of 1990 to a decreasing path while the other two countries 
are still struggling to contain their debt increase. 
United Kingdom 
The debt-to-capital stock ratios are quite constant, so that there does not seem to be particular 
problems of their sustainability, even though the absolute amount of debt is increasing. 
United States 
Notwithstanding that, quite recently, the real interest rates have been decreasing, the debt-to- 
capital stock ratios are quite large, and the American debt has been widening a lot. The situation 
in the US seems to be critical as it is for Canada and Italy. 
The general result is that the debt-to-capital stock ratios are on an increasing path and in some 
countries they are already higher than the maximum sustainable ratios calculated with our 
model: current fiscal policies in developed countries 
like Canada, Italy, Japan and United States 
are quite likely to be unsustainable. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOME FURTHER APPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF MAXIMUM 
SUSTAINABLE LEVEL OF DEBT 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we extend the methodology adopted in the previous chapter to derive the 
criterion of sustainability of government financing policies applied to other frameworks. By 
resorting to the model developed in chapter 2 we have been able to provide a mathematical 
and intuitive explanation of why the issuing of a certain amount of bonds might lead the 
economy to the collapse. Now we want to apply the same methodology for the analysis of 
systems and constraints different from those already examined. In this respect there are some 
models in the literature which have approached the issue of government financing policies 
without focusing on the sustainability of the policy itself. This is the reason why we decide to 
consider three other frameworks to which the procedure to find the maximum sustainable 
level of spending can be applied. These are: 
1) a social security system which creates the need for the government to raise revenues; 
2) a pure exchange economy based on the same assumptions for debt management policies as 
presented in chapter 2, which allows to investigate more deeply some results shadowed in the 
production economy analysis; 
3) the perpetual youth economy a-la-Blanchard where the author had neglected the important 
aspect of sustainability of a fiscal policy. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. We start considering the case of a social security 
spending policy. One of the two pension schemes currently applied in many countries, the 
pay-as-you-go system, can be represented by a model similar to the one developed in the 
previous chapter for the financing policy through savings deposits. Not surprisingly, due to its 
similarity to our original model, we can prove that the criterion to find the maximum 
sustainable level of debt still gives satisfactory results when applied to find the maximum 
&S 
sustainable level of social security contributions when using a Cobb-Douglas production 
function. 
In the mid part of the chapter, we apply the concept of the maximum sustainable level of 
debt to the simple exchange version of the model illustrated in chapter 2. Notwithstanding 
the existence of only one endogenous variable (the real interest rate) and the simplicity of the 
economy, still neat and interesting results are generated, which highlight a particular intuition 
underlying that concept. 
Finally, we investigate the issue of sustainability of a fiscal policy by using the "perpetual 
youth model" a-la-Blanchard (1985) in order to evaluate whether uncertainty and a positive 
level of government spending affect the applicability of this criterion. The investigation of 
these models leads to the conclusion that our criterion can be applied to different contexts, 
yielding interesting results. 
3.2 Spending Sustainability within a Social Security Model 
Generally speaking, social security programmes are introduced for providing old people 
with sufficient income during their retirement as they do not have any other source of 
income. This policy could be interpreted as a paternalistic attitude of the government towards 
the citizens of a country. In fact, people might behave myopically and not provide enough for 
their retirement. Moreover, another rationale for the emergence of social security is simply 
the desire to transfer resources to a particularly needy generation of elderly, albeit at the 
potential expense of subsequent generations. However, the proportion of elderly people, 
especially in developed countries, has been steadily increasing and this has raised the general 
fear that the burden of social security as a proportion of GDP would grow further over the 
coming decades. This situation reminds the increasing debt-to-GDP ratio which has been the 
topic investigated in the previous chapter. 
The model assumes that individuals make their contributions when young and receive the 
payment foreseen by the social security scheme when they are old. Let us indicate with d, the 
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contribution of a young person at time I. There are two main different systems of social 
security which also differ in their method of finance and their redistribution effects. The first 
one is called the fully funded system where members' contributions over their working lives 
made at time t on an individually actuarially fair basis are invested in a trust fund which 
yields a market-determined rate of return r, at time 1+1 during retirement. The second system 
is called the pay-as-you-go system and consists in having at each point in time benefits to 
retirees to be paid directly out of the current contributions of workers living in the same 
period and using, for instance, current tax contributions to pay for current benefits. Assuming 
that the population grows at a constant rate n, this parameter represents also the rate of return 
on the contributions. If n is less than the economy's interest rate, workers contributing to 
social security receive a smaller return on their contributions than if they had been allowed to 
save these contributions and invest them in the economy. This system is also called unfunded 
system. Overlapping-generations models have been employed to consider the rationale for 
the existence of social security programmes (say Pareto-improving policies) and to study the 
macroeconomic effects upon the steady state per-capita capital stock. For our present 
purpose, and for consistency with our debt model, we consider the framework without 
bequests and gifts. 
It is quite well-established that a fully funded social security system has no effect on total 
savings and capital accumulation in the economy. Intuitively, this can be explained by the 
fact that, investing in the fund this social security system provides for, it yields the same rate 
of return as private savings invested in productive capital so that the individual is indifferent 
between these two investment options at his disposal. Capital accumulation would not be 
affected because savings are always available to sustain the required path for capital. 
The reasoning is different for the pay-as-you-go system because the rates of return on 
private savings and social contributions are not the same. While savings earn the rate of 
interest r, the rate of return paid on social contributions is instead n, that is the increase in the 
number of people alive in the next period who can pay for the contributions. We analyse the 
effects on capital accumulation from changes in the level of the contributions by using the 
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model presented in Blanchard and Fischer (1989)1. Given that the social security is unfunded 
and the rate of return is n, the Lagrangean for the household's intertemporal utility 
maximisation problem in this case can be written as: 
(3.1) L =ß1nc, ' +(1-, g) In co,, +4(w, -d, -c; 
)(1+r, 
+, 
)-c, *+, +(l+n)d, +1]" 
Comparing the present optimisation with the Lagrangean in the previous chapter, we see that 
eq. (3.1) contains in the budget constraint the term of the social security contribution, d,, 
which earns (l+n)d, +l to the 
investor in the next period. The intertemporal optimisation 
process yields the following expression for the saving function: 
(3.2) s, =(1-, fl)(w, -dr)- 
d, 
+1 
(l + n)fl 
l+r, +, 
The asset market clearing condition requires that the total amount of private savings available 
in the economy must be invested into capital accumulation: 
(3.3) sýýwý(kr), ri+ý(kr+t ), d =(1+n)k, +,, 
where, for reason of consistency with the assumptions of the model in the previous chapter, 
we assume that the government is keeping constant the amount of contributions at a level of 
d, = d, +1 = 
j. From eq. (3.3) it is clear that the social security system is a pure transfer scheme 
from the young to the old if d is positive. This social contribution affects saving decisions 
but it is not a financial asset in itself which can offset investments in productive capital. By 
contrast, in the model of chapter 2, debt enters the asset market equilibrium because it 
represents a financial asset alternative to physical capital in which savings are preferably 
invested. 
The asset market equilibrium is represented in the figure below by the phaseline KK, 
which intersects the abscissa axis at a positive value of k,. 
I The model developed in Blanchard and Fischer at pp. 111-113 is here modified by resorting to the Cobb- 
Douglas utility and production functions used in chapter 2. 
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figure 3.1 
The system displays two steady states, the unstable point A and the stable point B. The 
effects of an exogenous increase in social security contributions can be compared with the 
effects of an exogenous increase in debt in the model a-la-Diamond. The contributions 
multiplier which measures the change in the future capital stock, k,.,, is equal toe: 
&r 
(3.4) 
dk,,, chi 
di 1+n-sf"(")' 
Substituting each of the arguments of the multiplier with their expressions derived from 
eq. (3.2), we can rewrite eq. (3.4) as follows: 
(1_f+ «1+n) 
(3.5) 
dk, 
+i -_ 
1+r 
dd l+n+d(1+n)ßa(1-a)' (1+T)2 k2-a 
which is clearly negative on the assumptions that 0<a, /3< I and n>0. Therefore, an 
exogenous increase in the amount of social security contributions would shift down the 
2 This multiplier can be found in Blanchard and Fischer (1989), p. 113. 
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phaseline KK to K' K', so that, at each level of k, the value of the future capital stock 
decreases. The overall effect of an increase in d on the steady state k is measured by the 
following multiplier: 
(3.6) dd = 
-I 1+kaQ I(1-ß-(1+n)ý3](1+kaal 
lz r lz 
(i+n) 1+kaQ I -a(1-a)(1-ý3)ka-'I 1+ka« I +da(1-a)ß(1+n)ka-2 CJJ 
By applying the Correspondence Principle, it turns out that 
dd is negative when evaluated 
at the stable steady state, so that crowding out of the capital stock occurs. It is also worth 
noting that a well-defined level of d=d* corresponds to the maximum sustainable level of 
social security contributions. When d exceeds this threshold, the same scenario of a poverty 
trap evidenced in chapter 2 will take place. 
Before summing up, it is important to note that this result has been derived by using a 
Cobb-Douglas production function which satisfies the Inada conditions. As already specified, 
we have chosen to use this particular production function for the sake of consistency, since 
we were interested in comparing the long-run effect (i. e. the multipliers) on the capital stock 
in this model with the one found in the debt model of the previous chapter in which we also 
adopted a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
In conclusion, an increase in the burden of social security contributions negatively affects 
the rate of capital accumulation and the stable steady state level of capital stock is reduced. 
These findings can be intuitively explained by considering that the contribution represents 
only a transfer which, like a lump sum tax, affects the amount of disposable income which 
can be devoted to saving. If the burden of the contributions rose, this would reduce the 
amount of savings and, consequently, the amount of capital accumulation. 
However, an important difference arises when comparing the mathematical structure of the 
social security model with the one of the debt model analysed in the previous chapter, 
although in both of them an expansionist fiscal policy has a crowding out effect on the capital 
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stock. This difference consists in the fact that the former does not include a financial asset 
which can displace capital in the economy; nevertheless, an increase in social security 
contributions still may cause a poverty trap to occur. Moreover, the maximum sustainable 
level of social security is reached via an abrupt disappearance of all steady states as happened 
in the model with debt in chapter 2. This implies that also in this model the possibility of a 
catastrophe exists and social security contributions can be increased until the system reaches 
the point where productive resources will be rapidly exhausted. 
Finally, eq. (3.3) also implies that the population growth rate can affect the steady state in 
the same way as the social security contributions. "... faster population growth raises the per 
capita transfer to the old for a given lump sum tax on the young. The higher income leads to 
a shrinkage of saving at any given interest rate"3. A high rate of population growth can lead 
to the adoption of a less-capital-intensive technology, to less savings per head and a higher 
interest rate. 
3.3 The Interpretation of the Concept of Maximum Sustainable Level of Debt 
in a Simple Pure Exchange Economy 
In the present section we simplify the model developed in section 2 of chapter 2 in order to 
apply it to a simple pure exchange economy where no productive capital exists. Although it 
is a simpler version of the previous model, our purpose is to use it to derive an explicit 
expression of the maximum sustainable level of debt and the conditions to be satisfied to find 
at least one equilibrium. We will show that some 
interesting conclusions can be reached 
through this approach. 
The economy is again characterised by members of each generation living for two periods 
and a zero population growth rate. Since there 
is no production in this economy, the 
individual does not work but has an endowment made up of a composite perishable good, e'', 
when young whereas when old 
he receives e°. The interest rate is the only endogenous 
3 Azariadis (1993), p. 296. 
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variable in the model. Households are willing to invest all their savings in financing 
government debt and dynamics in the endogenous real interest rate arise. The government 
financing policies are those explained in the previous chapter, and, briefly, the system 
exhibits the following characteristics for each type of debt management policy: 
- In the savings deposits case, there exist two steady states (one stable and one unstable) 
provided that debt does not exceed a sustainable level beyond which the government would 
run a Ponzi-game scheme with a rolling over of interest payments. The existence of only one 
stable equilibrium (the smaller steady state interest rate) implies that, if the system starts at a 
too high real interest rate, it will be on an unstable path despite the fact that a stable path for 
the economy exists. Moreover, any attempt by the government to bring in a reform 
programme which permanently cuts the size of debt would not apply if prior to the reform r 
was at a too high level. 
- In the treasury bills case, the steady state 
is always stable since there is a unique solution 
for the interest rate which is a function of the exogenous parameters within the economy. 
- For the perpetui bonds case, the reasoning 
done for the savings deposits still applies. An 
increase in the long-run debt is shown to decrease the bond price or, alternatively, increase 
the long-run interest rate which is a result consistent with what predicted by the standard 
macroeconomic theory. 
The concept of a maximum sustainable level of debt applies also to this simple exchange 
economy. The consumer's intertemporal utility maximisation problem can be written as: 
(3.7) maximise ßlnc; +(I-ß)lnc, °+, 
subject to e''-z, =c; +ss 
ýi+i =(l+r, +, 
)s, +e°. 
Using the Lagrangean method, we find the saving function: 
(3.8) s, 
e'ß 
=(1-/ý(ey-Tr)-(1+Pr+, )" 
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Savings are a function of net disposable income and real interest rate. The analysis which 
follows focuses on each bond financing system separately, as the implications for the asset 
market equilibrium and the interpretation of the results are different for each case. 
Firstly, let us consider the savings deposits case. If the government holds the amount of 
debt constant, then taxes are equal to r, = rib ; the asset market equilibrium condition can be 
written as4: 
0 
(3.9) (1-fi)(ey-rb)- b 
(1 , +, ) 
which, at the steady state, becomes: 
0 
(3.10) (1-fi)(e''-rb)- 'Oe 
F =b. 
The LHS represents savings calculated as the difference between the functions 
1_ (e -rb ) and 
ALwhich 
are represented graphically in the upper of f 3.2 with (ý l+r' part g" 
a straight line (YY) and an hyperbola (00) respectively. In the lower part of the figure, SS 
represents the saving function and the solutions to eq. (3.10) are the points where this function 
intersects the horizontal line BB. The hill shape of the saving locus is attributed to the 
conflicting effects of the interest rate on savings which can be described as follows: 
a) the first effect consists in the fact that a higher interest rate lowers the present value of the 
future endowment e°, thus decreasing the lifetime wealth. Since current consumption (c; ) is 
a positive function of total wealth, it decreases so that, as a result, savings rise; 
b) the second effect, which operates in the opposite direction to the previous one, refers to 
the fact that since a higher interest rate raises the burden of taxation, current disposable 
income decreases and so do savings. 
4 The asset market equilibrium condition is equal to: s(ey -rb , e°, r, +, 
) =b, which is a first-order difference 
equation in r. 
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So long as the first effect dominates, which is more likely when the interest rate is low, 
savings are a positive function of r; after a certain level, the effect is reversed so that savings 
are negatively related to F. 
r 
r 
figure 3.2 
Eq. (3.10) has two solutions, and the smaller root of r represents the stable steady states. If 
debt rises, then the straight line BB shifts up whereas SS shifts down to the left. There exists a 
level of debt beyond which the maximum level of savings is not sufficient to absorb all debt 
s This procedure of defining the maximum sustainable level of debt is similar to Soren Bo Nielsen's (1992) which 
has been briefly described in chapter 1. 
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ST 
SS 
issued so that no equilibrium point exists. At this maximum level of debt, called b*, the 
scenario is the following. 
B* 
I 
figure 3.3 
The maximum sustainable level of debt is calculated by solving the quadratic in F-, 
eq. (3.10), and then setting the discriminant equal to zero, and we get two positive solutions 
for the debt which are: 
(l-/ß[e3'+2e0±2 e°(e°+e'')] 
(3.11) b* = 
Unlike in the model with production, the simplicity of this model is crucial for solving 
explicitly for b* and, consequently, for the steady state interest rate. The acceptable root b 
is the smaller one, since for the larger one the inequality r* > -1 is not satisfied. 
The unique solution for the steady state interest rate is equal to r ey 
2 
When 
2b* 2(1-ff) 
we substitute the acceptable root for b* and calculate, by assigning arbitrary values to the 
parameters, the value of the interest rate associated to b *(i. e. r *), the latter turns out to be 
positive. This confirms the quite well known result that instability of the system in the 
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presence of debt is more likely to arise when there is dynamic efficiency, since the 
introduction of debt should, in principle, help to eliminate dynamic inefficiency. 
In conclusion, for the case of savings deposits the maximum sustainable level of debt is 
associated with the existence of a maximum level of savings which the households are 
willing to make, given the constraint represented by their lifetime income. 
Quite interestingly, it is possible to derive an explicit expression for the maximum 
sustainable level of debt for the other two cases of financing policies, although the 
implications are slightly different. Let us start with the case of treasury bills. The asset 
market equilibrium condition is satisfied by a unique value of the interest rate. However, an 
upper limit still exists and it coincides with the maximum level of debt for which the interest 
rate has still an economically meaningful value. Given that the asset market equilibrium is 
equal tob: 
(3.12) (1-, 6) e'' -b-_b l+r, +l 
l+r, +, 
l+rr+, 
where the LHS represents the saving function, there is a unique steady state value of the 
interest rate: 
b +ße°-(1-ß)e'' 
(3.13) r, +, =r= (1-)(e,, -b) 
which is the solution to eq. (3.12). A necessary condition for the steady state to be acceptable 
is7 that b< e''. So long as this condition holds and provided that there is no upper limit to the 
value of the interest rate, then any amount of debt issued could, in principle, be absorbed by 
the market'. 
6 This follows from the condition: sr =q, bb+t = (l+rr+t)_'b, +t =(l+r, +, 
)''b which is a static equation in 
r, +, and satisfied 
by a unique value of the interest rate. 
I 
7 In fact, for umr, +E = +co, 
but, just beyond that level, rr+t -> -0Q and Jim rr+t =-< -1, which is I-Q 
not acceptable. 
8A comparison with the production economy suggests that the introduction of an additional endogenous variable 
would rise the order of the dynamics of the system so that the stability properties are no longer unambiguously 
satisfied. 
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When the government decides to issue perpetuity bonds, the equilibrium on the capital 
market becomes9: 
0 
(3.14) (1-ý(e' -b)- =q, b 1+rf+l 
which, by using the information that q=1, can be written at the steady state as: F 
(3.15) (1-ý(e''-b)- q =qb, 
which is a quadratic equation in ; T. In order to have at least one solution, the condition 
(1-'fl)(e" -b) </Je° must be satisfied. This condition can be represented graphically (see 
fig. 3.4), and implies that the functions represented by the twö expressions on the LHS 
intersect, which happens when the horizontal asymptote of the function (00) is higher 
R 
than the horizontal straight line YY, (1- f (e"" -b ), which does not depend on i T. 
9 In general terms, it would be equal to: s(e-' -b, e°, 
[1+ q1+i -q, ] I qr) = gbr+, =q, 67. 
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figure 3.4 
As b -+ e", the line SS (i. e. the saving function) shifts to the left and the straight line pivots 
until they intersect only at the origin. Since negative values for the bond price are excluded, 
the value e" (the same value found in the treasury bills case) represents the upper limit on the 
level of debt, and it is related to the existence of an acceptable steady state rather than to the 
existence of a steady state itself'°. 
The conclusions derived from this analysis are very interesting in so far as they provide an 
explicit indication for some conditions which must be fulfilled for finding the equilibria of 
the system. The study of this pure exchange economy differs from the study of the production 
economy in so far as it succeeds to shed light on some specific aspects which have been left 
10 It is worth noting that the introduction of the capital stock variable would rise the order of the system although 
the saddle point property of one of the equilibria is consistent with the characterisation of the perpetuity bond 
price as a jump variable. 
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indefinite in chapter 2 and also allows to find an explicit mathematical specifications of the 
conditions which characterise the maximum sustainable level of debt. The very striking 
conclusion is that a constant issue of debt can be a source of instability also in a simple 
exchange economy with no capital stock and where only one financial asset and endogenous 
variable exists. 
3.4 The Applicability of the Concept of Sustainability of Government 
Financing Policies in a Continuous Time Model a-la-Blanchard 
The model we consider in this section is the "OLG perpetual youth model" a-la-Blanchard 
(1985), where the horizon of the agents is chosen arbitrarily. The lifetime period is uncertain 
and there exists an insurance company which individuals join to insure their future wealth; 
nevertheless, debt still plays an active role in smoothing out aggregate consumption when 
there are fluctuations in output and its size is important for determining the dynamics of the 
main macroeconomic variables in the economy. 
We firstly present a brief description of the model' I and then we investigate the issues of 
the maximum sustainable levels of government spending and debt applied to that framework. 
In this economy agents face a constant instantaneous probability of death, p, where 0: 5 p<1, 
so that their expected remaining lifetime is p-1. The population 
is constant, normalised to 
one, so that at each instant a flow p of consumers die and p more are born. They contract 
with the insurance company to leave to it all their wealth (denoted by w) contingent on their 
death. In the event that they do not die, they will receive pw from the same company. Since 
consumers are large in number and with free entry to the 
insurance market in which 
insurance companies face no risks, an actuarially fair insurance is offered and companies 
make zero profits. Consumers choose to 
insure themselves completely since bequests do not 
it Blanchard's (1985) model is quite well-known, and is investigated in details also in Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989), chapter 3. Therefore, we do not include a detailed description and an exhaustive derivation of all the 
formulas. We are more interested in underlining the most important features of the model in order to apply the 
criterion of the sustainability of a 
fiscal policy. 
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exist. Two other additional specifications are necessary: utility is assumed to be logarithmic 
with a positive subjective discount rate, 9+p, and labour income is distributed equally 
across agents, thus allowing for aggregation. An agent maximises his utility: 
(3.16) f1ogc(s, v)e'"dv, 
dw(s, t) 
-C subject to the intertemporal budget constraint: r(t) + p]w(s, t) + y(s, t) - c(s, t). 
The latter states that the change in the lifetime non-human wealth is equal to the amount of 
non-human wealth (which at birth is assumed to be zero) on which the individual receives 
interest, r(t)w(s, t), plus a sum from the insurance company, pw(s, t), and the labour 
income, y(s, t), derived from labour sold in return for wage income, net of consumption. The 
other type of wealth existing in the economy is the human wealth, h(s, t), which is equal to 
the present value of expected future labour income: 
r, - 
f ir(/ý)+pld 
(3.17) $ y(s, v)e dv. 
Human wealth at time t is identical for all agents alive at t as non-interest income is, by 
assumption, age-independent, and all individuals are identical and have the same expected 
lifetime. 
The discount rate in eq. (3.17) is equal to (r + p), i. e. the same rate at which individual non- 
human wealth accumulates. Assuming that the no-Ponzi-game condition for the households 
holds'2, then aggregate consumption turns out to be a constant proportion (p + 0) of the sum 
of total human and non-human wealth13. Aggregation of consumption is possible because, as 
is clear from the expression for c(s, v) obtainable from the optimisation of eq. (3.16), an 
individual's consumption depends only on his wealth and not on his age, so that it is possible 
12 The no-Ponzi-game condition for the households can be defined as follows: if the individual is still alive at time 
4 [KN)+P]4u 
v, then it is true that: 
lime w(s, v) = 0, namely that in the infinite future when the household dies, 
the value of the non-human wealth 
has to be negligible. 
13 The marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth is age-independent, reflecting the fact that the 
remaining lifetime is independent of the age of the 
individuals who then have the same remaining lifetime. 
Moreover, since preferences are logarithmic and separable in consumption and real balances, the marginal 
propensity to consume out of wealth 
is constant. 
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to sum over all individuals and get identical relationships between the corresponding 
aggregate variables. All the aggregate variables are denoted by upper case letters: 
consumption C(t), human wealth, H(t), which accumulates at a rate [r(t)+p], and non- 
human wealth", W(t), which accumulates at a rate r(t), pW(t) being just a transfer, through 
the insurance companies, from those who die to those who remain alive. The latter cannot, 
therefore, add to aggregate wealth because the p effects cancel out. 
The system is formed by three differential equations in (C, H, W) which can be reduced to 
two's: 
(3.18) 0=(r-6)C-p(p+O)W 
and 
(3.19) W= rW+Y-C. 
Any time p>O, the rate of change of consumption depends on non-human wealth. It can be 
noted that, even if we set p=0, for r>0 consumption would still exhibit an increasing 
dynamic behaviour. The wage rate ca and the rate of interest r are determined by capital 
accumulation. We assume that capital and labour are the two factors of production in the 
economy and that the production function Y= F(K) is net of capital depreciation16. The 
profit maximisation condition yields the non-interest income (i. e. labour income) equal to the 
wage rate, w(K), and r(K) = F'(K), which can be positive or negative. 
Lastly, we introduce into the economy a government which spends G on goods, from which 
private consumption does not gain any marginal utility, and finances it by lump sum taxes 
14 In aggregate terms, non-human wealth is equal to 
w(t) =f w(s, t)pea'-rtds, which, differentiated 
L 
forward and taking into account that this financial wealth of the newly born is equal to zero (the assumption of 
w(s, s)O reflects the definition of a new cohort as being a family not linked to previous dynasties through 
operative bequests), yields eq. (3.19). 
15 The three equations are: 
C= (p + 9)(H+W ), 11= (r + p)H - Y, W= rW +Y-C; differentiating the first one and eliminating 
H and W. it yields egs. (3.18)-(3.19). 
16 Namely, F(K) = F(K, 1) - Äk on the assumption that the size of the population can be normalised to one. 
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(transfer if negative), T, or by debt, D, any time spending plus interest payments over tax 
revenue is positive. The dynamic budget constraint is equal to: 
(3.20) D=rD+G-T. 
Integrating the last equation forward yields: 
(3.21) D(t)=f [T(s)-G(s)]e''rds, 
that is the current level of debt must be equal to the present discounted value of primary 
surpluses. Eq. (3.21) holds provided that the no-Ponzi-game condition for the government 
holds, which implies that debt will ultimately have to grow less rapidly than the interest rate, 
namely that limD(t)e'" =017. Non-human wealth is equal to the sum of capital and debt, $-, 00 
W= K+D. Furthermore, taxes affect the level of human wealth which is equal to 
'J H(t) =f Y(s)e ds- ! 
T(s)e ds, or, equivalently, to the present discounted 
value of non interest income minus taxes discounted at the rate (r+ p). 
The government fiscal policy affects the macroeconomic system through the following 
mechanism: 
a) debt is part of wealth and, as such, it affects consumption; 
b) the level of G affects aggregate demand directly; 
c) the sequence of taxes affects human wealth and, consequently, consumption. 
The system is represented by the following three differential equations'8: 
(3.22) C' = [r(K) - O]C - p(p + O)(D + K) 
(3.23) K= F(K)-C-G 
(3.24) D=r(K)D+G-T. 
If the government, at some time to, decides to issue new debt, for the budget to be 
balanced, taxes must be increased by the amount necessary to pay the additional interest 
17 This is the same condition we focused on in chapter 1 and which turned out to be important for evaluating debt 
sustainability. 
18 Naturally, there are some other implicit conditions which must be satisfied, such as that individual consumption 
must be non-negative at every instant. 
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payments, i. e. dTo = r(K0 )dD0. This financing policy adopted by the government corresponds 
in our model to the case of debt management through savings deposits: debt is held constant 
at the new increased level, whereas taxes change over time in order to cover interest 
payments. If we assume that the government budget is balanced19, then the two stationary 
loci are: 
(3.25) C=0C= p(p + 
ý(K+ D) 
r(K) -0 
and 
(3.26) k=0 F(K) = C+G. 
The system is represented in fig. 3.5 below for a level of G=0; the capital stock is a 
predetermined variable whereas consumption is a jump variable20. The stationary locus C=0 
has been drawn for a value of debt which is higher than -K* and approaches the vertical 
asymptote from the left. The locus k=0 has a concave shape. There are two equilibrium 
points: the origin 0 and point E. From the direction of the arrows, we can conclude that the 
steady state E is a saddle point and the convergent saddle path, SS, is upward sloping. All the 
other trajectories imply a negative level of C or K in finite time, which must be excluded. 
19 This condition has some implications: for instance, if the government decides to increase the size of public 
spending at the steady state, for the budget to be balanced, it must reduce national debt or raise taxes. 
20 Consumption is the outcome of forward-looking intertemporal choices made by individual consumers and 
therefore it is a non-predetermined variable. 
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figure 3.5 
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The vertical asymptote is represented by the value of K* for which r(K*) = 0. The steady 
state level of capital must satisfy the following conditionszl: 
(3.27) 0< F' (K) < 9+ p. 
The proof is made by contradiction and setting D=O for simplicity. If we assume that 
r> O+ p (where r denotes the steady state interest rate), then (F - O) > pC, which 
r-s (r - Oc implies that 
p>1 
is true. As we know that for C=0, _ (p + 07, then 
P 
(p + 9K >ZT. Since for k=0, F(K) = C, then using the condition stated at the beginning 
we would have F7 > (p+ 07 rK> F(K) which cannot hold, QED. The same 
reasoning can be followed to prove the other side of the inequality. 
So long as D> -K *, 
C=0 is upward sloping and positive, goes through the origin and 
approaches K* from the left. An increase in debt would shift it up and thus decrease the 
steady state level of C and K. Therefore, the government can affect the level of capital stock 
by an appropriate choice of the level of debt. Each of the paths for C and K are associated 
with a particular fiscal policy. For a positive level of debt, we have that r(IT) > 0, which 
21 The value ofK** for which F'(K * *) =p+0 can be called the "Doubly Modified Golden Rule", since the 
"Modified Golden Rule" is represented by F'= 0+ n, where n is the population growth rate. 
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implies that, despite the fact that people have finite horizons, the equilibrium is necessarily 
dynamically efficient (i. e. r>n= 0). 
In order to investigate how the concept of sustainability of a fiscal policy applies to this 
framework, let us focus on two different policies which the government may decide to adopt. 
1) An increase in debt, D. given G=O. 
An exogenous increase in D has an initial wealth effect on consumption; however, holding 
G constant at a zero level, taxes must be increased to balance the government dynamic 
intertemporal budget constraint. Therefore, the new steady state levels of both K and C will 
be lower. Graphically, the stationary locus C=0 gets steeper (although it always goes 
through the origin) whilst the stationary locus k=0 stays unchanged. Consequently, the 
positive steady state moves towards the origin. The adjustment is made possible because 
consumption is a jump variable and the mechanism is that agents base current demand on 
expected lifetime income. There are two contrasting effects on consumption: initially at time 
t=0 it would increase because households would feel wealthier due to an increased debt 
owned. Since p# 0, a smaller fraction of the anticipated higher future tax burden is expected 
to be borne by currently-alive consumers, so that a higher percentage of the current market 
value of debt is perceived as "net wealth". Spending would then temporarily increase. 
However, the increase in government debt and taxes displaces capital and causes a shortage 
of output produced. Consumption will gradually decline in the long run along the new saddle 
path which leads towards the new equilibrium point. 
Since the positive effect on consumption due to the increased wealth from debt is more 
than offset, in the long run, by the negative effect on consumption due to the increased 
present value of future taxes, Ricardian Equivalence does not hold. 
The effect of a change in debt on the capital stock can be calculated by differentiating 
eq. (3.22) evaluated, at the steady state, to obtain: 
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dK p(p+0 
_ (3.28) _ dD 
F'C -p(p+O)+(r - 
ox 
is equal to r from the goods market equilibrium: F(K) =C +G. However, we can re- 
express r by considering that, when the government budget constraint is satisfied, 
F(K )D = T- G, so that the formula for consumption can be transformed as follows: 
(3.29) C =F(K )-G= F(K)-T+F'(K )D'= 
=F(K)-F +rK +F'(K )D -T = tv-T+r (D +K) 
w-T 
r D+K D+K 
Substituting this expression, together with eq. (3.25), into eq. (3.28), we obtain the final 
expression for the multiplier: 
dK p(p+e) 
(3.30) _ dD F"C -(r -0)r 
(co- T) 
D +K 
A sufficient condition for the multiplier to be negative is that w> T. The level of 
government debt is crucial in so far as it displaces capital from the portfolio of savers. Taxes 
are endogenously set to balance the budget and, since aggregate demand is made up only by 
aggregate consumption, debt can be increased so long as the rise in the burden of taxation 
does not offset savings entirely. The maximum sustainable level of debt occurs when the two 
stationary loci are tangent, which happens to be at the origin. 
Since there is a unique non-trivial steady state, the poverty trap phenomenon cannot arise 
and no positive critical level of debt exists beyond which a catastrophe would occur. More 
precisely, a maximum sustainable level of debt exists, but it just occurs where the steady- 
state level of the capital stock is driven to zero. 
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However, we now show that the introduction of a positive level of government spending 
can modify these conclusions. 
2) The introduction of government spending. 
The previous analysis was based on the assumption that government spending was 
negligible. However, if we introduce an active fiscal policy, new interesting results arise. If G 
rises from zero to a positive level, the locus 
k=0 shifts down as the intersection point with 
the ordinate axis, from eq. (3.26), is equal to -G. In this case, there are two positive steady 
states (point A and B), the higher of which (point B) is saddle point stable (see figure below, 
where SS represents the saddle path). 
0 
K 
figure 3.6 
The analysis proceeds by considering two different policies: an increase in debt, given a 
constant level of government spending, and an 
increase in spending plans financed by an 
increase in the taxes levied, holding constant the level of debt. 
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2.1) An increase in debt, given a constant positive level of G, would pivot the locus C=0, so 
that the two steady states would get closer. In this case it is possible to define again the 
maximum sustainable level of D*, as the one related to the point where the two loci are 
tangent, i. e. point E in fig. 3.7 below. 
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All the stationary loci e=0 are drawn for different values of debt, D DZ,..., D *: as debt 
rises, the loci become steeper. The maximum sustainable level of debt corresponds to an 
unambiguously strictly positive steady state level of the capital stock, whereas in the case of 
G=0 (point I above) this level occurred at a zero value of the capital stock. As in the model 
presented in chapter 2, a further small increase in debt beyond D* would produce a massive 
and discontinuous change in the capital stock towards a zero level, which is known as a 
catastrophe. What happens is that, beyond that point, taxes to be levied are so high that there 
are not enough resources to be invested in the capital market so that the system leads towards 
capital decumulation. The increase in debt has a negative effect on capital (as shown by the 
total multiplier in eq. (3.30)) and on consumption. In fact, the initial positive effect on 
consumption is represented by the increase 
in the total amount of wealth which depends 
III 
positively on debt. However, the supply of resources in the market decreases and, since the 
amount of government spending, G, is kept constant, C starts declining. It is well established 
that the path followed by the system will depend on the initial conditions in the economy: 
also for D>D*, dynamics below the locus C=0 would lead unambiguously to 
decumulation of both capital stock and consumption. 
2.2) Let us assume that the government decides on a programme of an increase in 
government spending through an increase in the burden of taxation. The locus k=0 would 
shift down whereas 0=0 would not be affected. The two steady states would get closer and 
the reasoning put forward in point 2.1 above would still apply. Increased taxes would 
decrease disposable income and the steady state consumption through both human and non- 
human wealth effects. In fig. 3.8 below we represent the dynamics of the process just 
described. The set of loci K=0 is drawn in fig. 3.8 for different values of G, namely 
G,, G2,..., G*. 
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figure 3.8 
As G rises, this locus shifts down until it is tangent to 6=0 at point D for a particular level 
of government spending equal to G*. The government must levy an increasing amount of 
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taxes in order to finance a higher government demand. When government spending has 
increased so much that no intersection point exists, the economy would be brought to the 
collapse. 
A final observation can be derived from fig. 3.7. Depending on the initial conditions and 
given a positive level of government spending, two definitions of the maximum sustainable 
level of debt, D*, can be proposed: 
(i) D* can be interpreted as the maximum capital-independent sustainable level of 
government debt, namely the level of government debt beyond which no equilibrium exists. 
It can also be referred to as the global maximum level of D* since it does not depend on any 
initial conditions. 
(ii) If the system initially is at a level of Ko < Ks , then D2 can be interpreted as the 
maximum sustainable level of D conditional on the starting point K0. In fact, when D= DZ, 
the equilibrium capital stock is exactly K= K0, so that the system is in equilibrium. This 
second concept of sustainable level of government debt is capital-dependent and thus weaker 
than the global D *. If K, < K,, then the system would diverge from the equilibrium and D. 
could not be claimed to be the maximum sustainable level conditional on K,,; moreover, if 
KO > Ks, then (i) and (ii) would coincide. The relationship between the maximum global 
level of D and the initial level K,, is represented in fig. 3.9. 
K 
U 
figure 3.9 
113 
The same analysis could be carried out for the maximum level of government spending. G*, 
by following the same reasoning (as just done for debt) in fig. 3.8. 
To sum up, the technique applied in the previous chapter to derive the maximum level of 
debt can still be applied to the present framework where the catastrophe phenomenon occurs 
when we introduce government spending, which is interrelated with both debt (through the 
government budget constraint) and consumption (through the goods market equilibrium). 
A last remark is worth being presented. The distinctive feature of this model, as analysed in 
point 2.2, which is also peculiar for the debt model presented in chapter 2 and for the social 
security model presented in this chapter, is not simply that a maximum sustainable level of 
debt (social security contributions) exists, but that when the latter is pushed very slightly 
beyond this threshold, a catastrophe occurs, and the economy is thrown into an abyss of 
uncontrolled capital decumulation, leading to a complete collapse. By contrast, Blanchard's 
perpetual youth model of debt with no government spending has still the property that a 
maximum sustainable level of debt exists, which, however, is reached smoothly at the point 
where the steady state capital stock has been driven to zero. An ignorant policy maker who 
raised debt by a bit, would allow the economy to reach zero capital step by step. 
On the other hand, by examining our models and Blanchard's with positive government 
spending, such an ignorant policy maker would, at some point, receive a nasty shock finding 
that well before a zero capital steady state was reached, one more small increase in debt (or 
contributions) would provoke a massive collapse. 
In the following chapters we investigate how the issue of sustainability of a particular 
policy can be extended to a monetary OLG framework and how this issue is interrelated to 
the issue of hyperinflation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NON-SUPERNEUTRALITY OF MONEY AND 
AN ENDOGENOUS SEIGNIORAGE POLICY 
4.1 Introduction 
The present and the following chapters contain a description of two different seigniorage 
policies and of their effects on the real variables in the economy. Our aim is to focus on the 
issue of sustainability of seigniorage policies which are used to finance the subsidies for the 
young. Therefore, for the rest of our thesis we extend our analysis of government financing 
by considering the policy of using money instead of the policy of issuing bonds, as previously 
investigated. The OLG framework adopted will guarantee consistency and continuity with the 
analysis carried out in the first part of the thesis. 
In the present chapter, we deal with the investigation of the dynamics of real money 
balances and capital stock in an OLG monetary economy where money grows at a constant 
rate and is injected into the economy to finance government spending under the form of a 
subsidy given to the young generation. We also show that in this type of microfounded set-up 
superneutrality of money does not hold and the Mundell-Tobin effect is at work. An 
exogenous shock in the money growth rate affects capital intensity and the welfare of the 
consumers. The poverty trap issue and the effects of an increase in the money growth rate are 
investigated as well. 
In the framework object of this investigation, the economy is populated by individuals who 
live for two periods and are identical over as well at a point in time. In period ta new 
generation of N, individuals is born and, as population is assumed to grow at a constant rate 
n, the number of people living at time t will be N, = No(l+n)`. In such an economy 
consumers act to maximise their utility which depends on the amount of consumption over 
the two periods of their life and the quantity of money they hold. The framework of the 
its 
general model consists of a series of behavioural equations for each sector of the economy, 
consumers and firms. 
In the next chapter, instead, we extend our model and we endogenise the money growth 
rate variable. The purpose is to investigate how, in such a rational expectations context, a 
policy of financing a constant amount of public deficit through money printing (i. e. raising a 
constant level of seigniorage) may lead to hyperinflation. It is worth saying that the topic of 
hyperinflation has been a subject of many debates, especially during the last two decades, 
because of the difficulty of setting up a rational expectations theoretical framework in which 
this phenomenon could arise, and a conclusive result has not been reached yet. With our 
model, we hope to establish new findings to explain why economies with a high rate of 
money growth and a policy of deficit financing mainly through an inflation tax policy exhibit 
hyperinflation. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part, we start describing the basic 
framework which is an adaptation and a re-formulation of Stein's model (1971). We show 
that, in an intertemporal optimising set-up, superneutrality of money' may not hold so that, 
within a finite-horizon optimising model, the Mundell-Tobin effect is at work. 
In the second part we extend the same model by using two different types of production 
functions. The conclusion is that, under some specific conditions, a poverty trap may arise, 
which enables us to draw a comparison with the results achieved with the debt model 
illustrated in chapter 2. As a matter of fact, with a production function which does not satisfy 
the Inada conditions and with initial conditions on the capital stock and real money balances 
which do not sustain the initial unstable equilibrium, the system could experience capital 
decumulation. 
The whole model is described in the next section. 
1 This result was obtained by Sidrauski (1967) in an OLG model based on utility maximisation by an infinitely- 
lived individual. The issue of the superneutrality of money has already been a topic of research during the 60s 
although in that context an ad hoc saving rule had been used. 
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"- SECTION 1. 
THE GENERAL MODEL 
4.1.1 Consumer's behaviour 
The intertemporal utility optimisation problem of the individual is the usual one, namely: 
(4.1) maximise u(cv, m1, c, +l) 
subject to w, +g, -cr' =m, +a, 
[l+r, 
+, 
]a, + P, m, =c, o+, 
Pr+t 
where the two last equations are the budget constraints in the first and second period of the 
individual's life. w1 represents the wage the individual receives from supplying inelastically 
one unit of labour in the first period of his life; g, is the subsidy the government gives to the 
individuals when young and which is financed by printing money. The total net amount of 
real wealth the consumer holds at the end of his first period of life, that is real wage plus 
transfers from the government, is both in the form of real money balances, m, = 
M' 
, which p1 Ni 
are measured at the end of period t (and whose gross real return is equal to the rate of price 
deflation or minus the inflation rate), and in the form of real-value interest-bearing financial 
assets, a1, which coincides with the expenditure on physical capital (i. e. shares), both defined 
at the end of period t. 
&± 
=1+ n, +l represents the gross rate of 
inflation. 
Pr 
Money is introduced in the utility function as it provides liquidity services and is a store of 
value2. This function attributed to real balances is associated to the services it can guarantee. 
One service is, for instance, the increased leisure derived from having larger inventories of 
2 The view that money can intermediate trade, which is based on the idea that real money balances yield services 
to the holder like physical capital does (for instance in terms of economising on transaction costs), helps to 
explain why money is introduced as an argument of the individual's utility function. Of course, since money does 
not pay any interest, as an alternative it has to provide services for being a good store of value. 
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real balances: the consumer can save trips and shoe leather costs to go to the bank. The value 
of the service to the consumer is reflected by the product of the opportunity cost of real 
balances and the quantity of real balances held by the consumer. As agents have finite lives, 
real balances are acquired by the young in exchange of providing goods to the old. Finally, 
utility is always guaranteed by the value of additional leisure available by replacing barter 
with money. 
The financial assets yield a gross real return of (1+r, +, 
) which, together with the value of 
real money balances held in the portfolio, are used to finance consumption in the second 
period of life. The old instead consume the rental incomes received from the stock of capital 
in which they invested and exchange their money balances for goods as they do not leave any 
bequest. Both money and capital are stores of value. 
The lifetime budget constraint can be written as: 
(4.2) w, +g, = Cr +[1+rr+il-1c, 1 +[1+rr+i]-ß[1+rr+i - 
Pý pmt. 
Pr+I 
We define the nominal interest rate i, between t and t+1 as the money yields derived from 
holding capital, that is the rent plus (minus) the expected capital gain (loss): 
(4.3) [1+rr+tI Pr+t =[I+ it] 
A 
which can be rearranged to yield: 
(4.4) [l+rr+ý]Al+rr+, - 
P, +1 
Substituting the last expression in eq. (4.2) we get: 
(4.5) w, +g, =c; +[l+r, +l]-'c, +l+i, 
[l+i]-'m, 
The LHS and RHS represent the lifetime real income and the present value of the lifetime 
consumption respectively. The intertemporal utility maximisation process yields a money and 
asset demand function which can be represented as follows: 
(+) (+X-) 
(4.6) mit=m(w, +g,, r, 1, it) 
W (? ) (7) 
(4.7) a, = a(w, +gr, ri+º, il 
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Demand for real balances per worker is a function of the lifetime real income and of the 
opportunity costs of holding real balances, r,,, and i,. A rise in the capital stock raises the 
transactions demand for real balances because it lowers the opportunity cost (the yield on real 
capital) of holding real balances. Investments in financial assets by the young depend 
positively on disposable income, but the effect of a change in the interest rates remains 
ambiguous;. 
4.1.2 Firm's behaviour 
We assume that at any period of time the composite good consumed is produced according 
to a production process which employs two factors, capital and labour. We assume that the 
individuals work when they are young and retire when old and leave no bequests. Therefore, 
the supply of labour at any period of time is equal to the number of young at that date. The 
endowment of capital at the beginning of period t, Kr, is the amount of resources which were 
not consumed in the period before. Thus, the expression for capital is equal to: 
(4.8) K,., - K, = N, a(w, +g,, r, ,, i, )-K,. 
The LHS represents the net investment which is a change in the capital stock between period 
t and t+1. The RHS represents the net savings which consist of financial investment of the 
young (a(")) net of dissaving of the old. Stein (1971) assumes that savings of the young in 
the form of output, and which are not consumed, are rented to firms and constitute the 
amount of capital to be used in the next period. The only 
interest-bearing asset in the 
economy is represented by physical capital, so that the total real value of the 
interest-bearing 
financial assets is invested in building up capital stock. Eq. (4.8) can be written in per capita 
terms as follows: 
t (4.9) k,., = (l+n)- a(w, +g,, r+,, i, ) 
3 The relation between savings and the interest rate has already been discussed in chapter 2. 
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where k, = K, / N, is the capital-labour ratio. The asset market equilibrium in eq. (4.9) differs 
from the asset market equilibrium of the model in chapter 2 both because we assume 0 
and because we take into account population growth. 
Output of the production process is governed by a constant returns to scale production 
function which is invariant over time, equal for each firm and neoclassical in its 
specification: 
(4.10) Y, =F(KN, )=N, f(k, ). 
The production function f: R+ -4 R+ is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, 
positive and strictly concave4. Since we assume perfect competition in both capital and 
labour market, each factor is paid its marginal product. Henceforth, the rental rate to capital 
paid by firms to the owners of capital and the wage rate is given by: 
(4.11) r, = f'(k, ) 
(4.12) w, =f(k, )-kf'(k, )" 
Therefore, eq. (4.9) can be rewritten as: 
(4.13) kr+ý =(l+n)-'a[f(k, )-k, fý(k, )+g,, fý(ki+ý), i, ] 
which is an implicit first-order difference equation in k. 
4.1.3 The Set-up of the Model and the Analysis of the 
Macroeconomic Equilibrium and of the Steady State Welfare 
The set-up of the model consists in defining the relationships which characterise the 
remaining markets in the economy. The goods market equilibrium is represented by the 
resource constraint which 
implies that the quantity of output produced in each period is both 
consumed by the individuals during their lives and invested to increase the amount of the 
capital stock available 
in the economy in the next period. Therefore, at time t this relation 
can be written as follows: 
4, Strictly concavity implies the following sign of the cross derivative in the Hessian matrix: 
Fon - (F4 )2 > 
0, where n stays for labour. 
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(4.14) Y,. = (N, c, +N, _, cr)+(K, +, -K, 
). 
which, in per-capita terms, becomes: 
4.15 = c'' + --SL- +k I+n 
We assume that in this economy there is a government which is issuing national currency 
(i. e. injecting money) to finance a lump sum subsidy to the young generation. Let us suppose 
that M, is the stock of money existing at the end of period t. The government financing 
policy consists in injecting money into the economy at a constant rate p: 
(4.16) 
rr 
=1+P. Mr-, 
Money is used to finance the total value of the subsidy given to the young: 
(4.17) N, Prg, = M, - Ms-t, 
so that, from the government budget constraint, the real transfers per worker are equal to: 
(4.18) gt= 
Mr 
-M`/(l+p)= 
p 
mr- N, p, N, p, 1+, u 
Therefore, real transfers per worker are proportional to the real balances per worker, m,. 
The money market always clears, which implies that the total supply of real balances 
injected into the economy is equal to the demand for money (which is derived from the 
individual's utility maximisation process). Substituting the expressions for some of the 
exogenous variables included as arguments in the demand function, eq. (4.6) can be rewritten 
as: 
(4.19) m, = m[f(kr)-kJ'(k, )+P(1+, u)-'m,, f'(kr+i), i, ]. 
Recalling that the per-capita real money balances are given by the expression 
M'+i 
$Vi = 
0,.., co, the following relation holds: 
(4.20) 
P, +i = 
mr Mi+1 N, 
Pr mr+1 Aft N1+1 
which, after some arrangements, 
becomes: 
121 
l+p l+r, 
+, (4.21) n1: +, - l+n l+i, n7,, 
where the second term, 
P_ 
= 
l+r, 
+, 
, represents the 
inverse of the gross inflation rate. The p, +i 
1+il 
hypothesis of clearing markets is consistent with what follows. Since an individual can save 
either in the form of real capital or in the form of real balances, if he is saving the desired 
quantity of 
(K1+1 
+ 
M' 
and holding the desired level of capital, then he must be holding 
Pr 
also the desired stock of real balances. Therefore mm represents the quantity demanded and 
supplied in the economy. Eq. (4.21) is a first-order difference equation in m and, together with 
eq. (4.13), forms a two difference equation system summarised as: 
(4.22) k, +1= 1+na[f(kr)-k, 
f'(kr)+P(l+p)-'m,, f'(k, 
41), i, 
] 
(4.23) mr+, - 
1+i 1+f'(k, +1) m, l+n l+i, 
where i, = i(k,, k, +l, m,; iu) can 
be derived from eq. (4.19). 
The study of the steady state properties is easily carried out by resorting to the First-Order- 
Conditions (FOCs); this is the reason why we turn back to considering the consumer's 
intertemporal optimisation problem through the relations which characterise the steady state 
equilibrium. In particular, we focus on the effects of a change in money growth rate on the 
steady state. We first solve the intertemporal allocation problem by using the Lagrangean: 
(4.24) L= u(c; , c, 1, mß)+ýýwr +g, -cý -cr+i(1+r, +i)-1-ir(1+iý)'lmfý. 
The First-Order-Conditions are represented by the following equations: 
(4.25) u,, (t) _ (1+r, +, 
)uo(t+l) 
(4.26) umýt) (1+r, +t)uo(t + 
1) = 
t` U W, l+i, 1+iý ' 
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where the argument tine in parenthesis stands for the time index of the variables which the 
marginal utility refers to, namely: uy(t)= 
ß`(c" I, M, ), uo(t+l)= °ý`( ö+`'"1' and 
anj 
From eq. (4.25) it is clear that savings, in the form of real capital, increase utility by 
uo(l+r, +l) 
in the following period, whereas, from eq. (4.26), savings in the form of real 
balances give a marginal utility of um as leisure gained by having more real balances to 
finance transactions (and which is also equal to 1`u° , 
i. e. the amount of goods provided 
for retirement). 
At the steady state real balances per worker are constant, so that the equilibrium rate of the 
price change is equal to the growth rate of money supply per worker. The relation between 
the steady state nominal and real rate of interest is the following5: 
(4.27) 1+i = l+n . 
[l+r]. 
If the growth rate of money supply is negative, then the nominal interest rate is non-negative 
only if r>n. In conclusion, given that money supply changes to provide transfers to the 
young generation, it is not possible to have a dynamically inefficient system together with a 
positive nominal interest rate if the money growth rate is negative. A rearrangement of 
eq. (4.27), useful for our analysis further on, is the following: 
i__ 
1_ 
l+n I 
(4.28) 
l+i l+, ul+r 
At the steady state the resource constraint or goods market equilibrium (eq. (4.15)) can be 
written as: 
(4.29) y=f(k)=cy+l+nc°+nk. 
5 This relation clearly shows that the nominal interest rate is a function of the capital stock, money and population 
growth rate, i, = i[k,;, t, n], as anticipated above. 
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The assumption of additively separable utility allows us to rewrite the condition in eq. (4.25), 
evaluated at the steady state, as: 
(4.30) uy(c'') = [1+ 
Moreover, by combining the latter with eq. (4.26), we get: 
(4.31) um(in)=[l+f'(k)]l+i u°(ZF, )" 
By substituting eq. (4.28) into eq. (4.3 1) we obtain the relation: 
(4.32) U. (m) = 1-1+p 1+ f'(k) uy(Zy) = 
[1+f'(r)_1+ý 
u°(c°) 
where m is a function of k, i and c°. Since the endogenous variables in the system are the 
four (cY, c°, k, m), it is necessary to find one more equation in m and for this purpose we 
consider the household's second period budget constraint: 
o (4.33) [l+rr+t]a, + 
P, 
m, =co+t" 
Pr+l 
As the market equilibrium implies that a, =[l+n]k, +l and, at the steady state, 
L= l+ný 
Pý+, 1+P 
real balances per worker become: 
(4.34a) m= (l+p) l+n -[1+ 
f'(k )]k 
which implies, after a few transformations, that second period consumption is equal to: 
(4.34b) c° =[l+ f'(k)][l+n]k + 
l+n 
m. 
P 
From equations (4.29)-(4.30)-(4.32)-(4.34b) we derive our model consisting of a two- 
equation system as follows: 
(4.35) uy . 
f(k) nk - l+n 
(1 + f'(k))u°(U°) 
o_ 
(4.36) U. 11+pl l+n-ýl+f 
(k)ýk = 1+ f'(k)- 
i+n 
uo(c ). 
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The two equations (4.35) and (4.36) represent the goods market (GG) and the asset market 
(AA) equilibrium locus respectively, and are drawn in fig. 4.1 in a (k, c°) space, where point 
E(kE, cE) represents the steady state equilibrium. 
Co 
C° E 
AA 
GG 
0k 
F 
E 
figure 4.1 
The slopes of the two stationary loci and the effects of a change in p on the two real 
variables (k, c) are found by studying the system in a matrix form as follows6: 
u», [f'-n]- f"uo -un, /(l+n) 
- 
(1+ f')u. dk 
(4.37) 
_uß[1+ßt](1+ý '+f"k)-f'uo u... (1+p)/(1 +n)-(u. /uo)u. dc_ 
-uým /(1+ýt)+ý1+n)uo /(l+ft)Z 
du 
The slope of eq. (4.35) is equal to: 
° UW'-n)- f"ua crc (4.38) _1 dk GG _U -(l+f')uu l+n 
6 We assume that the marginal utilities with respect to consumption in the two periods of life are positive and 
decreasing in it. 
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and depends on the sign and size of the difference (f '-n) (being uy u,,,, < 0). Let us 
suppose, initially, that f'= n. Consequently, the relation between c° and k in eq. (4.35) is 
negative so that the GG schedule is negatively sloped. On the other hand, the slope of the 
relation expressed by eq. (4.36) is ambiguous even when u=0, as is clear from the following: 
u,,,,, (1 + p) 
_ 
u 
1 
(4.39) ._ 
+n uo 
A -U. (l+, u)(1+ f'+f"k)- fua 
However, if we assume that k[1+ f' (k )] is increasing in k77 and the numerator in eq. (4.39) 
is negative, then the slope of AA is positive. We can now prove the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.1. A positive change in the rate of money growth, p, will affect the steady 
state equilibrium so that money is not superneutral. 
Proof. A positive change in the rate of money growth, U, increases the RHS and decreases 
the LHS of the asset market equilibrium (eq. (4.36)). Therefore, at each level of c°, k must 
increase to re-establish the equilibrium and AA shifts to the right (AA), and the equilibrium 
point moves from E to E' (fig. 4.2). The opposite trend holds for the consumption c° which 
decreases. Money is not superneutral as capital intensity is increased by the rate of monetary 
growth8. 
7 It is worth remembering that as k increases, f'(k) decreases in absolute value. 
8 The decrease in the long-run level of real money balances is based on the assumption that the expression 
k (1 +f '(k )] is increasing in k as well. 
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kE kE' 
figure 4.2 
Since the signs of the slope of the two loci are ambiguous, we consider also the case of 
(f'-n)» 0 in fig. 4.3 below. When the last condition holds, GG could be positively sloped 
whereas AA could be negatively sloped. In this case, an increase in p would raise both the 
steady state capital intensity and the old generation's consumption. 
C 
a 
c' E 
E 
kE kE' k 
figure 4.3 
Non-superneutrality of money implies that the "Mundell-Tobin" effect is at work: at the 
steady state, a higher rate of money growth per capita will bring about an increase in the 
AA A'A' 
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expected inflation rate. A higher rate of inflation increases the opportunity cost of holding 
real money balances since the nominal interest rate will rise at any level of capital intensity. 
Agents will therefore change their portfolio's composition and will shift from money balances 
towards real physical capital so that the stock of productive capital per worker will rise. The 
fall in real balances demand by the young will make more resources available either for 
consumption in the first period or for investment in real capital. The level of capital intensity 
should increase. As underlined by Stein, "[... J the crucial point to remember is that the older 
generation has absolutely no control over the rate of capital accumulation [.. ]. The relevant 
variable is simply the younger generation's desired holdings of real balances"9. This result 
contradicts the hypothesis of super-neutrality of money put forward by Sidrauski (1967). 
Succeeding studies confirmed the breakdown of the hypothesis of money superneutrality, 
although the assumptions relaxed every time were different. By considering a utility function 
which is not intertemporally separable in preferences, Epstein and Hynes (1983) showed that 
money super-neutrality does not hold. Moreover, if utility depends on leisure time but is not 
separable in it and the labour supply is endogenous, Brock (1974) showed that the rate of 
money growth could affect output. 
To summarise the results obtained so far, we first rewrite the matrix in (4.37) as: 
O (+; 1) (+) 
j 
dk7]= 
(4.40) 
a, i a12 
ob 
dp 
aa c+ 
For a small (f'-n) the sign of a,, is positive. Moreover, for big p and small 
u= (which 
u, 
implies that the nominal interest rate is low) the sign of a22 is negative. By Cramer's rule, the 
multiplier of the steady state level of capital with respect to the money growth is: 
(4.4 
dk 
_ 
-b a, 2 > 0. 1) - dp at ia22 - a21ai2 
9 Stein (1971), p. 48. 
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Therefore, all >0 and a22 <0 are sufficient, although not necessary, conditions for having a 
positive effect on the steady state level of capital stock. As we underlined above, the relation 
between c° and k on each of the two stationary loci is ambiguous as the two following 
multipliers show. 
4Cr °I a>> (4.42) 
dk a12 
which is negative if a >0 (holding constant c°), and: 
(4.43) 
ddc' k 
IAA 
a22 
which is positive if a22 <0 (holding constant 
T). It must be noted that the term 
1+ f' (k) -1 
+n is positive because, from eq. (4.36), the marginal utility with respect to 
I 
+P- 
real balances must be positive. This implies that 1+f '>I ++n 
nf ,>n if uS0. However, 
the higher is /i, the more likely is for the equilibrium to be dynamically inefficient. This 
condition can be summarised in the following proposition: 
Proposition 4.2. If there is a constant nominal money stock; namely ft = 0, f'> n is always 
true and the system is characterised by dynamic efficiency. Overcapitalisation is then 
excluded by the positive rate of return of money. 
This result is claimed by both Stein and Weiss under the hypothesis that the monetary 
policy is assumed to control only the size of the nominal transfer to each young person. 
By considering eq. (4.40), the scenario represented in fig. 4.3 can be interpreted as follows. 
As the difference (f'-n) becomes bigger, the positive value of all decreases and the curve 
GG gets flatter. When a,, is negative, GG becomes positively sloped. Conversely, as ,u gets 
smaller, AA is more likely to be negatively sloped. 
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A last final consideration can be put forward. In the model just presented the Fisher effect'° 
fails to hold: in fact, the effect of an increase in the money growth rate on (1+i) is 
ambiguous since, in eq. (4.27), [l+ f'(k)] decreases. 
Lastly, we are interested in calculating the effect of a change in p on the steady state 
welfare of the representative individual when the authority can only control the size of the 
transfer to the young and it cannot acquire real capital. We claim that: 
Proposition 4.3. An increase in the rate of money growth starting from zero will both 
bring about a reallocation in the individual's portfolio composition and increase utility 
(since the initial equilibrium is dynamically efficient). 
Proof. By starting from the general specification of the utility function as in eq. (4.1), the 
overall effect on u(") is derived: 
c '' cO& cr'' 1 cZO 1+ n1 ain 
(4.44) 
du(g) 
= uy +uo +u, ý =uy + +[, _ dýc öýr 9/1 oar öa 1+r Fu 1+ý 1+r äßt 
Changes in the aggregate value of money must be accompanied by non-trivial changes in the 
real allocation of consumption over time. Eq. (4.29) is transformed as: 
(4.45) cy =f (k)-nk 
c 
-1+n 
so that the multiplier with respect to the consumption 
in the first period is equal to: 
y 
(4.46) n]a l+n a 
We can follow the same procedure for eq. (4.34a) thus obtaining the following multiplier: 
CY? T 
_m1 
c''° är 
(4.47) öý l+fc+(l+P) l+n äft a; j . 
10 The Fisher equation represents a link between the money growth rate (i. e. inflation) and the nominal rate of 
interest. In the long run, when expected and actual inflation rates coincide, an increase in the inflation rate is 
totally reflected on the nominal 
interest rate. This implies that the real interest rate is not influenced by money 
growth. 
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By substituting eqs. (4.46)-(4.47) into eq. (4.44) we derive an expression which, evaluated at 
= 0, yields: 
(4.48) 
IA l+n Z-11 1+n 1 aý° 1+n 
uydy. f'-n- 1-1+ f' 
(l+f'+f"k) 
op+ l+n+l+f'+ 
1-l+f' 
l+n Ou 
1-l+fý m 
Since we showed that f'> n when u=0, after some calculations we derive the overall effect 
on utility stemming from a change in the growth rate of the money supply: 
(4.49) 
1a-- f'"k (f'-n) cfc + 
f'-n 
m_. 
uy Op l+f' öp1+f' 
This expression shows that the steady state utility increases with money growth rate "... so 
long as factor rewards are influenced by factor supplies (f "< 0), f... J evaluated at a position 
of zero money growth "11 as already stated by Weiss (1980). Any decrease in the return on 
money would induce a shift towards capital accumulation. This would raise output which 
positively affect wages, thus lowering the return on capital. If the initial equilibrium is 
characterised by dynamic efficiency, then changes in factor payments induced by changes in 
factor supplies due to a portfolio reallocation would have a ':.. first-order effect on the 
welfare of the typical individual'nz. 
In the next section we focus on the specific exercise of parameterising the general model 
investigated so far by adopting definite utility and production functions. This will help us to 
highlight some aspects of the model which have remained untreated in the present section. 
II Weiss (1980), p. 570. 
12 Weiss (1980), p. 569. 
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SECTION 2. 
SOME PARAMETERISATIONS OF THE GENERAL MODEL 
4.2.1 Introduction 
In this section we parameterise the model presented in the previous section by using a 
specific log-linear utility function13. The individual's intertemporal utility maximisation 
problem can be written as: 
(4.50) maximise u= ßßl lnc; +ß2 Inc, *., +ß3 lnm, where A+ fl2 +ß3 =1 
subject to w, +g, =c; +(l+rr+, )-lcIO+i+it(1+ir)''mt. 
Log-linear utility over consumption and real balances has been widely used especially 
because of the completeness of the results obtained. The First-Order-Conditions are the 
following: 
(4.51) °Z=Qý-A=0 
°T= ßi (4.52) -2(1+, 0 
, +i cc +1 
(4.53) 
,=m, 
1+i, 
By equating egs. (4.51) and (4.52), we get: 
(1+rr+ß)c'. (4.54) c/+i =A 
From eq. (4.53) real money balances are equal to: 
(4.55) m, =Q31+itcr, A i, 
and by substituting this expression into the budget constraint, we get the equations for the 
three endogenous variables of the system: 
13 Stein did not examine the sensitivity of his model to the specific form of the utility function used. 
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(4.56) c =ßi(w, +Sr) 
(4.57) c4, =ß2(1+r, +t)(w, +g, 
) 
(4.58) m, =X31+"(w, +g, )" it 
Consumption in the first and second period, savings per worker and real money balances 
demand are a constant fraction of real disposable income per worker, (w, +g, ), because of 
the property of the logarithmic function: the income and substitution effects cancel out so 
that the demand function does not depend on the interest rates. However, although those 
variables are a constant proportion of the total amount of lifetime income, it is important to 
underline that they are derived from a utility maximisation process and are not represented by 
ad hoc expressions like those adopted in the standard IS-LM analysis. Positive quantities of 
real capital and real balances are held only if the nominal interest rate is not negative. 
The expression for a, is found by substituting the last three equations into the first period 
budget constraint: 
(4.59) a, = ß2 _3 
(x', + g, )" 
Introducing eq. (4.18) into eq. (4.58) we can derive the expression for the nominal rate of 
interest: 
ti'ý'(k, )+p(1+p)-1m, 
=! (k,, m,; p), (4.60) iý =1_ 
73 1+9 
which can be rewritten as: 
(4.61) 
1 
=1- 
p A-Q3 w(k, 
) 
1+i, 1+/[ m, 
If we substitute eqs. (4.59) and (4.61) into eqs. (4.22) and (4.23) respectively, the two first- 
order difference equation system is the following: 
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(4.62) k, +i = 
1 (Qs +ß3)w(kr)+ (ßi +A) 
I+n 
(4.63) mr+i = l+n 
[1+f'(kr+, )] 1-1+ýA m1-Qsw(kr) - 
1+P 1- Qs mr -Qsx'(kr) l+ i' 
1 ((ß2+ß3)w(ki)+[23»'_11mi 
1+n 1+P l+n 1+, u 
where k, is a predetermined variable established at the beginning of period t, whereas mr is a 
non-predetermined variable and already deflated by pr at the end of period t. 
4.2.2 The Case of Cobb-Douglas and 
Logarithmic Production Functions 
In order to find an explicit solution to the system formed by egs. (4.62)-(4.63), we will 
resort to two different production functions, the first of which satisfies the Inada conditions. 
A) Let us first consider the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(4.64) y=k" 0<a<1, 
for which the following relations are derived: 
(4.65) f'(k) = akd-', kf'(k) = aka, w(k) =. f (k)-kf'(k) = (1- a)ka. 
A. 1) In the simple case where p=0 the two stationary loci become: 
(4.66) Akr =0 m, =(fii+A)(1-a)k, °`-(I+n)k, 
a-1 1 
(4.67) An, =0 m, = 
n[m`s(1-a)k, 
"I 1+ 
+n((ýi+Qs)(1a)k, 
"-m, ý 
which is a non-linear two equation system to be solved graphically to assess whether a steady 
state exists. 
Eq. (4.66) is a concave function which intersects the horizontal axis at two points one of 
which is the origin. Its slope at the origin is infinity and it has a maximum in the positive 
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quadrant (see fig. 4.4 below, line OA). Capital stock increases for all the points below the 
function. 
m, 
()62+ß3)i1-a )k' 
I 
0 
r+ I 
figure 4.4 
Eq. (4.67) represents the stationary locus for the money market equilibrium and is pictured 
in fig. 4.5. The RHS is unambiguously decreasing in k, whereas both the LHS and the RHS 
+' 
are increasing in m,. However, the condition 
(1l+n) 
2114 implies that an increase in money 
raises the RHS by more than the LHS so that the relationship between capital stock and 
money is positive. This function is concave, passes through the origin and reaches a 
maximum. Moreover, since the term in the second brackets on the RHS is decreasing in k,, 
there will be a point where the relationship between m1 and kc becomes negative and the 
function turns down to minus infinity for m1. This part is not reported in the figure because 
the intersection with the function ik, =0 would imply a negative steady state for real 
balances. Real money balances increase above the function. 
14 This condition always holds at the steady state for ut =0 as we showed before, i. e. at the intersection point 
between Mim, =0 and Akf = 0. 
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figure 4.5 
As a matter of fact, the range of variation of m, is further restricted by taking into account 
that both money and capital stock cannot be negative. Therefore, in order for the RHS of 
eq. (4.67) to be positive, we must have m, > fl3w(k, ), whereas, from eq. (4.66), 
m, < (ß2 +/33)w(k, ). Therefore, m, must lie in the range: 
(4.68) /33 w(k, ) <mr <(Qi +Q3)w(k, )" 
Moreover, from eq. (4.67) evaluated at the steady state, the following equality holds: 
(4.69) 1+f'(k)=_ m [1+n]>[1+n]. 
m -ß3w(k ) 
This condition implies that the steady state of the system will be dynamically efficient. This 
still confirms Stein's result that, if a= 0, then f'> n at the steady state. This is a general 
result independent of the form of the production function adopted. 
The solution of the system (eqs. (4.66)-(4.67)) is represented in fig. 4.6 below and only one 
non-trivial positive and acceptable steady state exists which, from the directions of the 
arrows, turns out to be a saddle. 
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A. 2) Let us now consider the case of a positive money growth rate, i. e. p> 0. We 
illustrate this case since we are interested in analysing the effects on the capital stock 
following an increase in the rate of money growth. This exercise could be helpful to support 
the results already achieved with the general model in (4.37). To carry out this analysis, we 
rearrange eq. (4.62) evaluated at the steady state to get: 
(4.70) m=1 [(fl2+ß3)w(k)-(1+n)k]. 
1-(2+ßs)1+ý 
Substituting this expression for m into eq. (4.63) we obtain a single equation in k: 
(4.71) (2+ß3)w(k)-(1+n)k =1 1+'nk)1[1+pl, 
82w(k)-[1+(1-ß3)p](1+n)k}, 
which can be rewritten as: 
l+f'(k) 
(4.72) l+n l+fý-JUA-Q3(l+Afl) 
(Qý +Q3)-(l+n)k / w(k) 
The derivative of the RHS denominator with respect to u is equal to: 
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(4.73) o1ZHýýden. =1-ß3-ß3/2 
+ i3-(l+n)k/w(k) 
whose sign is ambiguous. 
However, eq. (4.72) can be studied graphically by considering the LHS and the RHS 
separately. By using eq. (4.64) the LHS becomes: 
(4.74) 
1+aka-t 
1+ký, 
a 
1+n 1+n 
which is clearly decreasing in k. The horizontal asymptote is equal to 
1_1 ) 
whereas the I+n 
vertical asymptote is represented by the ordinate axis. The function is pictured on the left- 
hand side of fig. 4.7. 
LHS 
1 
1 +n 
0 K 
r 
RHS 
0 
figure 4.7 
On the right-hand side of fig. 4.7 we represent the RHS of eq. (4.72) which is equal to: 
QZ(1+/i)1 
1i 
[(ß2+ß3)_l+(I_ß3)j 
(4.75) R HS-11+(1-ßs)81 [1+(1-ß )ful" ß2O +, u) 
1+(1-ß3), u 
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where x. 
k(l+n)_k - (l+n) is monotonically increasing in T. Eq. (4.75) represents an 
w(k) (1-a) 
L 
(1-a), ß2(1+, u) I-a hyperbola. The vertical asymptote is equal to kV =. The horizontal 
asymptote instead is equal to 1+(11 ý33)ýt' 
The numerator of eq. (4.75) is positive because 
the term 
A('+ P) can be written as (ß2 +/33) - 
ß3 (1 +Q"u) 
< (ß2 +133) . The hyperbola 1+(1-ß3)p 1+(1-ß3)fp 
- '-ý lies above the horizontal asymptote for kE0; , 
132 (1 +P)(1 a) 
and below it for (1+, u-/33p)(1+n) 
higher values of T. 
All the sets of values of k to the right of k, where E (l+n) 
I-a' 
are not 
acceptable because, since real money balances cannot be negative, from eq. (4.70) we have 
that (/3 z +/13)w(k)-(1+n)k >0 or, 
identically, that the steady state level of k must satisfy 
1 
+ 1-a -a 
the inequality: T< 
<ß2 ß )n )=FF. 
By merging the two figures representing the LHS and the RHS (fig. 4.8), we find that only 
one positive steady state exists to the left of point A. A change in p does not affect the LHS 
of eq. (4.72), so that in order to evaluate the effects of a change in money growth rate, we 
have to reconsider eq. (4.75). Some observations must be done: 
(A +ý3) 
1) for k=0 , the 
RHS =l ý2(l+, u) 
(i. e. the intersection point of the function with the ordinate 
axis) is decreasing in p. As k --). oo, the RHS tends to ; 1+(1-ß3)1u 
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2) by rearranging the RHS of eq. (4.72), the derivative of its denominator with respect to the 
money growth is equal to ß2w(k)-(1-/33)(1+n)k or, dividing by w(k), to [Q2 -(1-ßß3)x], 
which, when evaluated at the vertical asymptote, becomes: 
(4.76) /3 
(1- ß3 )ßs (1+ JU) _ 
Qz/33 
> 0. 2 [1+(1-ß3)p] [1+(1-ß3)p] 
From this last inequality, it is clear that a rise in p positively affects the denominator of the 
RHS which shifts downward at every level of the steady state, T. The horizontal asymptote 
shifts down whereas the vertical asymptote shifts to the right. The overall effect of an 
increase in u is illustrated in fig. 4.8 below, where the dashed lines are drawn for the 
increased money growth rate. 
F 
figure 4.8 
It is clear that money is not superneutral and it affects capital intensity by leading to a 
portfolio reallocation once the growth rate of money has exogenously changed. Unlike 
Sidrauski's analysis, according to our model a change in the rate of money growth starts a 
process of intertemporal utility maximisation which leads to a change in the capital stock per 
worker. 
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The conclusion to be drawn from the mathematical analysis of the relationship between 
capital stock and money growth rate, is that we have been successful in deriving an explicit 
equations system useful for evaluating the effects of an expansionist monetary policy on the 
steady state capital stock. 
We now continue our analysis by proving that the results of our model may depend on the 
production function we use and on the constraints applied to the system we investigate. 
B) We now carry out the same analysis by using a logarithmic production function of the 
form: 
(4.77) y= aln[yk+1] O<a<1, y>O 
for which we have: 
(4.78) f' (k) = A+1 , 
kf' (k) = 
a*1, w(k) = aln[ yk + l] - 
a*1. 
B. 1) The two stationary loci represented, in the case of p=0, by equations (4.66) and 
(4.67), are now written as: 
(4.79) Akt=0 m, =(ß2+ß3) aln[ , +1]-At+I (l+n)k, 
1 
(4.80) dnm =O mI = l+n 
[m, 
-Aaln[A, +I]+A 
kit 
aY 
-m 1+ 
1 (ß2+Q3) aln[A, +1J- aýk l+n A, , +1 
The basic results are robust to the values we assign to the parameters. Eq. (4.79) has a 
similar shape of eq. (4.66) except for small values of the capital stock where the stationary 
locus corresponds to negative values of m,. Eq. (4.80) is upward sloping for the initial interval 
of k, like eq. (4.67), and then it turns down, so that there are three steady states: the origin and 
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lel. 
other two for positive values of m, and k,. In fig. 4.9 we provide a sketch of the solutions 
found by simulating the model with different parameter values. The results of the simulations 
carried out to evaluate the effects of a change in the parameter values on the steady state 
level of the capital stock for both production functions are discussed in appendix I at the end 
of this chapter. 
ml 
0 
figure 4.9 
kt 
From fig. 4.9 the following remarks are straightforward. First of all, there are three steady 
states: points 0 and B, which are saddle point stable, and point A, which is unstable. Point 0 
represents the trivial equilibrium of zero production and factor incomes in an economy which 
has shut down; this steady state is conditional on f (0) = 0. On the contrary, point A 
represents the possibility that a poverty trap phenomenon can arise. 
Secondly, if the economy starts above the stationary locus Amt >0 and to the left of point 
A15, so that the saddle path condition is not satisfied, then dynamics would lead towards 
decumulation of the capital stock. People would be consuming and investing in real money 
balances so that less resources would be available for capital investment. As time passes by, 
less capital would be available in the economy also due to the fall in the total income earned. 
15 We assume that to the right of point A, the saddle path condition of point B is satisfied. 
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This scenario implicitly tells us that if, initially, for a given level of capital stock, real money 
balances are too high (and the system starts off above the stationary locus &rný = 0), then the 
immediate consequences would be a decumulation of the capital stock and the collapse of the 
productive sector: the increasing demand for money would leave fewer and fewer resources 
for capital accumulation. 
The existence of two non-trivial steady states is strictly associated to the kind of production 
function used. More precisely, the logarithmic production function does not satisfy the Inada 
conditions, so that when capital stock becomes negligible, r, -* ay, whereas in the Cobb- 
Douglas production function case it goes to infinity. What happens is that the stationary locus 
does not have an infinite slope at the origin, and the increase in wage due to capital 
accumulation is smaller at every level of k, with respect to the Cobb-Douglas case. 
Therefore, it seems that the switch in the technology process negatively affects the economy, 
since the amount of gross savings available to be invested in capital stock and money in the 
economy is now lower16. Provided that the amount of capital stock to be accumulated stays 
unchanged on the locus Ak, = 0, the decrease in savings, at every level of k, which occurs 
when we consider the logarithmic production function instead of the Cobb-Douglas one, will 
be represented by a shortage of money in order to maintain a constant capital stock. This 
implies that money will reach negative values when savings decrease by a large amount. 
Such a behaviour is determined by the non satisfaction of the Inada conditions and helps to 
explain why, for small values of k,, the stationary locus tk, =0 lies in the negative quadrant 
form,. 
B. 2) We now carry out the analysis for the case of ,u#0. 
The LHS of eq. (4.72) 
becomes: 
I+- aY 
y1c +1 
(4'81) 1+n 
16 The total amount of savings available in the economy is a proportion of the wage and is spent both on capital 
accumulation 
for next period generation and on money holdings, namely s1 [w(k, ), A] = (1 + n)k1+1 +m1, 
where A represents the parameter of the technological progress. 
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1+ ay, 
whereas the horizontal The intersection point with the ordinate axis is equal to 1 +n 
asymptote is l1" 
The function is positive, decreasing and convex along the interval. The 
RHS in eq. (4.75) is equal to: 
1 (4.82) RHS= 
1+(1-ý3s)ýt 
02 ß"ßs)- 
(l+n)k 
aln[A+l]- 
aß`1 
ß2(1+p) 
_ 
(1+n)k 
1+(1-ß3)1u 
aln[A+l]_ 
aA 
A+l 
The general reasoning followed for eq. (4.75) still holds; however, due to the complexity of 
the expression for the wage, it is no longer possible to find a simple equation in k (eq. (4.75), 
for instance, was a simple hyperbola). Simulations of eq. (4.82), for some specific sets of 
parameter values, allow us to conclude that the shape of the RHS is the one reported in 
fig. 4.10. Therefore, since the LHS and the RHS intersect twice, the equation (4.81)=(4.82) 
exhibits two non-trivial steady states (points A and B), as in the simplistic case of u= 0. 
RHS 
aý. 
y 
_. 
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0 k 
figure 4.10 
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LHS 
Simulations also show that an increase in the growth rate of money shifts down the RHS 
while the LHS remains unchanged. This would imply the existence of the Mundell-Tobin 
effect. The saddle point steady state would then rise with p (from point B to point B), which 
is actually the same phenomenon occurring for the Cobb-Douglas production function case 
depicted in fig. 4.8. 
The results of the analysis done by parameterising the general model with particular utility 
and production functions support the validity of our model as a working tool for a more 
accurate investigation of the steady state properties. 
4.2.3 Conclusions 
To sum up, the analysis of this chapter has shed light on some important aspects 
overlooked by Stein, such as: 1) an evaluation of the effects on the individuals' welfare of the 
government monetary policy of issuing domestic currency at a constant rate and 2) a 
formal/graphic investigation of the issue of money non-superneutrality through a re- 
adaptation of the same model. 
Our model has shown that the Mundell-Tobin effect holds whatever is the parameterisation 
of the model used for our investigation. The comparison between the present model and the 
debt model presented in chapter 2 has emphasised that a poverty trap is not associated 
exclusively with the presence of debt but to the existence of another investment opportunity 
available to the investors which looks more attractive than capital and, sometimes, also with 
the type of production function used. 
In this chapter we have focused on a financing policy based on a source of revenue for the 
government represented by the right of creating fiat money (i. e. levying an inflation tax), and 
investigated how any change in the inflation rate would lead households to fluctuate between 
capital and money holdings. In the next chapter we will consider dynamics of hyperinflation 
and the real effects on the economy once the government decides to transfer a constant 
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amount of resources to the young of future generations, so that the growth rate of money is no 
longer controlled by the government, but it is endogenously determined within the model. 
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APPENDIX 1 
In the main text we have underlined the existence, for u=0, of a multiplicity of equilibria 
which depends on the production function used. In this appendix we choose to analyse more 
deeply the system consisting of eqs. (4.66)-(4.67) (case of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function) and of egs. (4.79)-(4.80) (case of a logarithmic production function). The purpose of 
this investigation is to illustrate what are the main results of the simulations of the model, by 
studying the effects of a change in each parameter on the steady state level of the capital 
stock for p=0, while briefly commenting on the results for p#0. 
Let us, then, focus on the effects on the steady states following some changes in the 
parameters of the model when p=0. Although the results from using the Cobb-Douglas 
production function are quite well established, nevertheless a brief investigation is provided 
before we focus more deeply on the logarithmic production function. 
Cobb-Douglas production function. 
From the analysis in section 2 of chapter 4, we were able to conclude that a unique 
acceptable steady state exists. This steady state strictly depends upon the value of the main 
parameters within the utility function, while all the simulations' have been carried out for a 
value of a= 0.3, as suggested by most empirical estimations. A series of simulations have 
supported the following conclusions. 
1) Holding A constant, the lower %32 with respect to 83, the lower will be the steady state 
capital stock. In fact, notwithstanding that both ß2 and /33 represents the individual's 
preference for the second period consumption, however only the amount actually saved goes 
to build up new capital stock, whereas money is just valueless paper which is held by the 
young in exchange of goods alienated to the old. Therefore, the lower A, the fewer resources 
are invested in capital accumulation and the lower the steady state capital stock. 
As underlined at the beginning of the thesis, all these simulations have been carried out by using Mathematica 
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2) For a certain level of X32, the higher 8,, the higher the steady state capital stock. An 
explanation might be that, from eq. (4.59), the amount ar of investments in the financial asset 
(which coincides with the amount of capital stock to be built up in the next period) is 
negatively related to A, so that when the latter decreases, an unambiguous increase in the 
capital stock occurs. 
3) For a given value of X33, the higher A with respect to /32, the lower the steady state 
capital stock. This follows the same reasoning put forward in point 1): the lower the 
preference for the second period consumption and capital accumulation, the lower the 
population's savings which are invested and the lower the level of capital stock. 
4) An increase in n decreases the value of the capital stock at the equilibrium. 
Logarithmic production function. 
1) We start off by considering a generic set of parameters which yields two steady states 
(for instance, (a= 0.3, ß, = 0. l, ß2 = 0.8,133 = 0.1, n = 0.01, y=24)). Following an increase in 
n or a decrease in y, the two steady states would get closer (namely, there would be crowding 
out of the saddle point stable capital stock and an increase in the unstable capital stock level). 
Moreover, if y is below a critical value, no intersection point exists anymore, ceteris paribus. 
2) For the same set of parameters (a = 0.3,3, = 0.1, n=0.01, y= 24), the lower ß2 with 
respect to X33, the less likely to find two steady states with the value of y= 24. However, if 
we increase the parameter of "technology efficiency" to, for instance, y= 50, then we would 
find two steady states which, however, get closer and closer as 82 decreases with respect to 
/33. If iß2 is small, it is necessary that the parameter efficiency, y, is high enough to guarantee 
an equilibrium. This is equivalent to saying that enough amount of resources must be 
invested in capital accumulation so that the technology adopted must be relatively high 
capital-intensive. 
3) For a given set of parameters (a,,? 2, n, y), the higher A with respect to /33, the more 
distant the two steady states are for the same level of y, so that it is more likely to find two 
steady states for a certain value of y. 
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4) For a given set of parameters (a, ß3, n = 0.0 1, y= 24), the lower iß2 with respect to ß the 
more likely that there are no steady states so that we have to increase again y up to, say, 50, 
to find them. If the amount of resources invested in capital stock is a low- proportion of 
income, then a high value of technology efficiency is necessary to have multiplicity of 
equilibria. 
5) An increase in a has a positive effect because it widens the distance between the two 
steady states of the capital stock which get more distant. This means that it is more likely, for 
a given value of y, to find two steady states as a rises. 
6) The effect of an increase in n is the same as in the case of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, namely it shifts Ek1= 0 down and &rn1= 0 up, so that beyond a certain population 
growth rate no steady state exists. 
Some observations are noteworthy. Firstly, the whole model is based on the concept that 
domestic savings are a prerequisite for capital accumulation, so that policies which can 
promote high savings can facilitate the increase in the amount of capital stock in the 
economy. Of course, a high rate of saving is dependent on the availability of saving 
instruments and on high rates of return. 
Secondly, a comparison between the results obtained with the two types of production 
functions suggests that the multiplicity of equilibria is partially correlated with the type of 
production function used and partially with the values assigned to the parameters. As 
underlined in the main text, when there is just one non trivial steady state, it is a saddle, 
whereas when two steady states exist, one of them is a saddle and the other is a source. The 
existence of an unstable equilibrium raises the issue of the poverty trap phenomenon and 
allows us to build a bridge between the analysis of debt management dealt with in chapter 2 
and through money issue dealt with in chapter 4. 
The considerations till now expressed refer to the particular case of U=0. However, we 
have also carried out many simulations of the system in the case of U> 0 in order to check 
whether the number of the steady states associated to each production function is the same in 
the cases of zero and positive money growth rate. In order to determine the number of the 
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equilibria, we have to plot the LHS against the RHS of eq. (4.72) for different set of parameter 
values. The conclusion is that there is a perfect correspondence between the number of 
equilibria in both cases. 
This analysis has also turned out to be important to determine the effects of a change in the 
money growth rate on the steady state capital stock. An investigation of the results obtained 
by simulating egs. (4.74)-(4.75) and egs. (4.81)-(4.82) has suggested that the Mundell-Tobin 
effect still holds. More precisely, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, the unique 
steady state level of capital stock rises if the money growth rate increases. On the other hand, 
when considering the case of the logarithmic production function, the effect is the same apart 
from the existence of two steady state levels of the capital stock (one of which is unstable), 
so that the positive effect is only on the saddle point stable capital stock. 
Below we provide an example of a simulation of egs. (4.81)-(4.82) for the case of p= 0 
(table A. 1) and u> 0 (table A. 2) for a particular set of parameters. The results of some other 
simulations with other parameters sets are omitted to avoid overweighing the analysis. 
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Table A. 1 
a=O. 3, ß1 =0.1, ßZ =0.8, A= 0.1, n = 0.0l, y= 24,, u= 0 
Steady State for m 
Steady State for k e . 
4.79 e . 
4.80 
0 0 0; -33.6199 
0.01 -0.00427799 0.000748732; -30.3175 
0.02 -0.0019162 0.0024266; -30.4452 
0.03 0.0031043 0.00459078; -30.6003 
0.05 0.0151108 0.00967959; -30.931 
0.15 0.0492309 0.0376596; -32.3252 
0.2 0.0491734 0.0506585; -32.8482 
0.23 0.0453271 0.057993; -33.123 
0.25 0.0414672 0.0626959; -33.2929 
0.3 0.028043 0.0738433; -33.679 
0.35 0.010215 0.0841998; -34.0197 
0.4 -0.0110977 0.0938612; -34.3245 
The steady states are the following: 0.03 < k, 4< 0.05 and 0.15 < kB < 0.2. 
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Table A. 2 
a=O. 3, ß1 =O. 1, ß2 =0.8, ß, =0.1, n=0.01, y=24, p=0.02 
Steady State fork LHS e . 
4.81 RHS e . 4.82 
0.032 5.02218 16.4377 
0.035 4.8644 3.94415 
0.05 4.23042 1.87059 
0.1 3.08678 1.62051 
0.16 2.46297 1.82985 
0.2 2.21919 2.22559 
0.25 2.00849 4.37176 
The results in table A. 2 confirm that two steady states also exist when p> 0, which are 
0.032<k74. <0.035 and 0.16<k, 7,, <0.2. Since in the case of an exponential Cobb-Douglas 
production function we found one non trivial steady state both for the case ýc =0 and for the 
case u> 0, multiplicity of equilibria seems to be connected to the kind of production 
function used. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A CONSTANT SEIGNIORAGE POLICY, HYPERINFLATION 
AND THE HIGH INFLATION TRAP PHENOMENON 
5.1 Introduction 
The model described in the previous chapter is now extended to investigate how 
hyperinflation can result when the government chooses to collect seigniorage to finance a too 
large budget deficit'. This issue has been recently dealt with by some authors, like Evans and 
Yarrow (1981), Buiter (1987), Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Bruno and Fischer (1990) 
since, in extreme hyperinflationary situations, money printing becomes the only source of 
government revenues. However, the models developed in the literature do not seem to have 
been completely successful in dealing with this topic and their limitations are underlined 
later on in this section. On the other side, the framework we will develop is an improvement 
in so far as it incorporates the interactions between the monetary and real sectors of the 
economy; consequently, it becomes possible to analyse what are the effects on the capital 
stock in the economy when the government is trying to keep the amount of seigniorage 
constant. We also look for the existence of a maximum level of revenue a government can 
obtain from money creation. 
The standard analysis developed in the last two decades (including the papers quoted 
above) has adopted the Cagan's type of money demand whereas real variables are kept fixed. 
Our approach is to apply the same spending policy rule, namely examining a constant 
government real deficit which is financed by printing money but in a context where real 
variables are no longer constant, and to consider the existence of possible multiple equilibria. 
The duality of equilibria under pure deficit financing through money printing is a quite 
well-known result from the seminal contribution of Evans and Yarrow (1981) whose work 
t It is realistic to believe that countries may inflate their way out of troubles, but intuitively this would lead 
investors to demand higher interests exacerbating debt burden and leading to an excessive increase in money 
growth rate. This is why hyperinflation would occur. 
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has been recently extended by Bruno and Fischer (1990). Both models are based on the 
Cagan assumption of money market equilibrium, and the core of Cagan's pioneering analysis 
of hyperinflation is a demand for money function relating desired real balances to the 
opportunity cost of holding money which, in period of rapid inflation, can be closely 
approximated by the expected rate of inflation, while the real interest rate is assumed to be 
constant over time. However, these previous analyses have some strong limitations which can 
be summarised as follows: (a) they do not take into account an explicit optimisation rule for 
the behavioural equations of the economy and (b) real variables are kept constant over time 
so that it is unclear why hyperinflation should matter if real variables are not affected by 
changes in the purchasing power. Conversely, the money demand function we use is derived 
through a process of lifetime utility maximisation and the real interest rate and output are no 
longer kept constant. This choice is perfectly consistent with the suggestion made by Evans 
(1983) who pointed out that the monetary modelst, which had been usually used to study the 
dynamic behaviour of real balances and the inflation rate, did not permit variations in output. 
In the model formalised by Bruno and Fischer, the rate of money creation is assumed to be 
proportional to the price level and inversely related to the level of real balances. Two 
equilibria arise if deficit financing is sufficiently low. The stable steady state is associated 
with the higher inflation rate and lower real money balances and conversely for the unstable 
one. This implies that the economy may be stuck at a high inflation rate notwithstanding the 
existence of an unstable equilibrium with a lower inflation rate with guarantees the same 
amount of revenue3. This result is labelled as "high inflation trap". As the size of the deficit 
gets bigger, the two steady states shrink together until no steady state exists. The maximum 
seigniorage is defined as the greatest constant flow of real government expenditure that can 
be financed by the issue of additional currency at the steady state. This maximum seigniorage 
concept can be interpreted as the monetary counterpart of the maximum sustainable level of 
debt which we derived in chapter 2. 
2 Evans (1983) focuses on the analysis of different price adjustment mechanisms and their consequent effect on 
the short-run dynamics of real money balances. 
3 This clearly expresses the concept of the existence of the Laffer curve. 
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The main problem met by these models is that, in a rational expectations context (or very 
fast adaptive expectations) with exogenous seigniorage, dynamics do not lead to 
hyperinflation but to hyperdeflation. Only with adaptive expectations hyperinflation is found. 
The association of an increase in deficit with a decrease in the inflation rate is attributed to 
the fact that the economy is on the wrong side of the Laffer curve, so that a decrease in the 
inflation rate is needed to generate more revenue any time the deficit rises. 
The conclusion is that "[... J allowing monetary policy to accommodate fiscal pressures not 
only leaves the inflation rate to be determined by the fiscal authority, but - because of the 
possibility of multiple equilibria - also increases the likelihood that the economy will find 
itself operating at an inflation rate higher than it need to be "4. 
Blanchard and Fischer (1989)5 have analysed, in a simplified context, the same policy rule 
adopting the Cagan demand for money equation. When the government seeks to obtain a 
given amount of revenue from seigniorage, the high inflation trap is again associated with a 
rapid adjustment of expectations or a very interest rate elastic demand for money. Quite 
counterintuitively, if the expected inflation is low enough, the government can, by increasing 
the rate of money printing, obtain more revenue than it could at the steady state. An increase 
in seigniorage would then lower the stable steady state inflation rate. If the amount of 
seigniorage to be raised is higher than a critical level, then the equilibrium in the economy 
disappears, leading to hyperdeflation. Only if expectations adjust quite slowly to increasing 
inflation, the government can cause hyperinflation by increasing seigniorage. 
Over the years, many economists have tried to overcome the problems faced to model 
hyperinflation within a perfect foresight context by introducing some particular devices to a 
general model like the one of Evans and Yarrow (1981). It is worth mentioning some of these 
attempts. 
Kiguel (1989) considers the usual model of budget deficit financing through seigniorage, a 
Cagan-type demand for money function and perfect foresight. However, he assumes that the 
4 Bruno and Fischer (1990), p. 373. 
5 Blanchard and Fischer (1989), chapter 4, section 4.7. 
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money market does not clear instantaneously, and that the rate of inflation exceeds the actual 
money growth rate any time there is an excess supply of money. The system exhibits two 
equilibria for real money balances, one stable and one unstable6. If the government increases 
the size of its budget deficit to a level at which there is no steady state for the inflation rate, 
the economy will experience an explosive path of prices (i. e. hyperinflation). A larger deficit 
requires an increase in fiat money, which is expanded at a higher rate. The temporary excess 
supply of money leads to an increase in the rate of inflation, and, consequently, money 
demand is reduced. Of course, this phenomenon implies that the system starts off at (or to the 
left of) the unstable steady state, since only along the unstable path real money balances are 
falling as inflation accelerates. 
The criticisms to these models concern the fact that they ignore the possibility that the 
inflationary process is set to an end and do not incorporate expectations of a stabilisation 
policy. On the other hand, there is another stream of the literature which deals with models 
set up to explain the hyperinflation mechanism by allowing agents to anticipate a change in 
government policies. 
For instance, Bental and Eckstein (1990) have built up a model where the sudden end of a 
period of increasing inflation and falling real balances can be the result of an expected 
stabilisation programme. With expected stabilisation, the authors show that there is a unique 
equilibrium path, whose properties depend on the pre-stabilisation situation. Low pre- 
stabilisation deficits (i. e lower than the maximal steady state deficit) are a necessary 
condition for an increasing inflation towards the equilibrium together with the requirement 
that demand for real balances after stabilisation falls. Moreover, if the stabilisation date is 
delayed indefinitely, the lower of the two steady state inflation rates will be the stable one, so 
that hyperinflation based on the stability path converging to the high steady state inflation is 
inconsistent with expected stabilisation. On the contrary, in all the previous models which 
6 This result holds if specific constraints on the semielasticity of the demand for money with respect to the rate of 
inflation and the speed of adjustment of the money market are satisfied. 
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did not include the stabilisation expectations, the low inflation was dynamically unstable and, 
therefore, sustainable only under very specific model parameterisations. 
Evans and Ramey (1995) have developed a new approach to modelling expectations 
formation in a hyperinflation context. Agents are assumed to know the correct structural 
model of the economy, and they have to use it to forecast the path of inflation. They follow 
an optimality criterion in so far as they balance the costs of revising their forecasts against 
the benefits of improved expectations. Equilibrium paths with accelerating inflation and final 
collapse are found to be associated with high budget deficits and a pattern of accelerating 
inflation which is sufficiently high to give the agents the incentive to revise inflation 
continuously. 
Finally, Havrylyshyn-Miller-Perraudin (1994) have overcome the problem of finding 
hyperdeflation with unsustainable deficits and rational expectations by making seigniorage 
stochastic. As pointed out by Von Hagen "... The important trick is to decouple actual from 
expected inflation. If this is done in the right way, high and even increasing inflation rates 
can persist for quite a while in a rational expectations equilibrium, although the deficit is 
unsustainably large"7. 
We now prove that hyperinflation can occur in a perfect foresight and clearing markets 
context appealing to an extension of the model presented in chapter 4 based on the 
introduction of a constant seigniorage policy rule to finance a budget deficit. 
5.2 The Model with Constant Seigniorage Policy 
and Endogenous Money Growth 
In the analysis which follows we assume that the government is financing a constant level 
of real spending (or subsidy distributed to the young generation, g) by printing money. This 
policy can be expressed as follows: 
(5.1) M, = (l+pr)MM-t= Mr-i +PrgN, " 
7 Discussion by Von Hagen in Havrylyshyn-Miller-Perraudin (1994), p. 378. 
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The choice of deficit financing entirely by printing high-powered money is justified by Bruno 
and Fischer (1990) by the absence of domestic capital market and of foreign sources of 
finance. 
Since we have assumed that the money growth rate is no longer constant, then the equation 
for the inflation rate becomes: 
(5.2) P"' _ 
Mr+t mr Nº 
_ 
(1+fU, 
+, 
)m, 
P, M, mr+1 Nr+1 m, +1(l+n) 
Since we know that the expression for real money balances, at a generic time i=0,1..., is 
equal to mr+, =1 
P"' 
g, we can substitute the expression for the ratio 
T' into eq. (5.2) and 
the expression found into eq. (4.4) to get: 
tr 
=1- 
(l+n)pr 
(5.3) 
1+i fir+i(l+fýr)(l+r, +i) 
The rate of monetary growth is now endogenous; then the expression for the subsidy paid to 
the young can be rewritten as a function of real money balances (using eq. (4.58)) as: 
l+i 
(5.4) g= 
fir 
mr = 
ýr Q3 r (wr +g)" 
l+ftr 1+P, it 
Substituting the expression for 
1+ir derived in eq. (5.3) into eq. (5.4) yields: it 
fir f , i0+Pr)0+r, +, 
) 
(5.5) g 1+f[fQs(x'r 
g)fir+t(I+pj)(l+rr+t)-(l+n)pr 
Some rearrangements allow us to derive the first equation of the dynamic system: 
(l+n)gp, 
(5.6) fir+º - [(1+Pr)g-PA(WI+g)][1+f'(kr+t)]. 
The expression for k, +1 can 
be derived following the same procedure for eq. (4.62). The 
nominal interest rate is represented by eq. (4.60): 
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(5.7) i, = 
W, + 'u` m, l +, u, 
mL 
_ 
91 
m! _ wr 
Substituting eq. (5.7) into eq. (4.59) and the latter into eq. (4.22), we get: 
Mt Jul Mt - Wt 
(5.8) k, +1= 
1 JA -Qs ß3 1+P` (wr +g) l+n wr m l+/Cl ` 
By rearranging eq. (5.8), we obtain: 
(5.9) k,., =(l+n) 4(ß2 +ß3)w(ks)+ (2+13)1+' -1 m, _ fIr 
3)w(k, )+(ß2 +ß3)g-gl+'u' 
)[(ß2 
+ ßý 
Eq. (5.6) can now be rewritten as: 
(s. i 0) 
1+n 
fir+i = 
ýr [(l+p, )g-p, ß3(wr+g)] l+f' 
Cl+n 
cei+Q3)w(k, )+ýz+Q3)ä-91 
flr 
After finding the dynamic relations which characterise the model, our analysis proceeds 
with the investigation of the dynamics of the system represented by egs. (5.9)-(5.10). 
At the steady state, eq. (5.9) becomes: 
(5.11) k, =0 , u, = 
S 
(, 82 +/33)w, -ß1g-k, -kn' 
The expression in the denominator has the same hill shape of the stationary locus An, =0 in 
chapter 4 (and pictured in fig. 4.5), with the difference that, for any level of k,, it is decreased 
by the term ß, g. Since g has a positive value and p, is inversely related to the above 
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expression, then the function in (5.11) lies in the positive quadrant and has a U-shape in an 
intermediate range of values of the capital stock (fig. 5.1). Considering that, by assumption, 
seigniorage and real money balances are positive, then p1 >0 must hold. The capital stock 
increases above the stationary locus for all the positive values of u,. 
figure 5.1 
k =O 
1r 
'1 
What we expect to find is that a low level of capital stock is associated with a high inflation 
rate. This situation is equivalent to a scenario of high inflation trap only if the steady state 
were stable. Therefore, this finding could be useful to explain why hyperinflation matters so 
much in realistic terms. 
To support our intuition, we consider eq. (5.10) which, at the steady state, is equal to: 
(5.12) 
o 
(l+n)g'pr 
[0 +pr)g'urß3(w, +g)] l+. f' 
[1+n[ 1 (ß2 +Q3)(wr +g)-91+*`` fit, 
After a few simplifications and rearrangements, we get the following equation: 
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(5.13) 
[1+Pt_ß3Pi+1J]{1+f1[(ß2+ß3)(w+g)_gl±'tJ]}=(1+n). 1 
Pr 
The two expressions on the LHS are both decreasing in u, and k, and increasing in g for 
nearly all values of k, 8. For a given level of g, if k, is higher than a critical value, the 
relationship between u, and k, is negative throughout the range where u, is positive in order 
to hold the RHS constant (fig. 5.2 below). It also comes out that, in the same interval, the 
growth rate of money increases above the stationary locus9. 
r 
=o 
0 
figure 5.2 
SA sufficient condition for both parentheses on the LHS to decrease with p1 is WI >03 
)1' 
(from the first 
3 
parenthesis on the LHS of eq. (5.13) which can be rewritten as 
[g + (g -Q3w, -, #3g)p, 
]). Moreover, in order 
that > 0, it is necessary that Wt < 
(1+p, )g-ß3p'ä 
p3«t 
9 This can be seen directly from eq. (5.10) where, as k, increases, the denominator unambiguously decreases. 
Therefore, for a given /1,, a,., is increasing above the function. 
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The entire system is represented in fig. 5.3 below. Two steady states exist: the unstable 
point A and the saddle point stable B. We have omitted the part of the two functions lying in 
the fourth quadrant because for a negative value for p,, we have an economically 
meaningless scenario. 
TII °k =0 r 
ýA .... _...... _........ 
------ JUB Qý 
r =0 1 
i 
0 kA kB 1tr 
figure 5.3 
Some comments are straightforward. First of all, point A exhibits a high inflation rate 
associated with a low level of capital intensity. The arrows suggest that this point is unstable, 
which implies that if the system starts off in a position above the locus &u, =0 and to the left 
of A, the system would diverge towards hyperinflation. Conversely, point B is saddle point 
stable and there exists a saddle path which leads the system to a stationary equilibrium. 
Following an increase in the amount of seigniorage, g, the locus Ak, =0 shifts up'° whereas 
Apr =0 shifts outwards"; two steady states still exist provided that the subsidy to be paid 
does not exceed a certain limit. The steady state level of money growth rate unambiguously 
rises whereas the effect on the steady state level of capital stock is ambiguous. However, 
10 The denominator in eq. (5.11) decreases at each level of k, so that , u, rises. 
It The two terms on the LHS of eq. (5.13) are both increasing in g and decreasing in k1, so that any increase in 
seigniorage will be offset by an increase in capital stock, at each level of p,, to hold the LHS constant. 
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from the results of the simulations reported in table B. 1 in appendix 2 to this chapter it 
becomes clear that an increase in seigniorage would increase (decrease) the saddle point 
stable (unstable) steady state level of capital stock, B (A). This particular, result is also 
confirmed by a formal analysis (included in appendix 2) of the FOCs of the system, 
expressed in dynamic terms, similar to those represented in eqs. (4.35)-(4.36), but taking into 
account the endogenisation of p. 
The shifts in the two loci following a small change in g are illustrated in fig. 5.4, where the 
two stationary loci Ak, =0 and Ap, =0 are represented by the functions KK (which shifts to 
K'K) and MM (which shifts to MM) respectively12. 
12 By using the production function in eq. (4.77), we get the two loci: 
A=O f2r= 
-S (l+n)kr+(i ß3) aln[ykr+l]- 
Y rl+g _g 
and 
Apt =0 1= 
g(l+n) . 
a*, )] [(l + Pl)9 - AA aln[7k! +1]-At+l 
ay 
. 1+ l+i[ý 
l+n 
iQz+Q3) al Yký+1ý- 
a*' +g)- g 
f ý1 
Simulations for different values of the parameters iß233 
} 
confirm the graphical representation of the system 
as in fig. 5.3. 
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figure 5.4 
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Two different scenarios can be distinguished. If the system finds itself initially at the saddle 
point B, as soon as seigniorage increases, the system jumps onto the new saddle path S'S' (the 
money growth rate being a jump variable). Subsequently, it converges to the new saddle point 
equilibrium B'. If, conversely, the system starts off at the unstable point A, then either it could 
jump immediately to the new equilibrium point A' (which is very unlikely since the capital 
stock is a predetermined variable) or it would be likely to jump onto the saddle path S'S' and 
thus converge to B. On the contrary, should the seigniorage decrease, with the system 
starting off at the unstable point ,4, then it would diverge towards an infinite rate of inflation 
and zero capital stock (i. e. a situation of a complete collapse of the economy). However, a 
more formal and complete analysis of the hyperinflation process is presented in the next 
concluding section. 
As anticipated above, the existence of two stationary equilibria is conditional on the 
vertical asymptote of Dur =0 being to the left of the asymptotes of 4=0. As g rises, the 
former continues shifting to the right. Beyond a certain level of g, there will be just one 
intersection poiltt and, in the end, no steady state exists at all, as shown in fig. 5.5 below. 
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0 
figure 5.5 
Before focusing on the dynamics of hyperinflation we discuss some interesting 
characteristics of the comparative static properties of this extended framework. 
First of all, the reduction of the capital stock together with the increase in the money 
growth rate at the unstable point A may appear, superficially, in contrast with the conclusions 
reached with the linearised Stein's model (4.37). However, the theory tells us that, when we 
apply the Correspondence Principle, the increase in the exogenous variable, g, should have a 
perverse effect on the unstable steady state. Therefore, the negative effect of an increase in 
the subsidy on the capital stock kA accompanied by an increasing steady state money growth 
rate, is explained by the instability of the steady state itself. 
On the other hand, the negative effect of an increase in g on kA while money growth 
increases, would not be in contrast with the parameterised Stein's model consisting of 
eq. (4.81)=(4.82) when using the logarithmic production function. In fact, also in that case we 
have found two steady states, one saddle point stable and one unstable, and the increase in 
money growth rate was matched by a decrease in the capital stock for the unstable steady 
state (compare figures 5.5 and 4.10). 
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Secondly, the instability of point A, which is characterised by a high inflation steady state, 
is in contrast with the stability of the high inflation equilibrium in Bruno and Fischer's model. 
However, it can be argued that the full stability property possessed by the, high inflation 
steady state in their model is also a source of problems. Given that the rate of inflation is a 
forward-looking variable, if a shock occurs, the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
system to converge to the new equilibrium is that it jumps on the saddle path, which implies 
that the inflation rate is the variable which initially absorbs the shock. However, since the 
high inflation steady state in Bruno and Fischer's model is stable, the initial conditions do not 
matter in terms of convergence to the new equilibrium. Therefore, the system is clearly 
overstable, which implies that there exist multiple non-divergent equilibrium sequences of 
which the steady state is only one; the economy can then flip in and out of it quite arbitrarily. 
Conversely, the saddle point property of B is more consistent with the specific properties of 
the endogenous variables in the system and the initial conditions regain their importance. 
Thirdly, we have found that, if the amount of seigniorage exceeds a certain level, no steady 
state exists and, under certain conditions, the system may display hyperinflation, which is the 
expected and consistent result we were aiming to prove. Conversely, in Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989) and Bruno and Fischer's (1990) models the increase in the amount of 
seigniorage beyond a certain level generates dynamics of hyperdeflation, which had always 
represented a limitation of those models. 
Simulations of the model for the case of a logarithmic production function" have shown 
that all steady states are dynamically efficient. However, before focusing on the dynamics of 
hyperinflation, we intend to present a mathematical proof that this property holds 
independently of the form of the production function considered. We start our proof from 
eq. (5.13): the first term on the LHS must be positive for the equation to be meaningful. This 
implies that: 
13 This simulations, as all the others in this thesis, have been carried out by using Mathematica. However, we 
avoid presenting the results for not overweighing the analysis. 
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(5.14) ft, 5/ý/ 
9 
ß3(wt +g)-g 
This function represents an hyperbola whose vertical asymptote is equal to: WA = 
g(1-ß3) 
The acceptable solutions lie in the region below the function and to the right of the 
asymptote. However, we also need that the argument of f'(kr) is positive, namely that: 
(5.15a) (fl2+ß3)(w, +g)-gl" ? O, 
or, equivalently, that: 
(5.15b) >g 0s +A)(WI +ö)-9 
, Again this function 
is an hyperbola with the vertical asymptote equal to: wB = 
(1-ß2 -ß3)9 
(10i+A) 
where wB <WA. The solutions to the inequality (5.15b) lie in the area above the function and 
to the right of the vertical asymptote. It comes out that the values of (w,, k, ) which satisfy 
both inequalities are included in the double dashed area represented in fig. 5.6 below. 
A 
table region 
0 
figure 5.6 
167 
"P WA " Kf 
Dynamic efficiency requires that f'> n. From eq. (5.13), which can be rewritten as: 
(5.16) (l+ f') = 
(l+n) 
0 +ýur)-f1rQ3 
wr 
+1 
the denominator less than 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for having the inequality 
f'> n satisfied, and this is true when, for positive p,, the following holds: 
(5.17) 
11_ß3(! L+11<O W¬>gi 
Q3)_WA. 
3 
Since we have showed that the acceptability of w, for which the stationary locus 4u, =0 is 
economically meaningful, implies that w, > WA, then from (5.17) is clear that inside the 
dashed region any existing steady state is dynamically efficient. This result can be 
summarised in the following proposition: 
Proposition 5.1 Irrespective of how many steady states exist, they are all dynamically 
efcientia. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the satisfaction of the inequality (5.17) represents 
a sufficient condition for having a downward sloping stationary locus 0. ", =0 (see 
eq. (5.13)), so that the analysis of the phase diagram is now complete. 
In the next section we illustrate how hyperinflation can arise in our system and then we 
conclude our analysis by presenting the final results. 
14 However, the solutions are not equivalent in terms of the amount of seigniorage which can be raised. Any time 
there is hyperinflation, in order to be guaranteed the same amount of revenue, the government should keep on 
increasing the inflation rate (i. e. the money printing rate) because the tax base would be decreasing. 
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5.3 Dynamics of Hyperinflation 
In this section we first investigate the conditions which can produce hyperinflation. As a 
second step, we prove that the existence of two steady states in our model is not characterised 
by the Laffer curve property, so that the usual mechanism typical of the standard models, in 
which the same amount of seigniorage could be raised at two different rates of inflation, does 
not apply. Finally, we describe the dynamics through which hyperinflation arises and the 
behaviour of the main real and nominal variables. 
From fig. 5.3 it is clear that a rising hyperinflation is conditional on the existence of two 
steady states which is related to the fact that the stationary locus Ak, =0 has a U-shape, as 
shown in section 2. Any time the asymptote of Au, =0 lies to the left of both asymptotes of 
Ak, = 0, two equilibria exist. It is, therefore, interesting to show why the locus has this shape 
and what is the economic intuition behind it. 
The most immediate explanation of why the stationary locus Ak, =0 has that particular 
shape can be derived by considering eq. (5.1 1). An increase in k, exerts an effect on the 
money growth rate represented by the derivative: 
g(1+n)-g(ß2 +ß3) °ýr 
(5.18) 
du' 
= 
9C` 
At [(Qs+ß3)(w+g)-g-(1+n)k]2 
which can be positive or negative depending on the sign of the numerator. The numerator is 
negative if l> ýI 
+ý3) 
> 1, which is more likely to hold the lower is k,. Therefore, for 
small positive values of the capital stock the locus is downward sloping; as the capital stock 
gets bigger, the locus starts exhibiting an upward slope. 
However, a deeper investigation of the model suggests that there is an important economic 
meaning behind the U-shape of the stationary locus Ok, = 0. As we already mentioned in 
chapter 4, savings (which are a positive function of k, ) represent the resources which are 
either accumulated under the form of capital stock or invested in real money holdings. Any 
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time k, rises, there are two effects at work: the first one is the increase in wages, which 
positively affects savings, and the second one is the increase in the capital stock, k,.,,, which 
is needed to satisfy the relation Lk, = 0, and which demands a higher level of savings, ceteris 
paribus'5. Therefore, an increase in capital stock has two contrasting effects on savings which 
do not necessarily cancel out. 
Any time k, rises, if the increase in savings is sufficiently high to provide enough capital 
stock for the new generation, then the overall effect is positive, and real money holdings 
increase as well. Conversely, if the overall effect on savings is negative, real money holdings 
would decrease. Of course, since seigniorage is constant along the stationary locus, an 
increase in real money holdings implies a decrease in the money growth rate16, and vice 
versa. 
In order to evaluate the effect on savings following an increase in capital stock, we consider 
the wage expression consistent with the logarithmic production function, whose derivative 
is equal to 
ak 
(Yk+ I)2 . 
When the derivative cl-v' is quite high (which occurs for small 
o7cý cý'cr 
values of k, ), then the increase in savings due to a big capital accumulation will be large 
enough to sustain the new level of capital intensity: as a consequence, real money holdings 
will increase and money growth rate will decrease. In contrast, when the sensitivity of wage 
with respect to capital stock starts getting smaller, which happens when capital stock 
becomes quite large, the net effect on savings will be negative: real money holdings will have 
to decrease and money growth rate will increase. 
In conclusion, the slope of the stationary locus MIc, =0 is strictly associated with the size of 
the effect of the capital stock on wage (and, as a consequence, on savings). The importance 
15 It is worth remembering that (I+ n) k,,, + m1 = s[w(k, )] and that kr+t = k, on the stationary locus 
1k, =0. 
16 From the expression for seigniorage, which is equal to: g=I+m,, p, and m1 are negatively related to 
keep seigniorage constant. 
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of the sensitivity of current wage to changes in current capital for determining the 
multiplicity of the equilibria has been already investigated and underlined in chapters 2 and 
4. 
Since two steady states exist for a certain level of seigniorage, we will investigate whether 
their presence in our model is consistent with the Laffer curve property. If this were true, it 
would be preferable for the country to be at the lowest level of inflation given a certain 
amount of seigniorage to be raised. Therefore, we consider both the seigniorage equation 
(g =1Um in eq. (5.4)), and the demand for money equation, (eq. (4.58)) evaluated at the 
steady state, which, using eq. (5.3), can be transformed into: 
(5.19) m= 
(1+T)(1+r) ß3(w +g). 
(1+ßt)(1+r)-(l+n) 
By equating (5.4) and (5.5), we find a unique solution for the money growth rate: 
(5.20) 7i - 
(F-n)g 
(1+r)[ß3(x'+g)-gY 
This implies that there is a unique steady state rate of inflation which guarantees a certain 
amount of seigniorage, treating k; w and r (i. e. the real economy) as given. An intuitive and 
formal explanation for why the Laffer curve phenomenon does not occur under these 
circumstances is provided by studying the shape of the seigniorage function. Substituting the 
equation for money demand in eq. (5.19) into the seigniorage equation, both evaluated at the 
steady state, we derive the following relation: 
(5.2 1) g=Q3 (r-n) 
(l 
_ 
+(1+r)(1-ß3) 
T, 
The RHS is always increasing (decreasing) in fc if r>n (F < n). 
Since we have found both mathematically (above) and by simulations that any steady state 
solution must be dynamically efficient, eq. (5.21) exhibits the shape as in fig. 5.7. The line OG 
represents the seigniorage function in eq. (5.21). 
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figure 5.7 
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The condition for having a positive solution for 7 to eq. (5.20) is that W> g( -A), which 
3 
is actually the same condition in (5.17) necessary to have a meaningful steady state. This 
leads us to conclude that: 
Proposition 5.2 Multiplicity of the steady states in our model is not associated with a hill- 
shaped seigniorage function and the Laffer curve phenomenon does not arise. A maximum 
level of seigniorage exists beyond which a steady state ceases to exist and the economy 
would be characterised by dynamics of hyperinflation. 
The lesson to be learned is that, if the initial stock of capital is too low, then a government 
must be very careful to set up a programme of subsidising the young through seigniorage, 
because this could have a negative effect on capital accumulation and on lifetime income of 
the consumers and make possible a persistent increase in the inflation rate. 
Since we established that two intersection points exist, we can now start investigating the 
mechanism of hyperinflation in the system depicted in fig. 5.3. First of all, it is interesting to 
note that dynamics of hyperinflation may arise if the system starts off above the stationary 
locus 4u, =0 and to the left of point A, since we follow the usual convention that, to the 
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right of A, the conditions for the system to be on the saddle path are always satisfied. Using 
the information from fig. 5.4 about the dynamics of the system and the instability of point A, 
we now list a set of conditions which are necessary to have hyperinflation. 
a) When two steady states exist, hyperinflation arises if the initial level of capital stock is 
too low (i. e. k<k. ) or if a shock occurs and the system is pushed away from the initial 
unstable equilibrium, A. Although a stable steady state exists, it cannot be reached because 
dynamics would bring the system away from any equilibrium point. However, it must be 
underlined that l i, tends to plus infinity if the initial starting point is above the separation line 
(line as in fig. 5.8), which passes through point A and divides into two parts the space limited 
by the two stationary loci, Apr =0 and Ak, = 0. If the system starts below this separation 
line, the rate of money growth tends towards minus infinity. 
aq 
Au, =0 
äkr=O 
0 ký 
figure 5.8 
On the other hand, when the system starts to the left of point A and below the separation 
line, a poverty trap arises. If the government subsidises the young by printing money and the 
amount of capital existing in the economy is too low, then this policy might lead to de- 
cumulation of capital stock to counterbalance the increased injection of money into the 
economy (always assuming that all markets clear). 
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Conversely, if the system starts to the left of point A and above the separation line, then as 
k, starts decreasing, the real interest rate would rise. Since above the stationary locus Ap, =0 
and above the separation line the inflation rate is also rising (this is because 
Pr+1 (1+1u1)Pº+t ), then the nominal interest rate would unambiguously increase together 
Pr (l+n), ur 
with u,. The decrease in k, and the increase in i, have a negative effect on the demand for 
real money balances. Therefore, to guarantee a constant level of seigniorage (eq. (5.4)), it is 
necessary that the growth rate of money increases. Inflation would be ever-increasing 
together with a decumulating capital stock until the economy reaches the collapse. 
b) The amount of subsidy exceeds the maximum level above which a steady state fails to 
exist. In this case, for some initial points to the left of A and above the separation line, the 
dynamics lead to an ever increasing level of money growth rate. 
These results can be summarised as in the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.3 In the modified stein's model with endogenous money growth rate and 
constant seigniorage policy, hyperinflation may arise if either the initial level of capital stock 
is too low or if the amount of seigniorage raised is too high so that a steady state ceases to 
exist. 
This possibility that hyperinflation arises with perfect foresight constitutes an improvement 
with respect to some models, like Bruno and Fischer's, since in our model hyperinflation is 
associated with a collapse of the real economy and excessive deficit to be financed through 
seigniorage. 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we set up a model of hyperinflation which is based on intertemporal utility 
optimisation by individuals and on the explicit introduction of the effects of inflation on the 
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real sector of the economy. A policy of government deficit financing through printing money 
can influence the real side of the economy in so far as capital accumulation depends on the 
amount of resources people decide to invest out of their real lifetime income. Provided that 
the amount of seigniorage does not exceed a certain level, then there are two equilibrium 
points one of which is stable and one unstable. The latter is characterised by a high inflation 
rate and a low level of capital intensity. Although they are both dynamically efficient, if the 
initial level of capital stock is too low, then a poverty trap with decumulation of capital stock 
and an increase in inflation rate would arise. 
The existence of the two steady states is not associated with the Laffer curve property so 
that there is not the possibility of raising the same amount of revenue at a lower rate of 
inflation; conversely, the stability properties of the equilibria determine the future behaviour 
of the economy any time an exogenous shock occurs. 
Contrary to the analyses in the standard literature which adopted a Cagan demand for 
money equation, our demand for real balances is a function of real wage and stems from an 
explicit utility optimisation by the individuals. Since real variables are no longer kept 
constant, changes in prices can affect the process of capital accumulation and the production 
of goods in the economy. The real rate of return on investment is time-varying and depends 
on the dynamics of the inflation rate. This enforces a double-wedged mechanism on real 
balances and their growth rate through a policy of constant seigniorage. Any time the level of 
capital stock is too low to sustain that level of seigniorage which the government has targeted 
to raise at each inflation rate, the double effect of capital decumulation and of the increase in 
interest rates steers the dynamics of hyperinflation. 
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APPENDIX 1 
In this appendix we study the system consisting of the two stationary loci represented by 
egs. (5.11)-(5.12) and confined to the case of the logarithmic production function (eq. (4.77)): 
(A. 1) 4 =0=> k, =-'A, +) 'at 
(A. 2) A, u, =0 1= 
g(l+n) 
- (1+fir)S-, u, A aln(*, +l)- 
aYk, 
1 
1+ av 
l+l+n «i+as) aln(jk, +l)- a7kt +g _gl+fýt 7k, +I 
) 
The conclusions from the simulations we carried out is that for small values of g two steady, 
states exist and the two stationary loci have the shape shown in fig. (5.3) in the text. Since the 
behaviour of the system depends on some parameter values, we now consider how a change 
in each parameter, ceteris paribus, can affect the behaviour of the system. 
1) Holding (a, ß,, n, y) constant, as /32 decreases with respect to ß3,0p, =0 shifts down, 
while Ak, =0 is not affected, so that for the same level of g, the two steady states get closer 
and it is necessary to increase seigniorage to sustain the same level of capital stock if the 
proportion of income invested is lower. 
2) Holding ( a, 62, n, y) constant, the bigger A with respect to X33, ceteris paribus, the 
more likely that an acceptable steady state exists, since more resources are invested in the 
financial assets. 
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3) Holding {a, /3;, n, y) constant, the higher A with respect to X32, ceteris paribus, the 
higher the locus 0p, =0 and the lower Ak, = 0, so that, if ß, exceeds a certain value, a 
steady state will cease to exist. In fact, what happens is that the economy is not devoting 
enough resources to capital stock accumulation. 
4) Ceteris paribus, an increase in a would shift down both loci ek, =0 and Ap, = 0. As a 
result, the two steady states tend to diverge. 
5) A decrease in y would shift up the locus Ak, =0 and up to the right the locus Ap, = 0, 
so that, as y decreases, the two steady states get closer till they disappear. Therefore, y must 
be increased if we want two equilibria to exist, ceteris paribus. 
6) When two steady states exist, an increase in the rate of population growth, n, would shift 
up the stationary locus Ak, =0 and slightly down Au, =0 at any level of k,, so that the two 
steady states would shrink and the stable steady state level of capital per head is reduced. 
Therefore, the existence of two equilibria is conditional upon a not too high rate of 
population growth, n. 
This analysis implies that, given an initial level of per capita capital stock, k., the system is 
more likely to diverge towards capital decumulation the higher is the rate of population 
growth. This suggests that for the development of an economy it is necessary to have enough 
investments in physical capital to equip each new worker to produce more resources. A rapid 
rate of population growth would then deprive the young generation of most part of the 
resources which are necessary to make the economy sustainable. 
7) As anticipated in the text, an increase in g would shift up Ak, =0 and up to the right 
Ap, =0 in such a way that the two steady states diverge; when the vertical asymptote for 
0, u, =0 lays to the right of both asymptotes for Ak, = 0, the steady states would disappear. 
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APPENDIX 2 
In this appendix we are interested in evaluating the effect of a small increase in the amount 
of seigniorage raised by the government on the steady states of the capital stock, T, which 
are the solutions to the two first-order difference equation system (5.11)-(5.12). For this 
purpose, we follow the same procedure of chapter 4 and we calculate the overall multiplier 
dk 
by using the First-Order-Conditions of the general model in dynamic terms represented dg 
by eqs. (4.35)-(4.36) (previously evaluated at the steady state). This allows us to derive results 
which are independent on the type of utility and production functions considered. 
Using egs. (4.25)-(4.26) and making the necessary substitutions, the FOCs can be rewritten 
as: 
° 
(B"1) uy ý(ký)-l+n-(1+n)k, +, +k1 =(1+f'(k, +i))u°(cr+1) 
(B. 2) um(mr) = 
[1+f'(k1+1) 
- 
(l+n)_r 
u°(Cto 
fir+t (1 +fir ) 
where the argument in the parenthesis of the LHS in eq. (B. 1) is the resource constraint 
(eq. (4.15)), whereas the term in brackets on the RHS of eq. (B. 2) is the expression for 
1+r derived in the case of endogenous money growth rate e . 
(5.3 
l+ iý 
( r+ý) Y g(q )) 
Real money balances are expressed as m, = 
1+ý' 
g; however, further simplifications are 
fir 
necessary in order to eliminate one of the three endogenous variables (c°, k, p). The second- 
period budget constraint of the household, which is equal to: 
(B. 3) cr+, =[l+r, +, 
]a, + p' mr, 
PI+i 
can be written, by using eqs. (4.13) and (5.2) and the relation m, +1= 
+P'+' g, as: 
fir+1 
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(l+n)g 
(B. 4) cl+1 = (l+n)[l+f'(k, +i 
)]k, 
+i + ýr+l 
The latter is a static equation since it relates only simultaneously-determined variables. The 
intuitive explanation of this expression is that the old consume all their wealth, which 
consists of accumulated physical capital, profits and real balances after the inflation tax. 
Therefore, c° can be determined uniquely after finding the equilibrium values for k and p as 
solutions to the system (B. 1)-(B. 2). If we substitute eq. (B. 4) dated at timet into eq. (B. 1) and 
again eq. (B. 4) dated at timet+1 into eq. (B. 2), the system becomes: 
(B. 5) 
uy f(k, )-f'(k, )k, - -(1+n)k, +, =[1+f'(k, +, 
)]u° (l+f'(k, 
+i))(1+n)k, +i+fý, 
+ng 
(B. 6) um 
Pfý, (l+fý, )ftý 
]u0[(1+f'(ki+i))(l+n)k. 
+i +1 
+n 
gP]. 
The system consists of two difference equations and, for simplicity, can be summarised as: 
(B. 7) P(k,, k, ,, p,, pr+t; g)=0 
(B. 8) q (kr , kr+ý , fir , fir+t; g) = 
0. 
By indicating with a subscript index the argument with respect to which the derivative is 
calculated (i. e. p3 and so on with the same order as they are written inside the brackets air 
of p and q), we transform the system in a matrix form: 
(B. 9) 
Ps Pa dkr+, 
_ 
-Pt -P3 dkr + -ps 
]d 
q2 qa ' PIA -qt -qs dpr -qs 
ý'. 
Using the FOCs in eqs. (B. 5) and (B. 6) we calculate the partial derivatives (pq, i =1,..., 5) 
in (B. 9) evaluated at the steady state which are listed below: 
P, =-f"ku, 
p2 =-(1+n)u,,, -(1+f')u,, (1+n)(1+f'+f'k)-f fluo 
un, g 
Ps - 
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Pa =(l+f')u. 
(l+n)g 
PP 
q1 =0 
q2 =-f"u0- 1+f'-1 uß(1+n)(1+f'+f"k) 
urog uo(l+n) 43 =- T_ (l+µ)Z7 
ua(1+n)+ 1+ f'-1+n u 
(1+n)g 
94 (1+7t)7i 1+/[ °° fi2 
qs _u 
I+7 I+n I+n 
1+ u /°O ft 
In order to get rid of the matrix on the LHS of (B. 9), we find the partial derivatives by 
Cramer's rule, i. e. 
dkr+, 
= -PjR'a 
+Pa4j 
' and so on. 
In general terms, the system in (B. 9) can dk, p2g4 - p4g2 
be solved to finds: 
(B. 10) 
Adkr+i , -1 A dk$ + 
f3 
dä LMp, +1 gI S2 -1 dpr g3 
The arguments of the matrix in (B. 10) are related to the arguments of the matrices in (B. 9) by 
the following expressions: 
f _1 _ 
-plg4 +p4g1-p2g4 +p4q2 
' p2q4 - p4q2 
_ -P3g4 
+Pag3 f2 - P2g4 - P4g2 
I The two difference equations can be written implicitly as: 
kr+t =f(k,, p,; g) 
fir+t = g(k,, prg) 
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-p5q4 + p4gs f3 
- 
p2g4 - p4g2 
-P291 +Pi42 gý = 
P2g4 - P4g2 
Si = 
-p2g3 + p3g2 - P2g4 + p4g2 
P2g4 - p4g2 
-p2g5 + Ps92 g3 = 
P2g4 - P4g2 
The effect of an exogenous increase in seigniorage is measured by the total multiplier: 
(B. 11) 
dk -f3(g2 - 
1)+g3f2 
dg det C 
where C is the matrix on the RHS of (B. 10). As far as det C is concerned, we can apply the 
Correspondence Principle as we have done in chapter 2. Since capital is the only 
predetermined variable, for the system to be well-behaved, the steady states would be either 
unstable or saddle point stable. In the first case, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is 
positive, whereas in the second case is negative. Therefore, the sign of the multiplier depends 
on the sign of the numerator (N) which is equal to: 
(B. 12) N=- 
( p5g4 +Pag5) (-P2g3 +P3g2 - P2g4 +Pe42) + 
(-P3g4 +P4g3) 
, 
(-P24s +p5g2 ) 
(p2q4 -Pa42) (p2q4 -Pa42) (P2g4 -P4g2) (P2g4 -Pa42) 
which, after some calculations, can be simplified to: 
(B. 13) N= -Ps(g3+4a)+q5(P3+Pa 
(p2q4 -P4g2) 
After carrying out all the multiplications, the expression for Nis found to be equal to: 
_ 
1+n 
(B. 14) 
[1, 
ýu(1+n)1[(1)2 (l+n)p D 
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The overall sign of N depends on the sign of the expression in the last parenthesis in (B. 14), 
with D equal to: 
(B. 15) 
D_ 
(1+n)2un, uo 
-(1+f'- 
l+n u», u, (l+n)2g+(1+f')u,, u, (1+n)2(1+f'+f"k)+ 
TO+T) i+ /=J) ,2 7i(1+-P) 
+ 
f"uo(1+n)+_f"uou, (1+n)2g 
TO+T) X2(1+-P) 
whose sign is almost unambiguously negative (the only positive term is the last one, but for a 
small u,, it is negligible2). In conclusion, using the information obtained about the sign of the 
denominator of the multiplier, we can state that an increase in the amount of seigniorage 
raised by the government would increase the saddle point stable steady state k and decrease 
the unstable steady state capital stock. 
This conclusion is supported by some simulations of egs. (A. l)-(A. 2). Given the difficulties 
met with Mathematica to find the specific value for the steady states, we identified the range 
of values in which k must lie for different sets of parameters before and after the increase in 
g. The simulations yield the unambiguous result of a decrease (increase) in the capital stock 
at the unstable (saddle point stable) steady state. Some of the results that we have obtained 
are shown in the table B. 1 below. 
2 Our reasoning is based on the assumption that (1 + f' +f" k) > 0. 
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Table B. l 
a=0.3, ß, =O. 1, ß2=0.8, ß; =0.1, n=0.01, y=24 
Steady State g--o. 00 1 . 003 
point A 0.03<k'<0.07 0.025<k7<0.028 
point B 0.18<k <0.2 0.2<k'<0.25 
a=O. 7, ß1=O. 1, ß2=0.8, ß3=0.1, n=0.01, y=24 
Steady State . 0001 -0.0005 
point A 0.0075<k'<0.008 0.007<k'<0.0075 
point B 1<k <1.05 1.05<k <1.1 
a=O. 3, ß1=O. 1, ß2=0.7, ß3=0.2, n=0.01, y=24 
Steady State . 005 - . 
007 
int A 0.03<k7<0.05 0.028<k <0.03 
point B 0.08<k <0.1 0.1 <k <0.14 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis we have focused on OLG economies with perfect foresight, certainty and two 
period-lived individuals and we have investigated the dynamics of the system when the 
government must follow a debt management policy. As a consequence of the framework 
adopted, the model exhibits solid microeconomic foundations. The main conclusions 
achieved with the two models considered can be summarised as follows. 
The first model highlights how debt management policies in a dynamically efficient 
economy may hurt rather than help the recovery of an economy. Agents are assumed to invest 
their first period savings in one of three different kinds of bonds which the government can 
issue to manage an inherited amount of debt, namely savings deposits, treasury bills and 
perpetuity bonds. Each of these assets implies a particular financing policy rule and is related 
to a peculiar government budget constraint. The three types of bonds available to the 
government are simple enough that our model could withstand added complexity and realism 
without losing analytical tractability. 
The dynamic analysis of the model suggests the possibility that multiple equilibria exist and 
a poverty trap arises if the initial level of the capital stock is too low (namely below the 
unstable steady state) and the government decides to increase the amount of debt. Dynamics 
of increasing interest rates and decumulating capital stock create a vicious circle where 
interest payments would feed upon themselves. The huge pressure coming from the need to 
pay the interests tends to divert savings towards financial investments and away from 
productive capital. Countries with a too low level of capital stock start experiencing piling up 
of interest payments as a consequence of an increase in debt. 
We have also dealt with the concept of a maximum sustainable level of debt, defined as 
the maximum ratio of debt-to-capital stock which the economy can bear without heading 
towards a collapse. This upper limit on the debt-to-capital stock ratio has been endogenously 
derived within the model. When debt is pushed beyond this level, interest rates would be 
increasing and the endogenous response of private savings, which must absorb the new bonds 
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issued, would start a process of long-run decumulation of capital stock. This phenomenon is 
also known as a catastrophe: a shock in debt makes a steady state fail to exist and the 
economy collapses. However, unstable dynamics might well arise as a consequence of an 
exogenous shock to the level of government debt when the system starts initially off the 
unstable equilibrium. This situation is a clear example of a poverty trap. 
We have also presented some further applications of the issue of debt sustainability to other 
existing models, by underlining some interesting aspects, such as the existence of a 
maximum sustainable level of social security contributions, which had been overlooked in 
the papers of some authors concerned with government financing policies. 
The second model describes a monetary economy, which is a re-formulation of Stein's 
(1971) OLG model, and concerns the issue of money non-superneutrality, i. e. the effects of 
changes in the rate of money growth on the steady state level of capital stock. The structure 
of the economy consists in an intertemporal finite-horizon optimising framework in which 
real balances are treated as another consumption good which yields utility to the consumer. 
We show that money superneutrality does not hold, contrary to what was found by Sidrauski 
(1967), who had considered an optimising framework but with infinitely lived individuals. 
The model is then used to investigate specific issues overlooked by Stein, such as multiplicity 
and properties of the equilibria with different production functions. 
This model is also extended to incorporate the dynamics of money growth rate and 
inflation. We assume that the government has to finance a constant level of spending through 
seigniorage; so long as the system is in the neighbourhood of the saddle point equilibrium, it 
can converge to it, provided that seigniorage is not too large. On the contrary, if the system is 
at the unstable point, an increase in seigniorage might cause hyperinflation to arise. This 
result is very important since most recent studies on this topic have failed to model dynamics 
of hyperinflation in standard monetary frameworks. Endogenisation of the interest rate and 
output, microfoundations to all demand functions, including real money balances demand, 
and the failure of the Laffer curve property are the successful elements to overcome the 
limiting assumptions on which the standard models were based. 
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lt is quite clear that, although the two models we presented in this thesis display some 
structural differences and deal with two separate issues, nevertheless they both have an 
empirical importance in relation to the constraints imposed by the Maastricht Treaty upon the 
macroeconomic policies of the EC countries. The upper limits set on the debt-to-GDP ratio 
and on the rate of inflation, codified in the Treaty, constrain the amount of debt which can be 
run by those countries which agreed to join the European Monetary Union and prevent them 
from resorting to inflation tax financing, which has always been an important source of 
revenues in some countries for spending financing. The discussion about debt sustainability 
and seigniorage financing policy presented in this thesis highlights the importance of these 
issues in terms of real-world macroeconomic policies. The models we presented turn out to 
be very reliable in forecasting the scenarios ahead of the countries which will not reverse 
their policies as requested by the agreed constraints. 
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